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Abstract 
Sim swop, Phishing, Zeus and SpyEye are all terms that may be found in articles concerning 
online banking fraud.  Home users are unsure of how the configuration of their computers 
affects the risk profile for conducting online banking.  Software installed by a home user on their 
computer may be malware designed to steal banking details.  Customers expect banks to 
provide a safe online banking system.  The challenge that banks have is that they cannot control 
the configuration that exists on a client operating system. 
The V-Bank system was designed to determine whether virtualisation can be used as a means to 
increase the security for online banking.  The V-Bank system uses a virtual machine that is run 
from a guest that is single purpose, read-only and fulfils the configuration requirements that the 
bank has for a client system.  The V-Bank system also utilises public and private key encryption 
for identification, authentication and authorisation mechanisms in the online banking system.   
The architecture of the V-Bank system defines online banking as an end-to-end system.  It 
approaches online banking as a system that consists of three major components.  The three 
major components is a client-side component, network and server-side environment.  The V-
Bank system gives banks the ability to provide customers with a system that is controlled from 
the client, through the network to the server. 
The V-Bank system demonstrates that virtualisation can be used to increase the security of 
online banking. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
1 Introduction 
Doing banking over the Internet has grown rapidly in the last decade. Goldstuck reported a 28% 
growth in online banking in South Africa in 2003 (Goldstuck, 2004). Organised crime has taken 
the growth in online banking as an opportunity for exploitation using techniques such as 
malware and spamming to gain access to legitimate users’ bank accounts allowing money mules 
to get access to the actual funds.  (Florêncio & Herley, 2010). 
Banks implement various controls to minimise online banking risks.  One area, over which they 
have little control, is the user’s computers.  Banks have to depend on the user’s security 
awareness and computer habits to ensure a safe end-to-end banking environment.  (Karim, et 
al., 2009). 
A number of studies have been conducted that shows that a virtual machine on the client can 
increase the security of computer systems (Wang, et al., 2010).  A virtual machine increases the 
security of the computer system by taking control from the user.  Security is also enhanced by 
isolating the online banking environment from the rest of the computing environment. 
This chapter considers the problem that the study addresses and highlights the objectives that 
needs to be met by the study.  The research methodology and research contribution are 
discussed.  The chapter concludes by defining the structure of the dissertation. 
The next section looks at the problem which the dissertation addresses. 
2 Problem Statement 
In 2010 CNet reported that the Zeus Trojan was used to steal more than $1 million from UK 
banking customer accounts (Mills, 2010).  In an Internet security report from Symantec it was 
mentioned that over $9.5 million was stolen from bank accounts using the Zeus Trojan.  In the 
same report a new Trojan called SpyEye was mentioned as the latest bank stealing Trojan 
(Symantic Enterprise Security, 2011). 
Computer users at home have full control over their own computers.  They can change the 
configuration and install software without realising the security implications for online banking.  
Users expect banks to provide them with a safe environment to conduct online banking. 
Unfortunately banks cannot control what is installed on the computers of home users and 
cannot control the configuration of these computers. 
The problems that this study attempts to resolve is that banks cannot control what users load 
on their computers, nor can they control how users’ operating systems are configured.  Many 
users are not security conscious and do not know what effect a specific piece of software has on 
the overall security of their computer.  This leads to an environment where the operating 
system of a normal desktop computer is in an unknown, potentially insecure state.  To conduct 
online banking in this unknown or insecure environment is a problem for both the banking 
customer and the bank. 
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To better understand the security problems faced by an online banking environment, a typical 
online banking session is described in the next section 
3 Overview of Online Banking 
Consider a typical online banking session: 
John needs to pay AA-Electrical for some maintenance work conducted on his garage door.  
Before John starts, he ensures that he has the banking details for AA-Electrical. 
Step 1: Pre-session start-up 
John starts his computer in his study which runs Microsoft Windows 7 (Microsoft Corporation, 
2013).  John uses an ADSL Wi-Fi router to connect to the Internet.  During the computer start-up 
the computer loads necessary device drivers so that the operating system can function properly 
with his computer hardware. 
One of the device drivers that loads is for a printer that John has.  The device driver was 
installed a few months ago after John downloaded it from the Internet. 
Once the device drivers have loaded, the operating system starts a number of software 
applications automatically.  One of them is his Anti-Virus program, whose license has expired 
and has not been updated in a while.  Another application, which assists his children to choose 
between Internet based games, also starts in the background. 
Figure 1:1 is a diagram depicting John’s computer with the various peripherals attached to the 
computer, with the operating system and the Anti-Virus program and Internet Games Assistant 
program.  
Once the computer has given John control of his mouse and keyboard John is ready to pay AA-
Electrical. 
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FIGURE 1:1 PRE-SESSION START-UP ENVIRONMENT 
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Step 2: Online banking security channel establishment 
John starts his favourite web browser and selects the online banking site from one of his saved 
bookmarks as he does not like to type the online banking address every time. 
The browser opens a connection to the Internet server at the bank’s hosting facility.  The web 
browser establishes an encrypted channel with the web server, by connecting to 
https://johnsbank.com/bank. The certificate on the web server ensures the identity of the 
server and helps to establish the encrypted channel.  John does not scrutinize the information in 
the certificate that is displayed for him on the browser. 
Figure 1:2 shows that there is now a web browser that is loaded on John’s computer.  The web 
browser established a secure channel with the bank’s web server. 
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FIGURE 1:2 JOHN'S COMPUTER ESTABLISHES SECURE CHANNEL WITH BANK 
The bank’s logo is displayed on the web browser, together with a login area where John needs to 
type in his account number with a pin and password. 
Step 3: Login authentication 
John types in his account number, his pin and his online banking password in the fields 
provided for him.  He uses the keyboard that is connected to his computer to do the actual 
typing. 
The keyboard driver captures the keys as John types and presents the keys to the operating 
system.  The Internet browser’s software interface receives the keys from the operating system 
and stores in the login screen’s elements that currently exist on the browser. 
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John clicks on the submit button to submit his login credentials to the bank.  As John clicks on 
the submit button the browser automatically encrypts the keys typed in by John and posts it to 
the bank’s online banking server.  The online banking server receives the encrypted keys, 
decrypts it and sends it to the online banking system’s authentication system. 
The online banking system’s authentication system verifies the given pin and password against 
the stored credentials for John’s account number.  The credentials match and the authentication 
system informs the web server that John has been authenticated.  The web server establishes a 
connection to the bank’s transaction server and receives general account information that is 
displayed to John on his web browser. 
Figure 1:3 shows the Authentication Service as an extra component at the bank that 
authenticates login credentials supplied by online banking customers. 
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FIGURE 1:3 THE BANK AUTHENTICATES JOHN'S CREDENTIALS. 
The bank’s web server does not have access to John’s computer and cannot determine whether 
John has a valid Anti-Virus program loaded, or that there may be potential malware installed on 
the his computer. 
Step 4: Review banking statement 
Before John pays AA-Electrical, John requests a statement of his cheque account.  John can only 
see details of his cheque account and not his wife’s cheque account, because the bank has only 
authorised John access to his own account. 
Figure 1:4 depicts the Execution Service that ensures that account information is displayed to 
online banking customers.  The execution service is authorised to only give information for the 
current logged in account and no one else. 
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FIGURE 1:4 EXECUTION SERVICE PROVIDES ACCOUNT INFORMATION 
Step 5: Pay third-party 
John creates a beneficiary for AA-Electrical.  The bank flags this type of action as a special case 
requiring additional authorisation.  The bank has a policy that states that any transaction used 
to pay a new third party needs authorisation before being approved.  This minimises the risk of 
enabling an attacker to transfer funds from the bank’s customer account without authorisation. 
After John types in the banking details of AA-Electrical, the bank sends a random authorisation 
number to John’s mobile phone via a SMS (Short Message Service).  John types the random 
authorisation number into the special field provided by the banking system on John’s browser.  
The browser posts this number back to the bank and the bank verifies the number and 
authorises the creation of the new beneficiary. 
John proceeds to pay the new beneficiary by providing the proper information such as, from 
which account, to which beneficiary, as well as other information like the amount to be paid.  As 
soon as John clicks the submit button the bank verifies that enough funds exist in John’s account 
and that he has not exceeded his daily payment limit.  The bank then creates a transaction that 
is sent to the bank’s transaction server so that the transaction can be fulfilled between John’s 
bank and AA-Electrical’s bank. 
Figure 1:5 depicts the transaction service at the bank that manages transactions, which includes 
the payment of beneficiaries. 
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FIGURE 1:5 TRANSACTION SERVICE MANAGES PAYMENTS TO BENEFICIARIES 
John requests a proof of payment from the bank and prints the proof of payment on his printer 
attached to his computer.  John faxes the proof of payment to the accounting department at AA-
Electrical to show that John submitted the payment transaction with his bank. 
Step 6: Close 
John concludes the banking session by closing the Internet browser. 
The overview described in this section gives the reader an idea of what typically happens during 
an online banking session.  The overview highlights the online banking environment that is used 
as a reference when evaluating the risks of online banking (Chapter 2) and the information 
security principles used in online banking (Chapter 3). 
There are many components working together to enable the transfer of money between 
accounts.  There are also many possible entry points to be used to compromise the online 
banking session.  John’s computer is not as secure as a bank controlled and configured 
computer. 
The focus of this research is to comprehensively detail the security risks faced by the home user 
doing online banking.  The applicability of using virtual machines to increase the security of 
online banking for home users is researched. 
4 Hypothesis 
This study hypothesises that banks can protect a home user by creating an online banking 
virtual machine application that can be configured to be in a known state.  This known state can 
be evaluated and changed to conform to an accepted security configuration.  This virtual 
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machine, with its security configuration, can be locked down so that it cannot change.  The 
virtual machine can then be given to a customer of bank as a system in which the user must do 
online banking that is more secure than his normal computer. 
The next section considers what objectives need to be achieved in this dissertation. 
5 Research Objective 
In the previous section the research hypothesis was defined.  It was stated that research is 
conducted in the use of virtualisation as a means to increase the security of online banking.   
There are existing studies that consider virtualisation for safe Internet browsing (Wang, et al., 
2010) (Cox, et al., 2006).  This dissertation uses the idea of virtualisation, but applies it 
specifically to secure online banking from a user’s computer point of view.  To determine 
whether virtualisation is a viable option for secure online banking, a proof of concept system is 
produced. 
The primary objective of the dissertation is to develop a proof of concept system using 
virtualisation that increases the security of online banking from an end-user’s perspective.  This 
proof of concept system is called the V-Bank solution. 
 
A number of secondary objectives for the solution are identified.  These objectives include: 
 Describe the security risks faced by online banking. 
 Describe information security mechanisms used in online banking environments. 
 Describe the security controls included in an online banking system. 
 Identify the security advantages provided by virtual machines. 
 Describe the architecture of an online banking system. 
 Describe the isolation features that enhance the security of the online banking session.  
The primary and secondary objectives act as drivers while conducting research and producing 
the V-Bank prototype solution. 
The objectives of the study help us to define the deliverables of the study.  The contribution of 
the research is defined next. 
6 Research Contribution 
It was mentioned in the research objective that a number of existing studies consider 
virtualisation as a solution that enables safe Internet browsing (Cox, et al., 2006) (Wang, et al., 
2010). 
Primary Objective: 
Develop a proof of concept system using 
virtualisation to increase the security of online 
banking from an end-user’s perspective 
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The isolation properties of virtual machines are also used by England and Manferdelli to 
describe a model where a virtual machine is used to secure a host operating system (England & 
Manferdelli, 2006).  Rowan defined a virtual machine that a user can use at any time for secure 
computing using a USB memory stick (Rowan, 2008).  
Cox, et al. and Wang, et al. describe systems that use virtual machines for Internet browsing.  
The research by England and Manferdelli and Rowan describes general secure computing 
environments not just for Internet browsing or online banking.  
The research in this dissertation considers the above mentioned studies, but applies it 
specifically for a typical home user that conducts online banking.  It also includes not just the 
client-side virtual machine, but considers the network and server-side environment as part of 
the solution. 
To achieve the objectives of the research, a specific research methodology was followed, which 
is defined in the next section. 
7 Research Methodology 
The methodology for the research follows the approach as described by Olivier (Olivier, 2009).  
A literature survey is conducted, concentrating specifically on topics regarding security in 
online banking, online banking risks, virtualisation and the effect of existing research for online 
banking. 
A list of design requirements for the prototype is established during the literature survey. An 
architectural framework for the prototype is defined that fulfils the design requirements.  From 
the framework, the prototype is built and implemented and the prototype is evaluated against 
the stated hypothesis. 
8 Structure of Dissertation 
This dissertation is structured to support the research methodology shown in Figure 1:6.  The 
dissertation has two main parts.  The first, which is described at the top of Figure 1:6 is the 
literature survey.  Chapters two to five form part of the literature survey.   
The output of the literature survey is a list of design requirements for an online banking system. 
The next major area in the dissertation revolves around the prototype.  This includes chapters 
six to eight.  In Figure 1:6, these chapters are marked in a square called: “Prototype design and 
implementation” 
The dissertation ends with the conclusions and possible further research. 
The last chapter in the dissertation is the bibliography. 
Each of the chapters is discussed. 
In chapter 1 the problem and the objectives of the research are defined.  The hypothesis is 
defined and the reader is introduced to a typical online banking session 
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Chapter 2 discusses the information security risks that exist while conducting online banking.  
The chapter identifies the risks.  To address a risk, a design requirement is formulated which 
must be met by an online banking system to make it a safer environment.  A minimum set of 
design requirements is formulated from the existing controls that banks implement. 
In chapter 3 the information security concepts in online banking are described.  The chapter 
looks at information security concepts that apply to online banking.  It includes the controls 
used by banks to implement these security concepts.  The controls are evaluated and the 
existing set of design requirements is amended with the required controls. 
Chapter 4 considers virtual machines.  The different types of virtual machines are identified and 
describe the differences between virtual machines typically used on servers and desktops.  The 
chapter also identifies some of the virtualisation options that exist.  The chapter concludes with 
the security aspects that must be considered when implementing or designing for virtual 
machines.  These considerations are defined as requirements that are added to the already 
established list of design requirements. 
Some of the research that exists which address the security of Internet browsing by using 
virtualization are discussed in chapter 5.  The chapter looks at a study that created a system 
called the “Tahoma” system.  The chapter also looks at “SafeFox: A lightweight virtual browsing 
environment”, “The secure virtual computer on your keychain” and “A Novel Security Scheme 
for Online Banking Based on Virtual Machine”.  The solutions described by these studies are 
evaluated against the design requirements that were created in chapters two to four.  The 
existing design requirements are amended to include applicable design principles from the 
existing studies. 
Chapter 6 establishes a framework architecture against which the V-Bank prototype is built.  
The chapter revisits the problem statement and discusses the approach that was taken to define 
the architecture.  The chapter discusses the detail of each architectural component, establishing 
the link between the component and the design requirements that were the result of chapters 
two to five. 
In chapter 7 the implementation of the framework architecture is described.  The chapter takes 
each component that was defined in chapter 6 and see how it is implemented to establish the V-
Bank prototype. 
Chapter 8 describes and evaluates the prototype as it is implemented.  The chapter describes 
how the prototype works and highlights the security features. The system is then evaluated 
against the design requirements that were defined in chapters two to five.  The chapter then 
highlights the areas of the solution where it did not fulfil specific design requirements. 
Chapter 9 ends with a review of the problem statement, review the objectives and look at the 
solution that was described.  It lists areas where further research may be required. 
Chapter 10 contains the bibliography of references used in the dissertation. 
The dissertation ends with an appendix that describes implementation steps and settings that 
are used in creating the V-Bank prototype. 
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FIGURE 1:6 CHAPTER LAYOUT 
Before the beginning of each chapter Figure 1:6 is repeated, with the current chapter 
highlighted, so that the reader gets a quick overview where in the structure of the dissertation 
the chapter exists. 
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Chapter 2: RISKS INHERENT TO ONLINE BANKING 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter an overview of online banking was described.  A number of areas 
vulnerable to attacks exist in the online banking process. 
This chapter evaluates the information technology risks associated with online banking by 
approaching it from the view point of possible attack vectors.  During the risk investigation, a 
list of requirements is identified for designing a secure online banking system. 
The chapter is structured as follows.  The chapter first defines what online banking fraud is.  It 
then describes some of the terms and concepts that are used during the investigation of attack 
vectors.  Once the terms and concepts have been defined, a number of attack vector categories 
are identified.  Each attack vector category is described and a design requirement to minimise 
the effect of the attack vector is identified.  After all the attack vectors have been described the 
list of attack vectors identified is consolidated to be used as design requirements for a secure 
online banking system. 
2 Online Banking Fraud 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines fraud as the intentional perversion of truth in order to 
induce someone to part with something of value (Merriam Webster, 2012). 
Akopyan and Yelyakov (2009) define cybercrime as: “A process, in which a malefactor uses a 
computer to gain unauthorized access to other computers or control computer systems with the 
aim of gaining some benefit”. 
This research defines online banking fraud as a type of cybercrime, but where the malefactor 
specifically wants to gain unauthorised access to a banking customer’s online banking account 
to either gain knowledge of the financial status, or to transfer funds from the bank account.  
Online banking fraudsters use various methods to gain access to the customer’s bank account.  
These methods are called attack vectors (TechTarget, 2012).  Hansman and Hunt (2005) define 
an attack vector as:  The method by which an attack reaches its target. 
3 Terms and concepts 
In Chapter 2:4 the terms for the different attack vectors are described.  In this section of the 
research certain concepts allow the reader to better understand the impact and the specific 
attack vector.  For these reasons this section evaluates the following concepts and terms, but in 
context of an online banking session: 
 A computer with operating system 
 Banking system environment 
 Rootkits 
 Keyloggers 
 Command-and-control servers 
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 Money mules. 
 Man-in-the-browser attacks 
 Man-in-the-middle attacks 
 Bot nets 
3.1 A computer with operating system 
John makes use of his computer at home to open up a web browser and then establishes a 
connection to the Bank’s online banking website.  When John uses his computer in this way, 
different components of the computer are involved. 
Figure 2:1 shows the layers of the computer operating system.  The computer consists of 
primarily two layers.  These layers are known as user mode and kernel mode (Russinovich & 
Solomon, 2005). 
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FIGURE 2:1 OPERATING SYSTEM COMPONENTS. 
 
3.1.1 User mode and kernel mode 
Processors like the Intel x86 or x64 family of processors has four privilege rings, numbered zero 
to three.  The privilege levels of the rings provide protection for system code and data to be 
overwritten either inadvertently or maliciously (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
An operating system like Windows XP (Microsoft, 2013) uses ring zero and ring three.  Code 
executed in ring zero is also called kernel mode code and code executed in ring 3 is called user 
mode code (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
3.1.2 Kernel mode 
The kernel mode components include the following: 
 The Windows executive contains the base operating services, which includes services 
like memory management, process and thread management, security and I/O. 
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 The kernel handles multi-processor synchronisation, interrupt and exception 
management and thread scheduling 
 The device drivers translate user I/O calls into device specific I/O, as well as file system 
and network drivers.  
 The hardware abstraction layer abstracts the executive, kernel and device drivers from 
platform-specific hardware. 
 Windowing and graphics are responsible for the drawing and display of windows. 
Devices connect to the computer through specific hardware interfaces.  In the Kernel of the 
operating system, device drivers accepts and make connections to the operating system’s Input 
\ Output System (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
From a security perspective any code that executes in kernel mode has full access to system 
space memory and can bypass Windows security to access objects (Russinovich & Solomon, 
2005).  This implies that malicious code that executes in kernel mode can gain access to system 
wide objects and memory.  This type of malicious code is also known as rootkits.  See Chapter 
2:3.3 for a description of rootkits. 
3.1.3 User mode 
There are four types of user mode processes.  They are (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005): 
 System support processes are processes that perform Windows processes, but always 
start with the operating system.  They include the logon process and the session 
manager. 
 Windows service processes are logon independent processes that can run whether or 
not the user logs onto the computer or not.  This includes processes such as the spooler 
service and the task scheduler service. 
 User applications are applications that automatically start when a user logs on and 
manually executes the application.  This includes applications such as word processors 
or web browsers. 
 Windows XP (Microsoft, 2013) allows different system applications from executing in 
the operating system.  This includes Windows 32bit applications, Windows 64bit 
applications, MS-DOS applications, Windows 3.1 16bit applications, OS/2 and Posix 
applications.  Support for these applications is handled by the environment 
subsystems. 
User mode applications each have their own virtual memory address space and execution 
environment.  One application cannot access the memory and objects belonging to another 
process running in user mode (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
Applications that interact with the hardware, such as the file system, generate calls to 
subsystem DLLs, which in turn access kernel mode objects in the Windows executive that call 
device driver specific libraries, which in turn access the hardware via the hardware abstraction 
layer (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
Even though user applications are in general protected from each other, malicious applications 
can still influence other applications through the security level of the executing user.  Sagiroglu 
 Page 23 of 207 
 
 Risks Inherent To Online Banking 
& Canbek (2009) demonstrate how various user mode components can be affected to allow a 
keylogger from reading keystrokes on the operating system. 
3.1.4 Compromised operating systems 
A compromised operating system may have various components embedded into the operating 
system that change the expected behaviour of the system. 
Figure 2:2 refers to the architecture under discussion, but shows John’s computer with two 
malware items.  The two malware items on the computer is a malicious browser plugin and a 
keylogger.  The malicious browser plugin is a plugin installed in the web browser, which 
executes in user mode.  The keylogger was part of a device driver and executes in kernel mode. 
Both items were installed on John’s computer while John updated a printer driver on his 
computer using a driver John downloaded and installed from the Internet.  The possible effects 
that these items may cause, are John’s online banking password and pin can be intercepted by 
the keylogger.  Another effect is that false information about his banking status can be displayed 
by the browser because of the browser plugin. 
Even though the malicious browser plugin only has access to the memory and objects belonging 
to the browser process, it is still enough to display false information. 
The keylogger that is installed in kernel space, as part of a device driver has full access to the 
system memory and can easily record, store and transmit keystrokes entered from the 
keyboard. 
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FIGURE 2:2 COMPROMISED OPERATING SYSTEM 
3.2 Banking system environment 
Four different functionalities can exist in a banking system.  These functionalities can be 
implemented as four distinct services (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
1. Interface Server 
2. Authentication Server 
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3. Transaction Server 
4. Mainframe 
In some banking environments the Mainframe is replaced with an Execution Server.   
Figure 2:3 depicts the various components described by Claessens, et al. (2002).  It shows the 
Interface Server on the left that accepts connections from customers.  To the right of the 
Interface Server is the Authentication Server whose function it is to authenticate users.  The 
transaction server queues transactions to be executed on the mainframe of the execution server. 
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FIGURE 2:3 BANKING SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT  
The environment has now been described.  Before describing the attack vectors, the rest of the 
terms and concepts used in the attack vectors are now described. 
3.3 Rootkits 
A rootkit is a program that specialises in hiding itself or other malware from a system 
administrator.  The program’s main purpose is to perform certain functions that cannot easily 
be detected or undone (Microsoft, 2011). 
An example of a known rootkit is Win32/Rustock (Microsoft, 2011).  This rootkit is a family of 
Trojans that open backdoors on computers, but used to specifically distribute spam email 
(Microsoft, 2011). 
If John’s computer was infected with a rootkit that acted like the Zeus Trojan then it would be 
very difficult for an anti-virus program to detect the rootkit.  In this example John may realise a 
problem with his bank account only after he received a statement from the bank, or he tried to 
pay another beneficiary and no funds were available. 
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3.4 Keyloggers 
A keylogger is a piece of software, either in the form of a worm or Trojan, or it can be a piece of 
hardware.  The job of a keylogger is to capture keystrokes from the computer keyboard and 
then depending on the implementation of the keylogger store or send this information on to a 
third party. (Sagiroglu & Canbek, 2009) 
Keyloggers are either hardware or software based (Grebennikov, 2011). 
Hardware keyloggers are small electronic devices designed to capture the data in between the 
keyboard device and the I/O port.   Software keyloggers track systems that collect keystroke 
data within the target operating system, store them on disk or in remote locations, and send 
them to the attacker who installed the keylogger. (Sagiroglu & Canbek, 2009). 
Figure 2:2 showed John’s computer that had a keylogger installed.  The keylogger was installed 
when John installed a printer driver that he downloaded from the Internet.  The keylogger logs 
his keystrokes and stores his login details for his online banking profile. 
3.5 Command-and-control servers 
A command-and-control server operates in the manner of an army general.  This general can 
receive information and provide instructions to its troops.  The troops can be pieces of Malware 
like worms or Trojans.  These troops are also called botnets (Feily, et al., 2009). 
The command-and-control server can receive data from malware regarding banking pins and 
passwords.  It can also issue information to the malware to inject information into a banking 
session, such as banking details about third-parties to whom payments can be made to 
(Sherstobitoff, 2011). 
The command-and-control software can also be installed on any computer on the Internet that 
has vulnerabilities on it that enables the attacker to open a backdoor into the system.  It can 
then utilise different techniques to control the different botnets, like internet relay chat (IRC), 
web-based, peer-to-peer (P2P) and domain naming server (DNS) services (Ianelli & Hackworth, 
2005) 
The captured banking information on a command-and-control server can also be used by people 
to try and gain access to customer banking details (Sherstobitoff, 2011). 
Figure 2:4 depicts a scenario where online banking information gets transferred to and from a 
command and control server.  In one instance the account number and pin information for the 
online banking profile is sent to the command and control server.  In another instance the 
command and control server sends a command to an infected computer with instructions to pay 
another person instead of the intended recipient. 
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FIGURE 2:4 COMMAND AND CONTROL INFORMATION. 
3.6 Money mules 
To enable the successful transfer of money from a compromised bank account to the attacker’s 
bank account, money mules are used.  When a person’s online bank account gets compromised 
the attacker transfers money from the compromised bank account into a mule’s bank account.  
The mule in turn transfers the money into a bank account owned by the attacker (Florêncio & 
Herley, 2010). 
Banks can trace the transfer of money between various accounts.  If an attacker should transfer 
money directly from a compromised account into the attacker’s own account, then the bank 
could trace the transaction and the authorities could apprehend the attacker.  Attackers employ 
mules which act as middle men.  Money gets transferred from a compromised account into a 
mule’s account.  The mule transfers the money to a foreign account, which is not traceable 
(Florêncio & Herley, 2010). 
Florêncio & Herley (2010) argues that it is ironic that the person losing money most of the time, 
is not the bank or the compromised bank account, but the money mule itself. 
3.7 Man-in-the-browser 
Figure 2:2 depicts a computer with a browser plugin that affects the functionality of the Internet 
browser.  The browser plugin runs as part of the Internet browser that executes in user space.  
The browser plugin is an example of one of the components that comprises the Zeus Trojan 
(Sherstobitoff, 2011). 
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Kernel based keyloggers typically gets installed as part of a Trojan or rootkit.  Keyloggers have 
the ability to capture any input from keyboards (Sagiroglu & Canbek, 2009).  This allows them 
to capture banking details as a user types it into the browser when he visits the banking website 
and then visit the web site independently and use the customers banking details to gain access 
to the customer’s funds. 
User space malware installed in the browser can create, what is called, a Man-In-The-Browser 
attack.  The browser plugin effectively intercepts any code to the web browser and makes 
changes to it, making the customer believe he sees something, while actually doing something 
else (Gühring, 2006). 
Example: The Zeus Trojan (which is a man-in-the-browser type of malware, also have a 
keylogger) may get installed onto the customer’s computer, through a zero day, or existing 
vulnerability of the customer’s browser.  Once Zeus has been installed, it contacts a command 
and control server and retrieves a configuration file.  The configuration file tells Zeus to stay 
dormant until the customer visits a specific banking web site.  Some variants of the Zeus Trojan 
acts in the following way (Sherstobitoff, 2011): 
1. The user logs into his bank 
2. The login information is captured and sent to a command and control server 
3. It then captures the account balance and sends it to the command and control server 
4. It waits until the user goes to an electronic fund transfer page 
5. It waits for the user to click on the “Submit” button to do an electronic fund transfer 
6. The malware captures the intended amount 
7. It freezes the session and does not allow the transaction to go to the banking server 
8. Injects a fake page, making the user thinks the page is taking longer to load than normal 
9. Makes a call to the Command and Control server and finds information about an 
appropriate mule. 
10. It injects the mule’s account detail and an appropriate amount into the transaction 
11. It releases the session allowing the modified transaction to be sent to the online server 
12. It injects a fake balance into the Account Balances and Account Summary pages 
3.8 Man-in-the-middle attacks 
A Man-in-the-middle attack is very similar to the Man-in-the-browser, except that the 
interception of the banking session does not take place on the customer’s computer, but on an 
Internet facing server that makes the connection on behalf of the customer (Shirey, 2000). 
The server that makes the connection on behalf of the customer’s computer to the banking web 
site is also referred to as a proxy for the customer’s computer. 
The server that makes the connection is now “in the middle” of the customer and the bank.  This 
server makes it seem to the customer as if the customer computer is connected to the actual 
banking web site.  In reality the customer’s computer talks to this server, thinking it is 
connected to the bank and the server then connects to the bank, using information gathered 
from the connecting customer computer. 
This type of attack is dependent on the fact that the server disguises itself and makes it look and 
seem like the banking web site.  The bank’s web site on the other hand assumes the connections 
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from the server are actually from the legitimate banking customer.  This assumption from the 
banking web site is made because the server can get authentication details from the customer’s 
computer, because the customer’s computer is giving it to the server. 
3.9 Bot nets 
Attacks using unknowingly compromised computers, employed for malicious internet attacks, 
using an extensive array of these compromised systems are known as a bot net, or robotic 
network. (Carrow, 2007) 
Figure 2:5 depicts a network of infected systems that work together as an array to launch an 
attack on a computer. 
These attacks make use of unknowingly compromised users’ computers or corporate resources. 
These infected systems act as conduits for malevolent attacks redirected against individual 
users, websites or network domains. (Carrow, 2007) 
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FIGURE 2:5 BOT NET ATTACK 
The main purpose of a botnet is to steal information about cards or other bank details to gain 
access to money in bank accounts. (Akopyan & Yelyakov, 2007) 
 
4 Attack Vectors 
To understand possible attacks that can take place during online banking, is it necessary to 
understand the online banking system and the various components involved.  This study 
evaluates online banking from a perspective of a home computer belonging to a customer.  The 
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study excludes the attack vectors faced by customers while doing online banking from mobile 
devices. 
This chapter assigns a section for each attack vector.  While investigating the specific attack 
vector, the attack target is described.  The attack targets are limited to the areas derived from 
the case study described in chapter 1 and defined by Hutchinson and Warren (2003).  They are 
the following and are displayed in Figure 2:6 (Hutchinson & Warren, 2003). 
1. A customer operating environment on the left 
2. The network and Internet environment at the bottom 
3. The banking system environment on the right 
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FIGURE 2:6 AREAS IN AN ONLINE BANKING SESSION. 
Each of these areas is called an “environment”. They consist of various components that make it 
possible for the online banking session to be established. (Russinovich & Solomon, 2005) 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) define the following categories of attack vectors: 
1. Viruses. 
2. Worms. 
3. Trojans. 
4. Buffer overflows. 
5. Denial of service attacks 
6. Network attacks. 
7. Physical attacks. 
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8. Password attacks. 
9. Information gathering attacks. 
4.1 Viruses 
A virus is type of malware that reproduces and attaches itself to a file.  Viruses require human 
interaction to spread. Viruses are not inherently programmed to spread to other hosts, instead 
they only spread to another computer through the interaction of a human. When a person 
copies or emails an infected file to another computer, and the user of the other computer opens 
or executes the file, only then does the virus infect that computer (Shirey, 2000). 
Viruses have the ability to damage computer files, making the computer inoperable. 
Viruses can attack any computer system.  This means that a virus can attack both the customer 
operating environment and the banking system environment. 
Six months earlier John’s computer became infected with Win32.Neshta.a virus (ESET, 2006).  
The virus caused his web browser to become infected.  This in turn caused his computer to start 
malfunctioning while trying to connect to the Internet and his online banking system.  John had 
to download and install a new Internet browser after he cleaned his computer using his anti-
virus program. 
The infection of the computer virus caused John’s computer to malfunction and disallow him 
access to online baking.  If the virus infected the banking system environment then it may have 
caused the whole banking system to stop functioning.  This would not only have affected John, 
but all online banking customers. 
A virus is a type of malware, and the online banking system should minimise the chances of 
malware getting installed into the operating system. 
 
It is critical that online banking systems, both the client and the server be protected from 
viruses. 
 
Design Requirements 
 
2. The online banking system should be protected from 
viruses, by making the changing of files on the computer 
impossible. 
Design Requirements 
 
1. An online banking system should minimise the chances of 
malware getting installed into the operating system at the 
client and allowing fraudsters to change the online banking 
session 
 Page 31 of 207 
 
 Risks Inherent To Online Banking 
4.2 Worms 
Worms are programs that replicate themselves, but without using infected files (Hansman & 
Hunt, 2005).  It is common for worms to propagate through network services on computers or 
through email (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
Worms may utilise email, existing network connections, chat applications and even Internet 
servers to spread.  It makes use of these mechanisms through some kind of vulnerability or 
implicit design flaw. 
A worm is also a standalone program and does not require another file to exist (Symantec, 
2009).   
Apart from the worm’s ability to spread itself and run as a standalone program, worms usually 
cause some type of damage by executing its “payload”.  The payload may be to deface a web site, 
open a backdoor into the computer or steal personal information from the infected host.  The 
Win32/Conficker.e.dll (Microsoft, 2011) worm terminates many anti-virus programs, it blocks 
access to some web sites that helps to clean your computer from viruses and it distributes and 
receives commands through a built in peer-to-peer (P2P) network (Microsoft, 2011). 
If John’s computer became infected with a worm, it may be possible for a hacker to use the 
worm to steal his online banking login details. 
Worms can target both the customer operating environment and the banking system 
environment.  Since worms can effectively run any payload on an online banking system, the 
online banking system should be protected from worms.  Both the customer operating 
environment and the banking system environment should be protected from worms. 
 
4.3 Trojans 
A Trojan is a piece of malware, but it is disguised as something else.  It may be defined as a 
computer program that appears to have a useful function, but also has a hidden and potentially 
malicious function that evades security mechanisms, sometimes by exploiting legitimate      
authorizations of a system entity that invokes the program. (Shirey, 2000) 
A Trojan may for example be seem to be a friendly game, or screensaver, freely available on the 
Internet, that when downloaded, starts monitoring keystrokes. (Danchev, 2005) 
When John’s children installed a gaming helper program, the helper program may have been a 
Trojan.  If the Trojan was the Zeus Trojan (Symantec, 2010), then it would have been possible 
Design Requirements 
 
3. An online banking system should be protected from 
worms, minimising the chances that a worm can cause 
backdoors into the client computer to steal vital banking 
details. 
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for attackers to gain access to John’s bank account and transfer money from his account to a n 
attacker’s account. 
The Zeus Trojan (which is a man-in-the-browser type of malware, also have a keylogger) may 
get installed onto the customer’s computer, through a zero day, or existing vulnerability of the 
customer’s browser.  Once Zeus has been installed, it contacts a command and control server 
and retrieves a configuration file.  The configuration file tells Zeus to stay dormant until the 
customer visits a specific banking web site.  Some variants of the Zeus Trojan acts in the 
following way (Sherstobitoff, 2011): 
1. The user logs into his bank 
2. The login information is captured and sent to a command and control server 
3. It then captures the account balance and sends it to the command and control server 
4. It waits until the users goes to an electronic fund transfer page 
5. It waits for the user to click on the “Submit” button to do an electronic fund transfer 
6. The malware captures the intended amount 
7. It freezes the session and does not allow the transaction to go to the banking server 
8. Injects a fake page, making the user thinks the page is taking longer to load than normal 
9. Makes a call to the Command and Control server and finds information about an 
appropriate mule. 
10. It injects the mule’s account detail and an appropriate amount into the transaction 
11. It releases the session allowing the modified transaction to be sent to the online server 
12. It injects a fake balance into the Account Balances and Account Summary pages 
In the example where John conducts online banking, the Zeus Trojan allows an attacker to steal 
money from his bank account into another person’s account. 
Trojans can cause harm in both client operating environment and the banking system 
environment.  Users of a system can download and install Trojans on their home computers 
without realising the risk or effect the Trojan may have on their online banking sessions.  An 
online banking system should be protected from Trojans. 
 
 
4.4 Buffer overflows 
A buffer overflow attack gains control, or crashes another process, by overflowing the buffer of 
the other process (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
The SQL Slammer Worm, or W32.SQLExp.Worm (Symantec Corporation, 2013), is a famous 
worm that replicates itself by using a buffer overflow vulnerability that existed in Microsoft SQL 
Design Requirements 
 
4. An online banking system should be protected from 
Trojans. Users should not be allowed to download and 
install anything beyond what is already in the system. 
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Server 2000.  The worm spreads itself by connecting to UDP port 1434.  It overflows the buffer 
of the SQL Server Resolution Service, effectively allowing the worm’s code to execute in the 
security context of the SQL Server service.  It then randomly generated IP addresses and tried to 
spread itself to these IP addresses on port 1434 (Symantec Corporation, 2013). 
The SQL Slammer Worm caused widespread network performance degradation.  It affected 
ATM and voice over IP networks (Symantec, 2003). 
Buffer overflow attacks are one of the oldest and most pervasive attack techniques, exploiting 
vulnerabilities that exist in systems (Piromsopa & Enbody, 2006).  After the SQL Slammer Worm 
was detected, Microsoft had to write software patches to fix the vulnerability that existed in SQL 
Server 2000.   
Buffer overflow attacks can target a system using the internet and networking environment, but 
it can also attack directly using a cleverly placed file on the customer operating environment 
(Piromsopa & Enbody, 2006). 
In an online banking scenario the client side operating environment needs to be protected from 
the internet and networking environment.  Network connections to the client side operating 
environment should only occur to and from the banking system environment.  Users should also 
be prevented to accidentally change the files in the customer operating environment that may 
cause a buffer overflow attack. 
 
 
4.5 Denial of service attacks 
A denial of service (DoS) attack cripples a network service by flooding the service with many 
requests.  The service is usually Internet based, providing some type of service to Internet 
clients.  The flooding can be from either a single source or from multiple sources.  In the case 
where the flooding originates from multiple sources the denial of service attack is known as a 
distributed denial of service (DDoS) (Hussain, et al., 2003) 
Denial of service attacks originate on the network and can affect a destination network, or 
service on a network.  In an online banking session the areas that may be affected by a DoS 
attack are the internet and networking environment and the banking system environment. 
In a banking environment a denial of service attack can be targeted at the DNS system (Domain 
Naming System), which may cause customer computers from not resolving the IP address of the 
bank web site, or the banking web server itself.  On August 16 2012 AT&T suffered an outage 
Design Requirements 
 
5. An online banking system should be protected from buffer 
overflow attacks, by controlling access to clients from the 
network and not allowing clients to change the files in the 
customer operating environment. 
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from a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against their DNS servers.  This caused some 
of their customers to experience intermittent disruptions on their services (Williams, 2012) 
An attack on the banking web server can be achieved by keeping a web site so busy servicing 
authentication requests, that the system does not get enough time servicing legitimate banking 
customers.  Certain system vulnerabilities may also allow certain buffers on the server to 
overflow, which can sometimes cause the system to crash, effectively stopping the whole 
system.  On April 20 2012 the official Formula 1 web site was taken down through a DDoS 
attack from the hacker collective called “Anonymous” in response to violent protests in Bahrain 
(Wert, 2012) 
 
 
4.6 Network attacks. 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) defines a network attack as an attack that focusses on attacking a 
network of the users on the network.  This is accomplished through the manipulation of 
network protocols.  According to Hansman and Hunt’s taxonomy, even if the attack is a DDoS 
attack, but it floods the network, then the attack should be classified as a network attack. 
Hansman and Hunt also classify the following examples as network attacks.  They include 
(Hansman & Hunt, 2005): 
 Spoofing 
 Session hijacking 
 Web application attacks, like cross site scripting 
 Database attacks 
 Hidden field manipulation 
 DNS Contamination 
Network attacks use the network to attack the client operating environment.  The client 
operating environment should not allow connections to the client’s computer from fraudsters. 
 
Design Requirements 
 
7. An online banking system should not allow connections to 
the client’s computer from fraudsters. 
 
Design Requirements 
 
6. An online banking system should discard connections 
from systems trying a Denial of Service attack. 
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Each of these network attacks is now described. 
4.6.1 Spoofing 
Spoofing is defined as the act of an unauthorised entity gaining access to a system by posing as 
an authorised entity (Shirey, 2000).  In an online banking environment spoofed web sites pose a 
real threat to online banking customers. 
Spoofed web sites are web sites that look and feel the same as the bank’s actual web site. It 
usually exists inside another website, which in itself may have been compromised. 
The reason for a spoofed web site is to build web pages, that look and feel exactly like the real 
web site.  Attackers can use a spoofed web site to capture information from users, who thinks, 
they are connected to the real web site.  If the spoofed web site is a bank’s web site then the 
spoofed web site can steal a user’s online banking details (Standard Bank, 2005). 
Figure 2:7 is an example of a malicious spoofed web site that was loaded while clicking on a 
phishing e-mail.  The site may seem legitimate, but the address does not belong to the real bank. 
 
FIGURE 2:7 EXAMPLE OF SPOOFED INTERNET BANKING WEB SITE 
 
 
Design Requirements 
 
8. An online banking environment should minimise the 
chances of the Internet browser to go to a spoofed 
malicious banking web site. 
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4.6.2 Session hijacking 
Session hijacking is a term that describes an attack where an attacker takes control away 
between two parties that exchange information over a network.  In an online banking 
environment it is possible for an attacker to hijack the SSL session established by a client and 
server, allowing the attacker access to the online banking session for the client (Cheng, et al., 
2010). 
The man-in-the-middle attack and man-in-the-browser attack are examples where the session 
between a banking customer and the online banking system gets hijacked and manipulated.  
Man-in-the-middle and man-in-the-browser attacks were described in Chapter 2:3.7 and 
Chapter 2:3.7. 
An online banking system should be protected from man-in-the-middle and man-in-the-
browser attacks.  The first requirement that minimises this risk is for the online banking system 
to not allow communication to any system outside the online banking system. 
 
The second thing that can be done to minimise the chances of a man-in-the-browser attack is to 
disallow the internet browser used in an online banking session from changing. 
 
 
4.6.3 Cross site scripting 
Cross Site Request Forgery, or “Session Riding”, allows an attacker to use an existing secure 
session established from the customer’s web browser, to a secure site, but from another web 
site, which may be opened from within the same web browser, but in another tab (Jovanovic, et 
al., 2006). 
This type of attack happens without the customer knowing about it. The reason why this type of 
attack is possible is because a session with the web server is stateless.  This means that the 
HTTP protocol employed to establish the session is unable to distinguish a series of requests to 
Design Requirements 
 
10. It should not be possible to modify the Internet browser used 
by an online banking system. 
Design Requirements 
 
9. An online banking system should not allow communication to 
any system except the online banking system. 
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a particular customer.  The web server employs techniques such as cookies or URL re-writing to 
distinguish specific sessions. (Jovanovic, et al., 2006) 
These techniques unfortunately enjoy little protection and can easily be hijacked by a script or 
code executed from a different web site inside the same web browser. 
Example (Jovanovic, et al., 2006): 
1.) A user logs into an Internet Banking web site, using secure credentials 
2.) The web server stores the successful authentication in a session variable that identifies 
the user as having correctly authenticated. 
3.) Every time the web site now gets a request from the user’s web browser, it looks at the 
session ID and determines that the user already authenticated 
4.) The user temporarily gets distracted and does not log off from the Internet Banking web 
site, meaning the session is still authenticated according to the server. 
5.) The user opens another tab in the web browser and goes to a blogging web site.  On the 
blogging web site the user notices an interesting link and clicks on it. 
6.) The link in HTML terms looks something like this: 
< href=’www.bigbank.com/transfer.php?amount=10000?to=7777’>Click 
here</a> for something really interesting 
7.) The link effectively executes a command to transfer money into a bank account on the 
Internet Banking web site. 
8.) The Internet Banking web site accepts the request coming from the customer’s web 
browser, because the user is already logged in the session between the browser and the 
web server is already authenticated. 
The above example is very simplistic and alert people may notice the URL as it is written into 
the address bar of the web browser.  The same, however, can be accomplished by hiding the 
action inside a JavaScript application that may automatically start when the user navigates to 
the page. 
 
 
Design Requirements 
 
11. Online banking systems should not allow the Internet 
Browser from opening multiple pages and the transaction 
component in an online banking system should re-
authenticate the user, before committing important 
transactions. 
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4.6.4 Database attacks 
Information that is entered or displayed on a banking system is entered and retrieved from a 
database.  The entering and retrieval of information is handled using an industry standard 
query language called “structured query language” (SQL). 
If a web site does not filter the input provided by a customer, then it is possible for the input to 
transform the intended SQL command to retrieve or enter information into something else. 
An example of what SQL injection may look like is as follows (Friedl, 2007): 
When a user log in, there may be a field where the user should enter his username and another 
field where the user must enter his password.  From these two fields the system can then 
construct a query that searches the database for a record with the corresponding username and 
password.  The SQL code for such a query may look as follow. 
Select * from users where username = ‘John’ and password = ‘p@ssw0rd’ 
If any rows were found, then the system may know that the username and password entered 
were correct.  However, if the system does not filter the input from the user, the user can enter 
the following into the username field, and anything else into the password field. 
“John--“ 
The SQL query using the above username now looks like: 
Select * from users where username = ‘John’--and password = 
‘Gobbledygook’ 
The single quotation mark in SQL, as used around the words John and Gobbledygook in the 
above example, is the character that includes text type fields and the “--“ is the SQL syntax for a 
comment in the code.  Anything following the “--“ is interpreted as a comment and is ignored.  
The resultant SQL command effectively searches for any record, where the username is “John” 
and ignores the password field.  An attacker can now gain access to John’s information without 
knowing the password for John. 
The above example is a very simple form of SQL injection, more sophisticated SQL injection 
commands can even allow an attacker to execute system-level commands on the database 
server, which may give the attacker administrative permissions or even return all usernames 
and passwords stored on the system (Litchfield, et al., 2005).   
 
 
Design Requirements 
 
12. An online banking system should evaluate any input and allow 
only approved syntax in input fields. 
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4.6.5 Hidden field manipulation 
Web developers sometimes require content from a different web site to be displayed in their 
own web site.  This content may be advertisements, or news items.  The developer uses a 
component called an Inline Frame (IFrame) to display the content from the remote web server 
on the current web site. 
In the case where the IFrame on a web-site references an advertisement on a different web site, 
the attacker will target the web site with the advertisement on.  If this web site is compromised 
the attacker embeds script code into the advertisement then when the user clicks on the 
advertisement the code will execute on the client computer, which may download and install 
malware. 
Figure 2:8 depicts a banking web site with an advertisement.  The advertisement references 
another web site, which is compromised.  The script downloads and installs malware through a 
possible vulnerability in the web browser. 
Script < Download malware from 
site x >
Infected 
System
Download Malware
Banking Home Page
Advertisement IFrame
1. User clicks on Advertisement 2. Script executes from compromised 
advertisement site
3. Script downloads malware onto 
customer computer
 
FIGURE 2:8 IFRAME VULNERABILITY EXAMPLE 
 
Design Requirements 
 
13. The online banking system should not contain any IFrames, nor 
should it reference code from any site except its own. 
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4.6.6 DNS Contamination 
A man-in-the-middle attack is usually initiated via some type of phishing attack.  This means the 
user may receive an e-mail that seems as if it is from his\her bank, with a hyperlink to the 
“supposed” banking web site.  This hyperlink however is actually a link to the server in the 
middle of the man-in-the-middle attack. 
There is however also another way for the user’s computer to go to a spoofed web site, even 
though the user typed in the correct banking URL.  This is through DNS Contamination (ACM US 
Public Policy Council, 2012). 
DNS (Domain Naming Services) is the service on the Internet that translates names to IP 
addresses.  Communication on the Internet is done by connections made to and from various IP 
addresses.  IP addresses are difficult to remember and may change.  DNS can take a friendly 
name, such as www.bank.com and translate that to the actual IP address of the banking servers 
(Shirey, 2000). 
Computers and other DNS servers cache frequently used IP address mappings to ensure fast 
name resolution. 
DNS contamination is the ability of a malicious person or program to change the cached 
information of these names to IP address mappings.  This will redirect a web browser to a 
spoofed web site, even if the customer typed in the correct banking address (ACM US Public 
Policy Council, 2012). 
In an online banking environment the client operating environment should only connect to the 
online banking system.  Name resolution should not affect the connection of the online banking 
client. 
 
An online banking client should only be able to connect to the actual online banking server.  The 
online banking server should verify connections to ensure it accepts only connections from 
approved clients. 
 
Design Requirements 
 
15. An online banking system should only allow connections to and 
from approved clients and servers. 
Design Requirements 
 
14. Name resolution should not affect the connection inside an 
online banking system 
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4.7 Physical attacks. 
A physical attack is where an attacker damages physical components of a computer or network 
(Hansman & Hunt, 2005).  In an online banking environment physical attacks may cause a 
denial of service to customers, if the attackers can physically gain access to the customer’s 
computing environment or the banking system environment.  This study does not take into 
account physical attacks as an attack vector because of the lack of reported cases where it 
affects online banking.  
4.8 Password attacks. 
Password attacks are aimed at gaining knowledge of a user’s password for a system (Hansman 
& Hunt, 2005). 
A keylogger is a method used by attackers to steal passwords from users.  Keyloggers were 
described in Chapter 2:3.4.  Keyloggers affect the client operating environment in an online 
banking system.  Attackers can gain access to a customer’s online banking environment, if the 
environment is only dependent on passwords.  For this reason online banking systems should 
be protected from keyloggers. 
 
 
4.9 Information gathering attacks. 
Information gathering attacks do not do any direct harm to computer systems or equipment.  
Attackers gather information regarding type of equipment, user names, access rights or 
personal information to be used in an attack at a later stage (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
Examples of an information gathering attack are: 
 Social engineering attack 
 Phishing 
These attacks are now described. 
4.9.1 Social engineering attacks 
Social engineering attacks make use of human interaction to gain information about the 
customer’s online banking details.  The user may either disclose this information to the attacker 
Design Requirements 
 
16. A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking 
system or should minimize the effect it may have if present. 
 Page 42 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
using a telephone conversation, whereby the attacker disguises himself as a bank employee or 
agent who have to confirm banking details, or makes use of phishing attacks. (McDowell, 2004) 
Example of how a social engineering attack can be staged: 
John Imposter 
  
Hello there, I work for the bank. We are rolling 
out a new security system.  Can you please 
confirm for me a few of your particulars? 
  
Can you please confirm for me your account 
number, ID number, Address and Home 
telephone number? 
Yes sure.  I want to help.  My account number, 
ID number and other particulars are …   
  Imposter Bank Customer Service 
Hello there, my name is John.  I forgot my 
online banking password. Can you please reset 
it for me? 
Yes sure. For security purposes, can you please 
confirm the following for me?  What are your ID 
number, and your physical address? 
Thank you.  My ID Number is … 
Thank you sir.  Your new password is: xxxx.  You 
will be asked to reset it the first time you log in. 
Thank you very much.  I will now be able to 
access my online banking again!   
 
With the rise of the social networking, like Facebook and Twitter, social engineering has taken 
on new dimensions for compromising secure information.  According to the Symantec Internet 
Security Threat Report for 2011 one of the five identified recurring themes in Internet Security 
was the use of social networks to launch a targeted social engineering attack (Symantic 
Enterprise Security, 2011). 
The second area is a specific type of social engineering attack and is specifically discussed 
because of its effectiveness. 
4.9.2 Phishing 
Phishing attacks are a type of social engineering attack. It takes the form of an email that is 
received by the customer and fools the customer into connecting to a fraudulent banking web 
site, where the customer discloses his banking details on the web site (McDowell, 2004). 
Figure 2:9 shows a screenshot of an actual phishing attack that was detected on the author’s 
computer. 
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FIGURE 2:9 AN EXAMPLE OF A PHISHING ATTACK EMAIL 
 
 
 
5 List of design requirements 
During the risk investigation in this chapter a number of design requirements were identified 
that must be taken into account while designing a secure online banking system.  The list of the 
initial 17 requirements is listed in Table 1. 
Many of the requirements can be grouped together into a more generic requirement.  An 
evaluation of the requirements is done to see which requirements can be grouped together. 
Design requirements one to four concern themselves with minimising the effect of some type of 
malware, which includes viruses, Trojans and worms.  Requirements one to four has a common 
recurring theme that states that the client side operating environment should not be allowed to 
change.  Requirements ten and sixteen also fall in this category. 
Design Requirements 
 
17. An online banking environment should minimise the 
chances of an attacker using stolen information to gain 
access to a customer’s online banking profile. 
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Number Requirement 
1 An online banking system should minimise the chances of malware getting installed into the 
operating system at the client and allowing fraudsters to change the online banking session 
2 The online banking system should be protected from viruses, by making the changing of 
files on the computer impossible 
3 An online banking system should be protected from worms, minimising the chances that a 
worm can cause backdoors into the client computer to steal vital banking details. 
4 An online banking system should be protected from Trojans. Users should not be allowed to 
download and install anything beyond what is already in the system. 
5 An online banking system should be protected from buffer overflow attacks, by controlling 
access to client from the network and allowing clients to change the files in the customer 
operating environment. 
6 An online banking system should discard connections from systems trying a Denial of 
Service attack. 
7 An online banking system should not allow connections to the client’s computer from 
fraudsters. 
8 An online banking environment should minimise the chances of the Internet browser to go 
to a spoofed malicious banking web site. 
9 An online banking system should not allow communication to any system except the online 
banking system. 
10 It should not be possible to modify the Internet browser used by an online banking system. 
11 Online banking systems should not allow the Internet Browser from opening multiple pages 
and the transaction component in an online banking system should re-authenticate the 
user, before committing important transactions. 
12 An online banking system should evaluate any input and allow only approved syntax in 
input fields. 
13 The online banking system should not contain any IFrames, nor should it reference code 
from any site except its own. 
14 Name resolution should not affect the connection inside an online banking system 
15 An online banking system should only allow connections to and from approved clients and 
servers. 
16 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should minimize the 
effect it may have if present. 
17 An online banking environment should minimise the chances of an attacker using stolen 
information to gain access to a customer’s online banking profile. 
TABLE 1: INITIAL DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
If the client operating environment cannot change, then viruses cannot change files in the 
system, worms and Trojans cannot install and attack the system also software keyloggers are 
not able to install in the system and log keystrokes and the Internet browser is not able to 
change, for a man-in-the-browser attack.  These requirements can be rewritten as a common 
requirement that states: The client operating environment should be persistent.  It should 
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not be possible to change any file or configuration in the client operating environment. This 
is the new requirement one. 
Requirements seven to nine minimise attacks directed from the network to the client operating 
environment.  These requirements are fulfilled if the client operating environment can be 
isolated on the network to only allow connections from the client operating environment to the 
banking system environment.  Requirement seven to nine are redefined as follow: The client 
operating environment should be isolated on the network and only be allowed to connect to 
the banking system environment. This is the new requirement two. 
Requirement five concerns itself with buffer overflow attacks to a client from the network.  
Requirement six concerns itself with denial of service attacks to the client from the network.  If 
the client can be truly isolated on the network, allowing only connections to the server-side 
environment and stopping any connections that are not the server-side environment then both 
requirement five and six are fulfilled.  These requirements are fulfilled by fulfilling the 
requirement mentioned above, that states: The client operating environment should be 
isolated on the network and only be allowed to connect to the banking system environment. 
This is the new requirement three. 
Requirement 15 also falls in this category, but is a special case in that it also states that only 
approved clients should be able to connect.  To ensure a client is approved some type of 
validation should occur to confirm the client is approved.  For this reason requirement 15 stays 
a special case and is defined as it is, but is now renumbered to be requirement number 8. 
It has been mentioned that requirement 16 can be categorised together with requirements one 
to four.  Since keyloggers can be hardware, no software system disallows a hardware keylogger 
from trying to log keystrokes.  For this reason the requirement stays and is specifically defined, 
but is now renumbered to be requirement 9 
The rest of the requirements are all individual and cannot be grouped together.  Apart from the 
redefining of the requirements, the requirements are also grouped together according to three 
main categories customer, dedicated secure channel and bank.  The requirements listed in Table 
1 are now grouped together, renumbered, combined and described in Figure 2:10.   
Figure 2:10 shows the Client environment on the left hand side with the various computer 
architectural layers, starting with hardware at the bottom, followed by the operating system, 
with the application running on the operating system, with the user using the application.   
On the right hand side of Figure 2:10 is the server-side bank environment.  It follows with the 
same architecture as on the client, with the hardware followed by the operating system, but in 
this case the web server acts as translation layer between the banking system and the operating 
system.  In between the client and the server is the dedicated secure channel, which enables the 
communication between the client and the server. 
Figure 2:10 is used as a basis to explain changes in the design requirements throughout the 
dissertation and is redefined after each chapter up to chapter 6. 
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FIGURE 2:10 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
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6 Conclusion 
An online banking environment consists of the client environment, the Internet or networking 
environment and the server-side environment.  Each of these environments is susceptible to 
different types of attacks that affect online banking. 
In order to design a safe online banking system, like the V-Bank system, a list of design 
requirements are defined to minimise the attacks on the online banking environment. 
The next chapter evaluates the security of online banking environments.  Some of the existing 
controls used by banks will be evaluated to determine whether it should be a requirement of a 
new online banking system that uses virtualisation. 
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Chapter 3: INFORMATION SECURITY IN ONLINE BANKING 
1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 identified some of the risks faced by a home user when conducting online banking.  
These risks are known by banks and they have implemented a number of controls to mitigate 
the risks (Hutchinson & Warren, 2003). 
This chapter evaluates the controls used by banks to mitigate the risks associated with online 
banking.  The structure and context of the chapter reflects the case study discussed in Chapter 
1:3.  During each step, the controls that mitigate the specific risk are evaluated and mapped 
against the five information security services categories defined in ISO 7498-2 (ISO, 1989). 
The evaluation of each control may result in additional requirements to be added to the design 
requirements for our secure online banking system, V-Bank, defined in chapter 2. 
Before the case study evaluation a brief overview of the five security services categories follow: 
2 ISO 7498-2 Security Services 
ISO 7498-2 defines five categories of information security services.  These services are used as a 
standard against which controls can be mapped. 
The ISO 7498-2 information security services are used as a basis to determine whether the 
existing controls used by banks fulfils the specific information security service requirement.  
Example:  In the case study, John logs into his online banking profile.  The login process verifies 
the username and password of John in order to authenticate him.  The assurance of identity is 
known as authentication and is one of the ISO 7498-2 security services. 
The five information security services identified by ISO 7498-2 are (ISO, 1989): 
 Authentication 
 Access control 
 Data confidentiality 
 Data integrity 
 Non-repudiation (non-deniability) 
A brief overview of each term follows. 
2.1 Authentication 
Authentication is the information security service that ensures the identity of an entity.  Before 
an entity can gain access to a resource, the entity has to identify him to the security system of 
the resource (ISO, 1989).   
To ensure that the entity is who he claims to be, the entity has to provide some type of secret 
that is only known to the entity and resource.  The information security service that guarantees 
the identity of the entity is known as authentication. 
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2.2 Access control 
Access control is the information security service that controls what type of access the entity 
has to a resource.  The implemented security system can use various mechanisms to control 
access on the resource.  Some mechanisms include, discretionary access control, mandatory 
access control and role based access control (ISO, 1989). 
2.3 Data confidentiality 
Data confidentiality is the information security service that ensures that the resource can only 
be seen by the entity and cannot be eavesdropped or intercepted.  This information security 
service ensures data is kept confidential between the requesting entity and the resource system 
(ISO, 1989). 
2.4 Data integrity 
Data integrity is the information security service that ensures that the resource does not change 
while being transmitted.  The data should not be tampered with, or any tampering of the data 
should be detected (ISO, 1989). 
2.5 Non-repudiation 
Non-repudiation is the information security service that ensures that the entity cannot deny 
creating or modifying the resource after the fact (ISO, 1989). 
3 Information security controls applied by online banking 
systems. 
Banks have implemented a number of controls to mitigate risks in online banking systems.  
Some of the controls are recommended, like anti-virus programs, and others are implemented 
and controlled by the bank (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2011). 
The next section refers to a case study where a user needs to pay a company for work done by 
the company for him.  The case study describes five steps that John goes through.  The case 
study looks at each step and identifies the controls used in the different steps.  The five steps 
that are part of the case study are: 
 Step 1: Pre-session start-up 
 Step 2: Establish secure channel 
 Step 3: Login user 
 Step 4: Review banking statement 
 Step 5: Pay third party 
The controls that are described are: 
 Step 1: Anti-Virus programs (Standard Bank, 2012) (First National Bank, 2012) 
 Step 1: Software updates (Standard Bank, 2012) (First National Bank, 2012) 
 Step 2:  SSL \ TLS (Zoller, 2011) 
 Step 2: Trust anchors (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
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 Step 3: Fixed passwords (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
 Step 3: Dynamic passwords (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
 Step 3: Challenge \ response (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
 Step 3: Digital signatures (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
 Step 3: Hardware tokens (Markovic, 2007) 
 Step 3: Smart cards (Shirey, 2000) 
 Step 3: Random authentication codes (Goring, et al., 2007) 
 Step 4: Discretionary access control (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001) 
 Step 4: Mandatory access control (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001) 
 Step 4: Role-based access control (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001) 
 Step 5: Out-of-band verification (AlZomai, et al., 2008) 
 Step 5: Challenge questions (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2011) 
 Step 5: Private key signing (Claessens, et al., 2002) 
These controls are now described and evaluated in context of an online banking session. 
4 Case Study: Online banking security 
In order to create a context for evaluating existing online banking security controls, the case 
study is extended in order to highlight the information security risks. 
This section of the study looks at the process that John follows to conduct his online banking 
payment.  The process starts with John switching on his computer and finishes when John pays 
the contractor.  The process is broken up in five steps.  The steps are: 
 Step 1: Pre-session start-up 
 Step 2: Establish secure channel 
 Step 3: Login user 
 Step 4: Review banking statement 
 Step 5: Pay third party 
Each step is then further separated in the following structure: 
3.1  Step N: Description of the online banking process 
3.1.1  Information security control 1 
3.1.2  Information security control 2 
3.1.3  Affected information security  services 
3.1.4  Identified design requirements 
 
The structure this section starts with a description of the online banking process.  The existing 
information security controls used by banks are then listed.  Each information security control 
is described under its own sub-heading.  Once all the information security controls are 
described, the affected ISO 7498-2 information security services are identified and evaluated.  
After the information security services are identified and evaluated the information security 
controls are investigate to see if new design requirements for V-Bank are identified. 
The first step in the online banking process is when John switches on his computer. 
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John is a father of two teenagers.  He works for a mining company as an accountant.  He has a 
computer at home that is used by himself, his wife and his two teenage boys. 
John uses the computer primarily for paying his bills and reading his e-mail.  His wife uses the 
computer for online shopping and assisting the kids in their school projects.  The two teenagers 
use the computer to buy and download songs for their music players, play games and do school 
projects. 
4.1 Step 1: Pre-session start-up 
John arrives home from work and has to pay AA-Electrical.  John switches on his computer.  The 
computer boots into Microsoft Windows 7 and presents John with the desktop interface.  During 
start-up John’s computer loads various device drivers and start-up programs. 
One of the programs that starts is an Anti-Virus program.  The Anti-Virus program helps to 
protect the computer from various forms of malware.  An anti-virus program is a control that 
mitigates the risk of an attack from malware. 
Another component that starts in Windows 7 is the Windows Update service.  The Windows 
Update service contacts the Microsoft Windows Update infrastructure to determine if there are 
any security updates that need to be installed.  The security updates typically patch operating 
system functionality from known vulnerabilities.  The Windows Update service is an 
implementation of software updates that is a control that mitigates risks against known 
vulnerabilities in the operating system. 
Banks cannot control the installation of anti-virus software or ensure that customers keep their 
computers up to date with security patches, but they recommend both controls (Standard Bank, 
2012) (First National Bank, 2012) (Nedbank, 2012). 
The two controls identified that mitigate online banking risks are: 
 Anti-Virus Programs 
 Software Updates 
A short description of each of these controls follows. 
4.1.1 Anti-Virus programs 
To minimise the risks of malware hijacking online banking sessions, banks recommend 
customers to install an Anti-Virus program and to keep it up to date. 
The biggest disadvantage of anti-virus programs is that most of them are reactive in terms of 
threats, and are limited in proactive protection.  Proactive protection offered by anti-virus 
software does not always detect suspicious behaviour, or generates false negatives when real 
behaviour is identified as suspicious (Wu & Yu, 2011). 
Anti-Virus programs can however help in protecting most Internet users provided the users 
keep their anti-virus software up to date and configured properly. 
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4.1.2 Software updates 
Vulnerabilities in software can allow attackers unauthorised access to a specific system or 
communication channel. 
Most vendors patch their software when vulnerabilities are identified. To ensure that the 
vulnerability cannot be exploited the system has to be updated regularly. 
Banks advise their customers to update their software when new updates become available to 
minimise the risk of attackers exploiting a specific vulnerability in the system. 
4.1.3 Affected information security services 
The following information security service is affected: 
 Authentication 
Anti-Virus or updating of software is not required to ensure successful online banking 
transactions.  Banks recommend both controls, which imply that it increases the security of 
online banking.  Given that anti-virus programs protect a computer from malware, which can 
steal online banking login credentials, an anti-virus program helps to secure the authentication 
process. 
Software updates protect the computer from software vulnerabilities.  Software vulnerabilities 
allow malware to be executed on a computer, which in turn allow for the interception of online 
banking login details.  Ensuring that a computer is up to date with the latest security patches 
helps to secure the authentication process. 
Table 2 summarises the two controls present during step 1 of the case study.  It shows that both 
Anti-Virus and software updates minimise the risks associated with authentication. 
 
A
u
th
en
ti
ca
ti
o
n
 
A
cc
es
s 
C
o
n
tr
o
l 
D
at
a 
C
o
n
fi
d
en
ti
al
it
y 
D
at
a 
In
te
gr
it
y 
N
o
n
-r
ep
u
d
ia
ti
o
n
 
Step 1      
Anti-virus x     
Software updates x     
TABLE 2: CONTROLS FULFILLING SECURITY SERVICES - STEP 1 
With the identification of the controls in relation to the ISO 7498-2 security services, an 
investigation is necessary to determine whether the controls should be a requirement for an 
online banking system. 
4.1.4 Online banking design requirement 
In Chapter 2:3.1 a number of risks were listed that can be categorised as malware.  During the 
evaluation of each malware-type a design requirement was generated to mitigate the risk for 
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that specific malware type.  A proper anti-virus program could theoretically fulfil the 
requirements mentioned, however traditional anti-virus technology is not 100% effective (Wu 
& Yu, 2011). 
For the above mentioned reason an online banking system cannot rely on anti-virus technology 
as a requirement, instead the first requirement determined in Chapter 2 is the only requirement 
required related to anti-virus technology.  The requirement states: “The client operating 
environment should be persistent.  It should not be possible to change any file or configuration 
in the client operating environment”. 
Software vulnerabilities need to be addressed using software updates, because it may allow 
attackers to execute code remotely or intercepting data between the online banking client and 
server.  This results in a new design requirement.  This new design requirement is number 11 
because the previous chapter regrouped the design requirements in that chapter to only ten. 
 
During step 1 of the case study, it was determined that anti-virus and software updates are 
controls that mitigate online banking risks.  The case study now continues with the user 
establishing a connection to the online banking web site. 
4.2 Step 2: Establish secure channel 
Now that John has switched on his computer and logged into the operating system, he starts his 
web browser to connect to the online banking system.  John double clicks the web browser icon 
that he has on his desktop and selects the online banking system link from his bookmarks in the 
web browser. 
The bank ensures an encrypted connection with John’s web browser using Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) encryption.  The bank also presents a digital certificate to John’s web browser that 
identifies the web site to the web browser and user. 
SSL encryption is also known as transport layer security (TLS).  SSL and TLS are described in 
Chapter 3:4.2.1. 
Apart from the technical information stored in the digital certificate, the digital certificate also 
acts as a trust anchor.  It allows the banking client to visually verify the identity of the online 
banking web site (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
In this scenario there are two controls that mitigate online banking risks.  The two controls are: 
 SSL \ TLS. 
 Trust anchors. 
Design Requirements 
 
11. Online banking systems must have the ability to be updated 
when software vulnerabilities are detected. 
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The next two sections provide an overview of these two controls. 
4.2.1 SSL \ TLS 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) was originally initiated by Netscape.  Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
is the latest version and implementation of SSL and provides cryptographic support that SSL 
cannot offer (Zoller, 2011). 
Even though there are various versions of the protocol, they all provide a secure 
communications channel between the bank and the client.  The secure communications channel 
means that data between the client and the server is kept secret (confidentiality) and tampering 
of the data is detected (integrity).  
SSL authenticates at least the banking side of the channel and banks usually implement a 
separate client authentication channel on top of the existing secure channel (Claessens, et al., 
2002).  
SSL does not provide non-repudiation.  This means banking transactions are not signed and 
clients and banks can still repute specific transactions if a bank did not implement a separate 
non-repudiation mechanism (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
SSL v2 was developed by Netscape in 1996 and in 2012 the standard is 16 years old.  The 
system suffers from vulnerabilities and is no longer supported by most major Internet 
browsers. 
SSL v3 added many features that were not present in SSL v2.  After the development of SSL v3 
TLS 1.0 was developed and has since been revised up to TLS 1.2. 
The various versions are evaluated and adopted by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
To enable a specific version of SSL or TLS, both the client and the server has to support that 
version.  In May 2012 only the Opera browser and Internet Explorer 7 and above supported TLS 
1.2.  On servers only Microsoft IIS 7.5 (The web browser that comes with Windows Server 
2008) and web servers that support NSS (National Security Services) supported TLS 1.2 (Zoller, 
2011) 
In all the cases TLS 1.2 is not enabled by default and both the server and client have to be 
configured to support TLS 1.2. 
Because vendors are slow to support the latest TLS versions, most banks can only configure 
their servers to support SSL v3 and TLS 1.0, this leaves most electronic banking systems open to 
vulnerabilities that exist in these protocols. 
4.2.2 Trust Anchors 
A trust anchor is defined by Claessens, et al. as a visual indicator that the user is communicating 
to the correct banking web site.  Most Internet banking web sites make use of the green lock, 
displayed by the Internet browser.  This green lock is displayed by the web browser when the 
certificate by the online banking web site passes a few tests. 
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1. Is the certificate given by the banking web site trusted?  This is tested by looking at the 
certificate chain of signatures to ensure each entity that signed the certificate is from a 
trusted entity.  These root trusted entities are defined by trusted root certificates 
installed in the operating system. 
2. Is the certificate valid in terms of dates?  Any certificate is only valid between certain 
dates.  A browser does not trust a certificate when the current date is outside the valid 
date range of a certificate. 
3. Is the name of the entity in the certificate the same of the name of the web site?  If the 
certificate was given to a specific entity (web site) and displayed by another web site, 
then the browser does not trust the certificate. 
This certificate trust link however can be changed and Internet browsers displaying incorrect 
trust information when an attacker can install its own trusted root certificate into the operating 
system.  Any user who then visually looks for green lock in their browser will find a green lock 
even if the web site they are connected to, is not actually their banking web site, even though it 
may look the same. 
Because of the above reason, some banks also include a secret identifier, defined by the user 
during their first banking session.  If the user does not see this secret identifier, after he\she 
logged in, then the user should know that the banking web site is not the correct web site. 
These trust anchors help ensure that the communication channel is established to a trusted web 
site. 
4.2.3 Security Services 
SSL and TLS ensure that data is encrypted between the client and the online banking system.  It 
also ensures that tampering is detected and authenticates the server to the client. 
Trust anchors identify the server to the client.  The client verifies the identity visually, which 
acts as authenticating the server’s identity. 
Table 3 summarises the controls mapped against the security services they fulfil.  SSL\TLS 
keeps data confidential, and ensures integrity and server identification.  Trust anchors ensure 
server identification. 
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Step 2      
SSL\TLS x  x x  
Trust Anchors x     
TABLE 3: CONTROLS FULFILLING SECURITY SERVICES - STEP 2 
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4.2.4 Online banking design requirement 
The data transferred between an online banking client and the server is private and should be 
kept confidential.  Clients and banks would not like potential attackers from gaining access to 
login information or personal banking information.  Since there are already identified 
vulnerabilities in SSL v3 and TLS 1.0, the latest version of TLS is required, which is TLS 1.2. 
 
Banking customers should also have the ability to ensure that they can successfully identify the 
banking web site that they are connected to, is the correct web site.  This requirement may not 
be necessary if requirement four, in Figure 2:10 can be met that states: “The client operating 
environment should be isolated on the network and only be allowed to connect to the banking 
system environment”.   The existing requirement however does not give any visual indication to 
the user that the online banking system connects to the correct server-side system. 
 
John’s computer started, with the browser connected to the online banking web site.  John is 
now ready to access his personal profile on the online banking system. 
4.3 Step 3: Login user 
Before John can gain access to his personal profile in the online banking system, John has to 
identify himself to the online banking system and the online banking system has to verify the 
identity of John. 
John’s bank requires John to type in his account number, as identifier and also a personal 
identification number (PIN) and a password.  Only John should know his PIN and password 
linked to his account number.  If John types in the PIN and password correctly, the bank 
assumes that it is in fact John accessing his bank account. 
By providing an account number, with correct PIN and password, John authenticated himself to 
the bank.   
Design Requirements 
 
13. Online banking systems must have a visual trust anchor. 
Design Requirements 
 
12. Online banking systems must ensure TLS 1.2 channel security 
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Authentication is the process that ensures that a person is actually who he\she claims to be.  
The first step in the authentication process is where a user identifies him and then shares 
something with the other party that authenticates himself. 
This sharing can take the form of something they know, they have or they are (von Solms & 
Eloff, 2004). 
Something they know is typically a pin number, or password.  Something they have can be in the 
form of a smart card, or hardware token.  Something they are is some type of biometric 
authentication, like a fingerprint (von Solms & Eloff, 2004). 
The controls most commonly used for authenticating users according to Claessens, et al (2002) 
are: 
 Fixed Passwords. 
 Dynamic Passwords. 
 Challenge \ Response. 
 Digital signatures. 
 Hardware tokens. 
 Smart Cards. 
 Random authentication codes. 
The next few sections provide an overview of these controls. 
4.3.1 Fixed Passwords 
A fixed password is a secret combination of letters and\or numbers that is known only by the 
user.  It is fixed, because the user initially creates the password and only changes when the user 
changes the password. 
It is possible for a system to force a user to change his password, but the password is still 
considered fixed, since it doesn’t change dynamically. 
The problem with passwords is that they are subject to brute force attacks.  Brute force attacks 
are the process where an attacker starts guessing passwords and continues guessing, until the 
password is found. 
To minimise the effectiveness of brute force attacks, banks recommend that a user chooses a 
complex password.  Complex passwords in general refer to a password that contains upper 
case, lower case, numbers and special characters.  The longer the password is, the more difficult 
it is to guess. 
Banks may also implement controls where it locks an account after a certain number of failed 
attempts.  This stops brute force attacks from continually trying to guess a password, but opens 
up the accounts to denial of service attacks. 
Most banking systems use fixed passwords, simply because it is a low cost security control that 
can be effective. 
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4.3.2 Dynamic Passwords 
A dynamic password is also called a one-time password.  Dynamic passwords change from one 
session to the next and can only be used once (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
Dynamic passwords can be implemented by using scratch lists.  A scratch list is a piece of paper 
with a list of passwords on.  When a user used a password, the user must scratch the password 
from the list and use the next one (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
Dynamic passwords can also be implemented using extra software.  The extra software must 
exist on a computer, or it can exist on mobile phones.  Some hardware tokens also generate one 
time passwords. 
4.3.3 Challenge \ Response 
Challenge \ Response is a scheme where the user identifies him to the bank by responding to 
some type of challenge.  The bank challenges the client with something, which changes from 
session to session.  The client responds to the challenge in an appropriate method. 
The advantage of this system is that the response that travels over the communication channel 
changes from session to session. 
An example of a challenge \ response scheme is where the bank issues a challenge to the client.  
Example: The bank sends a random number of characters to the client.  The client then signs 
this challenge with his private key.  This signed response is different with each session, because 
the challenge is different with each session.  The bank ensures the signed challenge was signed 
by the client, by using the client’s public key (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
4.3.4 Digital signatures 
In a SSL\TLS communication channel the client can identify himself to the server by signing a 
hash of the previously exchanged handshaking methods.  The server verifies the signature by 
using the client’s public key. 
Individual transactions can also be signed to ensure non-repudiation on the transactions. 
Private keys can be stored on hardware tokens, but it can also be stored in software.  Private 
keys stored in software however is fairly vulnerable (Shamir & van Someren, 1999). 
4.3.5 Hardware tokens 
A hardware token is usually a small piece of hardware that is given to the user when they 
register for Internet banking.  Hardware tokens can generate one-time passwords in the case 
where a one-time password is required by the Internet banking system.  These one-time 
passwords are usually used before authorising a banking transaction (Markovic, 2007). 
4.3.6 Smart Cards 
A smart card is a credit card sized device that contains a chip, with its own processor, memory 
and input – output channel (Shirey, 2000). 
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Smart cards can contain cryptographic information, such as the private key in a public \ private 
key pair.  Access to the private key is usually controlled through a pin number or password. 
The advantage of a smart card is that it combines two of the three authentication components 
mentioned in Chapter 3:4.3.  The components are something you have (smart card, with private 
key) and something you know (PIN number or password). 
The disadvantage of smartcards is that there is a cost associated with the actual card, and not all 
computers have the native ability to read smart cards.  This makes the deployment of smart 
cards as an authentication device difficult for banks to implement. 
4.3.7 Random authentication codes 
Some banks implement two steps of authentication during an online banking session.  The first 
step is in the form of the identification and authentication using something like a pin.  The 
second step is then a prompt for a password, but only certain characters of the password are 
asked for during the second step. 
The main reason for only asking for a few characters for the password is to minimise the chance 
of a keylogger capturing the user’s full password in a single session. 
It should be noted that implementation of the random authentication codes affects the 
effectiveness of the control.  It has been argued that if the system asks the same random 
authentication characters, until a successful login, that an attacker can gain the knowledge of 
the full authentication password. (Goring, et al., 2007) 
Another disadvantage of the system is that the full password must be stored on the banking 
system.  Many security discussions concerning the storing of passwords recommend that 
passwords should never be stored in a system, only a hash of the password.  In the case of 
implementing random authentication codes, the full password has to be stored, because the 
authentication system should know the exact characters of the password, not just the hash of 
the full password (Guimaraes, 2006) 
The random authentication codes however can still be combined with another authentication 
mechanism to minimise the chances of an attacker using a keylogger to gain knowledge of the 
user’s login details. 
4.3.8 Security Services 
John logged onto the online banking system in the case study.  The various controls listed in this 
section are all controls that enable the act of authenticating the user to the system. 
All of these controls provide authentication to the online banking system and very little of the 
other ISO 7498-2 security services. 
Table 4 summarises the different controls and highlights the ISO security service fulfilled by the 
specific control. 
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Step 3      
Fixed Passwords x     
Dynamic Password x     
Challenge \ Response x     
Digital signatures x     
Hardware tokens x     
Smart Cards x     
Random authentication 
codes 
x     
TABLE 4: CONTROLS FULFILLING SECURITY SERVICES - STEP 3 
 
4.3.9 Online banking design requirements 
Online banking systems contain personal and confidential information.  It is the bank’s 
responsibility to ensure that the information is protected from unauthorised access.  Any online 
banking system must have some type of authentication process.  Users of the system must prove 
their identity to the system using some type of authentication control. 
 
John has logged into the online banking profile.  In the next section it is made clear that John can 
only access information that he has been granted access to. 
4.4 Step 4: Review banking statement 
After logging into the online banking system, John is presented with a number of features that 
exist in the online banking system.  One of the features is for John to retrieve an account 
statement.  John uses the information in the account statement to verify that he has enough 
funds to pay AA-Electrical. 
John’s wife Lisa also has an account with the same bank and also uses online banking to gain 
access to her information.  Even though John can see information about his account, he cannot 
view the information about Lisa’s account. 
Design Requirements 
 
14. Online banking systems must properly authenticate users 
before allowing access. 
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The bank controls access to their customers’ accounts and ensure that only the account 
belonging to the specific customer can be accessed by that same customer.  The customer 
cannot give access to another customer to his account information. 
The banks not only control access to the account information, but also control what can be done 
with the bank account.  The bank can control whether a specific bank account can be used to 
make payments, or the customer can only view a statement for the bank account. 
The controlling of access can fall into a number of categories.  Samarati & De Capitani di 
Vimercati (2001) lists three main classes of access control policies.  They are: 
 Discretionary (DAC).  
 Mandatory (MAC). 
 Role-based (RBAC). 
The next three sections provide an overview of these three classes of access control policies. 
4.4.1 Discretionary 
In discretionary access control policies, access is granted to an object based on the identity of 
the requestor and a set of access rules.  The word “Discretionary” in the term means that in this 
type of policy users can be given the ability to give other users the same privileges as they have 
on the objects. 
Discretionary access control policies are usually implemented in operating systems.  Microsoft 
adopted the DAC policy for their Windows NT operating system when it was first developed.  
This policy has since been used in their operating systems like Windows XP and Windows 7 
(Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
In the Windows NT – type operating systems objects are assigned an access control list (ACL), 
with a number of access control entries (ACE).  Users gain access to the operating system by 
logging in.  The user accounts contain a security identifier (SID) that identifies them to the 
system.  The SID, together with what type of access the user has on the object gets added to the 
ACL as an ACE.  When a user wants to access the object, the operating system determines the 
access granted by evaluating the ACL for access control entries that the user belongs to 
(Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
File
object
Security
descriptor
Allow
USER1
Read data
Allow
Everyone
File execute
Allow
TEAM1
Read data
Write data
ACL
 
FIGURE 3:1 DISCRETIONARY ACCESS CONTROL LIST 
Figure 3:1 is a simplified picture of a file with a file object and the ACL (Russinovich & Solomon, 
2005).  It shows that USER1 can read data from the file, but cannot write changes back to the 
file.  It also shows that members of the TEAM1 group can read and write data to the file and that 
everyone can execute the file. 
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The discretionary access control policy defines three important aspects.  The first is the object.  
This is the object that needs to be secured.   In an operating system this can be a file.  In a 
relational database management system this can be table or view (Samarati & De Capitani di 
Vimercati, 2001). 
The second important aspect of the discretionary access control policy is the subjects.  Subjects 
are the “who” that wants to access this object.  This can be user accounts, but can also include 
group accounts or processes (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001). 
The third important aspect is the actions.  Actions can include things like read access, write 
access, but may also include actions like ownership and control (Samarati & De Capitani di 
Vimercati, 2001). 
Another important aspect of DAC is the principle of the administrative policy.  The 
administrative policy defines who is allowed to change the allowed accesses.  A number of 
administrative policies exist (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001): 
 Centralised. Only one authoriser exists in the system that can grant and revoke 
authorisation to users. 
 Hierarchical.  One authoriser assignes responsibilities to other administrators so that 
they can grant and revoke authorisation. 
 Cooperative.  More than one person is required to change the authorisation of an object.  
 Ownership.  When a user creates an object, the user typically becomes the owner of the 
object.  The owner can change the access of the object. 
 Decentralised. Decentralised means that the owner of the object can further delegate 
rights to users to change authorisations on the object. 
The mandatory access control policies control the flow of information through the use of labels. 
4.4.2 Mandatory 
Mandatory access control policies are mandated from a central authority.  It allows access 
through a multi-level classification of subjects and objects.  Subjects are active entities that 
request access and objects are passive entities that stores information (Samarati & De Capitani 
di Vimercati, 2001). 
Subjects and objects get classified according to different levels of access.  The most common 
known categories are Top Secret (TS), Secret (S), Confidential (C) and Unclassified (U), where 
the levels of the categories are TS>S>C>U (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001). 
The secrecy based model implements the mandatory access control policy different from what 
Microsoft implemented.  The secrecy based model, first defined by Bell and LaPadula, uses the 
concepts of No-Read-Up and No-Write-Down (Bell & LaPadula, 1973). 
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FIGURE 3:2 INFORMATION FLOW FOR SECRECY 
No-Read-Up means subject with a lower level category does not have read access to objects with 
a higher classification category. 
No-Write-Down means subjects cannot write information into objects with a lower 
classification category. 
The No-Read-Up and No-Write-Down principle ensures that information gets created and flows 
upwards to subjects in higher or the same classification categories.  Subjects however can only 
read information stored in objects that are on classification levels the same or lower.  This 
ensures someone with a Secret classification cannot read information on objects on the Top 
Secret classification category, but can produce information accessible by people on the same or 
higher classification category. 
Figure 3:2 summarises the Bell & LaPadula model (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001).   
On the rights hand of the figure it describes that information flows upwards from the lower 
classification levels to higher classification level. The rest of the figure explains that Top Secret 
(TS) subjects can write only TS objects, but can read all objects in lower classification levels. 
Biba (1977) proposed an implementation of MAC, but which ensures integrity.  Biba proposed 
his model to ensure that low level classification subjects cannot make changes to objects in 
systems on a higher classification level.  This ensures integrity in the system.  Biba also 
suggested classification levels, but suggested a No-Read-Down and No-Write-Up concept (Biba, 
1977). 
An example of the classification levels in Biba’s model can be Crucial (C), Important (I) and 
Unknown (U).   In this example Biba’s model means that a subject with Important classification 
cannot write information to an object with a Crucial classification level, but can read 
information that is Important and Unknown.  
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FIGURE 3:3 INFORMATION FLOW FOR INTEGRITY 
Figure 3:3 summarises Biba’s model.  In this model information flows from higher classification 
levels to lower levels (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001).  Higher level classification 
subjects can make changes to objects in the system on lower levels.  Lower level subjects, which 
may be from untrusted environments, won’t have the ability to make changes to objects in 
higher classification levels. 
From Windows Vista onwards Microsoft implemented a form of Biba’s model into the operating 
system called mandatory integrity control.  Microsoft also defines different categories for 
subjects and objects.  They are system, high, medium and low.  Microsoft however only uses the 
MAC when a subject tries to write to an object.  A subject can write to an object if the object’s 
level is the same or lower than the subject’s level (Riley, 2006).  This helps protect operating 
system users from opening a virus attached to an e-mail (low level), which may infect operating 
system files (medium or higher level). 
4.4.3 Role-based 
The last access control policy class defined by Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati is role-based 
access control policies (RBAC). 
RBAC concerns itself not so much with individual users being given specific rights in a system, 
but base access rights on roles.  Many implementations of RBAC has been suggested.  There is 
however one single principle and that is users are assigned to a role or roles.  The roles then 
have a specific right or access in a system (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001). 
RBAC is very flexible in its implementation.  RBAC allows policies to define implementation 
where users can be a member of only one role at a time, or multiple roles at a time.  It can even 
allow roles to be members of other roles.  It can also define rules where certain roles are 
mutually exclusive, meaning a user cannot be member of the one role and a specific other one.  
RBAC allows for very specific policy implementation in a system, based on responsibilities, 
instead of individual user names (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001). 
Many commercial systems have adopted RBAC policies as the access control system 
implemented (Samarati & De Capitani di Vimercati, 2001).  An online banking system can adopt 
a RBAC policy and implement this to ensure access in the system is controled and adheres to 
specific system wide policies. 
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DAC, MAC and RBAC are all classes of access control policies.  Any system that implements 
access control adopts some type of access control policy.  Access control is one of the ISO7498-2 
security services. 
4.4.4 Security Services 
After John logged into the online banking system, John only has access to his own bank account 
information.  John is also assured that no other banking users have access to his bank account.  
This assurance is implemented using an access control policy defined by the bank.  The access 
control policy of the bank also controls what actions John can do on his bank accounts.  John’s 
bank controls his home loan account, so that John can only transfer money to his home loan 
account, but cannot transfer money out of his home loan account.  John’s cheque account 
however allows John to transfer money into and out of the account. 
The three different classes of access control policies that exist can be implemented in a system, 
using different implementation mechanisms.   Table 5 summarises the policies described in this 
section.  All the policies if implemented fulfil the access control security service, but MAC can 
also add integrity capabilities to a system. 
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Step 4      
DAC  x    
MAC  x  x  
RBAC  x    
TABLE 5 ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES - STEP 4 
 
4.4.5 Online banking design requirements 
Online banking systems contain critical and personal information.   Banks have the obligation 
and legal requirement to protect individual user account information.  Banks must ensure that 
access to individual user account information is controlled. 
 
Now that John has verified that he has enough funds is he ready to pay AA-Electrical. 
Design Requirements 
 
15. Online banking systems must implement a RBAC policy to 
ensure access to user information is controlled. 
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4.5 Step 5:  Pay third party 
John verifies that AA-Electrical is not an existing beneficiary and click on the function to create a 
new beneficiary.  John enters AA-Electrical’s banking details into the new beneficiary fields and 
presses the OK button. 
AA-Electrical is now a beneficiary in John’s online banking profile.  John clicks on the button in 
the online banking system that starts the function to pay a beneficiary.  The pay-beneficiay-
function asks John which beneficiary he would like to pay, as well as from which account he 
would like to pay the beneficiary and the amount of money that John would like to pay.  John 
fills in all the fields to pay AA-Electrical and presses the OK button.   
As soon as John presses the OK button his mobile phone receives a short message service (SMS) 
message from the bank with a random number.  The online banking system prompts John to 
type the random number he just received in the SMS message into the online banking system.  
The online banking system verifies the random number John typed with the one they sent and 
confirms the payment transaction. 
John prints out the payment transaction for his own records and faxes the printed out copy to 
AA-Electrical to let them know that he initiated payment of the account.  John logs out of the 
online banking system. 
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) in the United States identified 
that there are different levels of risk in online banking systems, dependent on the client.  In 
general consumer customers have a different risk profile than commercial clients.  Consumer 
customers in general transfer smaller amounts less frequently than commercial clients.   The 
FFIEC recommends that banks implement a layered security program (Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council, 2011). 
The FFIEC recommends two controls that can be used for authorising transactions.  They 
recommend out-of-band verification and challenge questions (Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council, 2011).  The author would also like to add the possibility of using private 
key signing to verify transactions.  An overview of these three controls follows. 
4.5.1 Out-of-band verification 
Out-of-band verification refers to the process of re-authenticating a user before a transaction is 
approved using another type of authentication control not using the same communications 
channel as the existing communications channel.  A popular control that is being implemented 
by banks is one-time-passwords sent to the user using SMS (AlZomai, et al., 2008). 
When the banking client creates a beneficiary to receive a payment, or when the banking client 
transfers an amount of money to another account, the bank sends an SMS with a one-time-
password.  The client must then enter the one-time-password into a field during the transaction 
on the online banking system. 
If the one-time-password that was entered by the user, matches the one-time-password that 
was sent, then the bank knows that the user have received the SMS on his personal phone and 
makes the assumption that the transaction is authorised by the user. 
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The advantage to the SMS authorisation scheme is that it is a fairly cheap way to implement 
extra security into the online banking system. 
The disadvantage to the system is that it is susceptible to a SIM swop.  A SIM swop is where an 
attacker approaches a mobile phone provider and claims the identity of the user.  The attacker 
then informs the mobile phone provider that he lost or damaged his SIM card that is in his 
phone.  The bank then swops the SIM card with a new SIM card, but with the same number.  
From this point onwards any telephone calls and message is relayed to the new SIM card, 
instead of the old card.  Figure 3:4 shows a simplified example of how such a SIM swop scam can 
be used to gain access a customer’s online banking system (Jordaan & von Solms, 2011). 
Service Provider
Actual Client (Bill)
Imposter
Hello there, my name is Bill, 
my phone’s SIM card got 
damaged. Can I please get 
new SIM card?
Service Provider
Service Provider, 
disconnects actual user’s 
mobile phone SIM card
Service ProviderImposter
Service provider issues new 
SIM card to Imposter
Imposter
Imposter gains access to 
customer’s online banking 
system using password and 
credentials received 
through a phishing attack.  
One-time-passwords are 
sent to Imposter’s mobile 
phone Customer’s Online 
Banking System
 
FIGURE 3:4 SIMPLIFIED EXAMPLE OF A SIM SWOP SCAM 
Another disadvantage to the SMS authorisation system is that it is also vulnerable to a man-in-
the-middle or man-in-the-browser attack.  It is possible for a spoofed web site to intercept, any 
passwords from the user (including the one-time-password sent via SMS), inject their own 
account and amount information, but displays false information to the user. 
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4.5.2 Challenge questions 
The FFIEC recommends challenge questions as an effective component in a layered security 
program.  The FFIEC lists challenge questions as a possibility for authorising, or re-
authenticating a user, during banking transactions (Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council, 2011) 
Security questions present the user with a question whose answer is only supposed to be 
known by the user and the bank.  Different types of security questions exist.  They are: 
 Sensitive security questions.  These questions are sensitive in nature and should be 
known by only the bank and the user.  This can be social security numbers, bank account 
numbers or ATM PIN number (Rabkin, 2008). 
 Personal verification questions.  The questions ask personal things about the user’s 
background, such as the user’s mother’s maiden name (Rabkin, 2008). 
Users of the system are able to select the questions and provide answers initially during first 
time usage of a system.  The FFIEC also recommends that the questions provided to the user 
may also include a “red herring”, which a legitimate user will notice as nonsensical, but a 
fraudster not (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2011). 
4.5.3 Private Key signing 
When a user of an Internet banking system creates a transaction, the user can utilise his private 
key to sign the transaction.  The signing of the transaction authorises the bank to continue with 
the transaction.  The signing of the transaction also authenticates the user at that time, since 
only the user should have access to his private key. 
If the bank uses the content of the transaction and signs the content, then they also have a non-
repudiation record.  This signature can then be used to verify the content of the transaction. 
There are a number of challenges to overcome before private key signing can be used in an 
online banking system.  The first challenge is the distribution of the private keys to the users.  
This can be in the form of some type of token or smart card.   
The second challenge is that only the Netscape browser includes a JavaScript mechanism to sign 
forms.  Any other browser must use secondary programs, like Java applets or standalone 
applications to enable the signing of forms (Claessens, et al., 2002). 
4.5.4 Security Services 
The three controls that may apply during the payment of a third party are: 
 Out-of-band verification 
 Challenge questions 
 Private Key signing 
These controls fulfil various areas in the ISO 7498-2 security services.   
Table 6 maps the three controls against the relevant security services.  All three controls 
authenticate the user.  This can be through one-time-passwords, security questions or access to 
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the user’s private key.  It can also be argued that re-authentication of the user adds some type of 
non-repudiation against the transaction.  The author argues that re-authenticating the user does 
not provide non-repudiation, since authenticating a user does not imply non-repudiation.  Strict 
non-repudiation only occurs in the case of the Private Key signing mechanism.  The Private Key 
signing mechanism ensures that the integrity of the data through the signature, as well as 
provide non-deniability because of the signature. 
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Step 5      
Out-of-band verification x     
Challenge questions x     
Private Key signing x   x x 
TABLE 6: AUTHORISATION CONTROLS - STEP 5 
4.5.5 Online banking design requirements 
The FFIEC recommends the implementation of a layered security program.  The layered security 
program implies that that type of information security control implemented is dependent on the 
risk profile of the user.  This recommendation is applied to the online banking design 
requirements. 
 
Now that John has completed the payment to AA-Electrical using online banking is it time to 
review the impact the investigation regarding the various controls used by banks has on the 
requirement of an online banking design. 
5 Design requirements and Information security services 
This chapter evaluated the information security controls in an online banking environment.  The 
evaluation was conducted to determine whether some of the controls or security services 
should be part of an online banking system. 
Table 7 lists the various controls used by banks during an online banking session and map it 
against the ISO 7498-2 information security services.  The table shows that most controls used 
by banks concern themselves with authentication.  This observation can also imply that the area 
Design Requirements 
 
16. Online banking systems must implement a layered security 
program. 
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of authenticating the user is the area where banks experience the biggest risk.  Banks want to 
put as much controls in place to ensure the identity of the user using the online banking system. 
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Step 1           
Anti-virus x         
Software updates x         
Step 2           
SSL\TLS x   x x   
Trust Anchors x         
Step 3           
Fixed Passwords x         
Dynamic Password x         
Challenge \ Response x         
Digital signatures x         
Hardware tokens x         
Smart Cards x         
Random authentication 
codes 
x         
Step 4           
DAC   x       
MAC   x   x   
RBAC   x       
Step 5           
Out-of-band verification x         
Challenge questions x         
Private Key signing x     x x 
TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF INFORMATION SECURITY SERVICES 
Table 7 also shows that some information security services, like data confidentiality and non-
repudiation have very few implemented information security controls.  Looking a little bit closer 
however shows that data confidentiality uses SSL\TLS security channels to encrypt the data.  As 
described SSL and TLS has gone through various versions and banks rely on the technology to 
ensure that data stays confidential.   
Non-repudiation is however a different problem.  It seems that very little emphasis is placed on 
non-repudiation.  It can be argued that some authentication information security controls 
ensures some form of non-repudiation.  The author argues that an information security 
authentication control does not imply non-repudiation.  Instead some type of electronic 
signature is required to ensure non-repudiation. 
Before a summary of the design requirements are given, a new design requirement is defined.  
Online banking systems should, ensure controls fulfilling all five ISO 7498-2 information 
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security services are implemented in an online banking system.  By not implementing 
information security controls for each ISO 7498-2 security service, the bank opens itself to risks 
in that specific category. 
 
In this chapter nine new design requirements were identified.  The nine requirements are 
design requirement number 11 to 17 and are shown in Figure 3:5. The new design 
requirements have been categorised under each of the case study’s main process steps.  The last 
design requirement was given the category “ISO 7498-2 information security services”, because 
it compels banks to ensure online banking systems implement international standards on their 
online banking systems. 
Design Requirements 
 
17. Online banking system should implement information security 
controls in all five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
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6 Summary 
In this chapter some of the controls used by banks to minimise online banking risks have been 
evaluated.  The controls have been mapped against the ISO 7498-2 security services to see what 
role the specific control plays in information security. 
The case study that was used described the online banking environment from the start where 
the user switches on his computer, opens the connection to the online banking system, logs in, 
accesses information and finally pays the third party. 
The chapter showed that some controls recommended by banks, like anti-virus and software 
updates, cannot be controlled which influence the security of the online banking system.  In the 
next chapter virtual machines will described as an introduction that may give banks the ability 
to control some of the items that are currently not in their control. 
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Chapter 4: VIRTUAL MACHINES 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter the existing security controls used by online banking systems were 
described.  The list of design requirements for a secure online banking system, V-Bank, was 
expanded to include some of the controls implemented by today’s online banking system. 
In the previous chapters a number of design requirements were identified for a secure online 
banking system.  Design requirement 2 states that the client operating environment should be 
isolated on the network and only be allowed to connect to the banking system environment.  
This chapter will show that one of the key features of virtual machines is its isolation property. 
Other design requirements also allude to the fact that certain configuration items such as the 
Internet browser should be in a specific known state.  This chapter also shows that a virtual 
machine can be configured according to a set configuration and be used to help secure online 
banking. 
A recurring idea that surfaces is that banks cannot control what customers install on their 
computers.  A solution to this problem could be that the bank can setup and give each online 
banking customer their own computer.  This computer could be controlled and owned by the 
bank, giving them full control over this computer.  Giving away a computer to each banking 
customer is fairly expense, so how can a bank give away a computer, but without the costs 
associated with the computers? 
Virtualising the computer may be a viable option, which allows the bank to still define the 
configuration of the computer and stay in control of the computer, even though the customer 
operates the computer. 
This chapter is a literature study of virtual machines, which consists of the following sections: 
 Background.  The history of virtual machines are briefly discussed 
 Types of virtual machines.  The two major types of virtual machines are identified and 
described. 
 Server and desktop virtualisation.  The reasons for virtualising computer differ 
depending on whether a computer is virtualised for desktop use or server use.  Since 
this dissertation is interested in desktop virtualisation, virtualisation of servers is only 
briefly discussed.  Desktop virtualisation highlights a number of features that is useful 
for securing the online banking environment. 
 Information security vulnerabilities and virtual machines.  Virtual machines are not 
without security risks.  The vulnerabilities of virtual machines are described to take into 
account when designing and implementing a solution for secure online banking. 
 Virtualisation options.  There are a number of computer virtualisation 
implementations available today.  A number of the computer virtualisation solutions are 
described, which gives a background on how different vendors implement virtualisation. 
 List of design requirements.  The chapter concludes again with the new design 
requirements that are identified during the research into virtual machines. 
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After the virtual machine types have been described, virtualisation of servers and desktops are 
discussed. This chapter is an introduction to the various virtualisation options as a possibility 
for an online banking solution. 
2 Background 
To minimise ambiguity the following terms are defined for this dissertation: 
 Virtual machine:  The original term for a virtual machine is an abstraction of a 
computer’s hardware in software.   These days it can also refer to a number of other 
abstraction types, like “Java Virtual Machine” (Rosenblum, 2004).  If not stated 
otherwise the term virtual machine refers to the abstraction of a computer’s hardware 
in software in the dissertation. 
 Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM): A VMM is a software abstraction layer that partitions a 
physical computer into one or more virtual machines (Rosenblum & Garfinkel, 2005).  
Examples of VMMs are Microsoft’s Hyper-V or VMware’s ESXi.  The VMM is also called a 
hypervisor. 
“Virtualisation is the process of presenting something that is genuine, when in fact it isn’t” 
(Perez, et al., 2008).  Virtualisation techniques are used in many areas of information 
technology.  Areas where virtualisation is used include virtual memory, virtual networks, data 
virtualisation and hardware virtualisation (Rosenblum, 2004). 
Hardware virtualisation enables a computer to run more than one virtual machine, each with its 
own operating system simultaneously.  IBM pioneered virtualisation on its VM/370 mainframe 
system in the 1960s.  This enabled the mainframe to be partitioned into multiple systems 
(Creasy, 1981).  
In the 1990s VMware introduced virtualisation to the x86-platform. VMware exported the 
hardware of the x86 to its own virtualisation layer, also called a virtual machine.  This made it 
possible for a VMware virtual machine to run all the Microsoft operating systems of that era, 
which included DOS, Windows 3.1, Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows NT, Windows XP and 
Windows 2000.  It also made it possible to run other operating systems like FreeBSD and Linux 
(Rosenblum, 2004). 
OS1
Apps2Apps1
OS2
CPU, Motherboard,
Disks, display, net...
CPU, Motherboard,
Disks, display, net...
Virtual Machine Monitor Layer
CPU, Motherboard,
Disks, display, net...
Virtual 
machines
Real 
machines
Virtual Machine Monitor
 
FIGURE 4:1 HARDWARE-LEVEL VIRTUALIZATION 
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Figure 4:1 shows a hardware-level virtualization layer sitting right on top of the hardware.  In 
this case the virtual machine looks like the underlying hardware (Rosenblum, 2004).  Starting at 
the bottom, the first layer is the host computer’s hardware.  The VMM gets installed on the 
physical hardware and allows a number of virtual machines to be installed on the host 
computer.  The virtual machines depicted in Figure 4:1 runs as separate entities, each with its 
own hardware, operating system and applications.   
It was stated that virtual machines can also refer to other abstraction types.  To minimise 
confusion when referring to virtual machines an overview of the different virtual machine types 
follow. 
3 Types of virtual machines 
Smith and Nair (2005) identify two categories of virtual machines.  They are “process” and 
“system” virtual machines.  We now describe process and system virtual machines briefly. 
3.1 Process Virtual Machines 
A process virtual machine exists only for the process being executed.  A process requires 
memory allocation and an instruction set and only receives access to hardware through the 
operating system (Smith & Nair, 2005).  An example of a process virtual machine is Sun 
Microsystem’s Java VM architecture and Microsoft’s Common Language Infrastructure, which is 
the basis of the Microsoft .NET platform (Smith & Nair, 2005). 
A compiled Java application can run on any processor platform and operating system, as long as 
a Java virtual machine exists in the operating system (Lindholm & Yellin, 1999) 
Figure 4:2 shows a compiled Java application that runs inside a Java virtual machine.  The Java 
application and Java virtual machine is a process virtual machine type.  Java applications can 
easily run on multiple operating systems providing the operating systems have a Java virtual 
machine. 
Hardware: CPU, Memory, Hard disk
Operating System: Windows, Linux
Java virtual machine
Compiled Java application Process
Virtual 
Machine
 
FIGURE 4:2 JAVA VIRTUAL MACHINE WITH JAVA APPLICATION. 
3.2 System Virtual Machines 
A system virtual machine on the other hand virtualizes a whole system consisting of operating 
system, user based processes, processor, networking and other IO components (Smith & Nair, 
2005).  Figure 4:3 is an example of a system virtual machine.  The computer system, in which 
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the system virtual machine is installed, is referred to as the host.  This is the bottom most layer 
in Figure 4:3.  The virtual machine running in the system virtual machine is called the guest.  In 
Figure 4:3 the top three layers, showing hardware, operating system and application, is the 
guest. 
An example of a system virtual machine is Oracle VM VirtualBox.  The Oracle VM VirtualBox 
installs inside an existing operating system, like Windows, MacOSX, Linux or Solaris.  The 
installed Oracle VM VirtualBox can host many operating systems, which include, but are not 
limited to various Windows, Linux and MacOSX server versions (Oracle Corporation, 2011) 
This dissertation concentrates on system virtual machines further and not process virtual 
machines.  System virtual machines allow for the virtualisation of hardware.  The virtualisation 
of an actual computer allows a bank to install, configure and control a computer from which a 
customer can conduct online banking.  A system virtual machine also allows the virtual machine 
to be isolated from the host computer, giving the customer an isolated, protected environment 
in which he can conduct online banking.  Process virtual machines do not virtualise hardware 
and as such is not applicable to the solution required. 
Hardware: CPU, Memory, Hard disk
Operating System: Windows, Linux
Oracle VirtualBox VM
Hardware
Operating 
system
Application
Hardware
Operating 
system
Application
System
Virtual
Machine
 
FIGURE 4:3 ORACLE VIRTUALBOX VM IS A SYSTEM VIRTUAL MACHINE 
During the introduction it was mentioned that Rosenblum (2004) identified hardware-level 
virtualization, originally defined by IBM, is when the virtual machine monitor is directly on top 
of the hardware layer.  He then further defined the case where the virtual machine monitor is 
hosted inside the operating system of the real hardware.  Rosenblum (2004) refers to this type 
of virtualisation as hosted virtualisation.  The hosted virtual machine is just another type of 
system virtual machine, defined by Smith and Nair (2005). 
The term system virtual machine also refers to the term hosted virtual machines in the 
dissertation. 
This dissertation focusses on online banking in a home environment.  This implies that a home 
user cannot use a virtual machine on a server, but rather on his home computer.  It is important 
to note that the reasons for using virtualisation on desktops and servers are different.  In the 
next section the reasons for using virtualisation on desktops and servers are discussed. 
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4 Server and Desktop Virtualisation 
The reasons why people implement virtualisation on servers are different than on desktops.  In 
this section the reasons for implementing virtualisation on desktops and servers will be 
discussed.  Once the reasons are understood, it will be simpler to understand why virtualisation 
can be used for online banking. 
Server virtualisation allows for (Agarwal, et al., 2012): 
 An increase in server utilisation rates. Multiple underutilised systems can be grouped 
together to better utilise existing hardware.  
 Consolidate multiple operating systems and applications. Applications that require their 
own dedicated operating systems can utilise many hardware devices if each operating 
system is installed on its own server hardware.  Virtualisation allows the server 
hardware to be consolidated, but still allows each application to run within its own 
operating system. 
 Deploy new applications in minutes.  New virtual machines can be installed and 
configured in minutes on existing hardware where capacity exists.  There is no need to 
first procure new hardware, physically install the hardware and then install and 
configure the operating system.  
Some of the driving factors for running virtualisation on existing desktop systems are described 
in the next section, they are (Rosenblum, 2004): 
 Application compatibility. With the upgrading to newer or different operating systems, 
virtualisation allows applications only compatible for a specific operating system to be 
run on any system.  
 Program testing and development. To ensure application compatibility in a developed 
application, virtualisation allows the developer to test the application on multiple 
systems, without having to physically have access to these systems.  
 Accelerated application deployment. Preconfigured virtual machines with specific 
applications can be deployed as is and allows the system to be used without complex 
installation and configuration tasks per client.  
 Data isolation. The strong isolation properties of virtual machines can be used to 
segregate data within one system.  This allows a system that need to access a secured 
network to obtain data without other virtual machines having access to the data 
retrieved by this system  
One of the factors not mentioned by Rosenblum (2004) is that it allows an open source 
operating system, like Linux, to run on nearly any other platform which is supported by the 
System virtual machine software.  This enables an organisation to develop and configure a 
solution based on an open source Linux, without having to worry about software licensing to a 
company like Microsoft when the solution is distributed to potential customers. 
In the next two sections the reasons for virtualisation on servers and desktops are discussed. 
These reasons lead to a better understanding of why virtualisation can be used as a solution for 
safer online banking. 
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4.1 Server virtualisation 
Virtualising systems on servers means that a server is used to run virtual machines on.  These 
virtual machines provide various services to the organisation. 
The reasons for virtualising systems on servers are: 
 Increase hardware utilisation (Vogels, 2008) 
 Hardware consolidation (Vogels, 2008) 
 Ease of deployment of applications (Microsoft, 2012) 
The dissertation does not go into details for the reasons for server virtualisation because the to 
be developed online banking solution lends itself more towards virtualisation on the desktop. 
4.2 Desktop virtualisation 
In the previous sections the virtualisation of servers were discussed.  Virtualisation of systems 
on desktops are also gaining popularity, but is being accomplished for different reasons than 
server virtualisation. 
The reasons why systems are being virtualised on desktops are: 
 Application compatibility (Rosenblum, 2004) 
 Program testing and development (Rosenblum, 2004) 
 Accelerated application deployment (Microsoft Corporation, 2012) 
 Data isolation (Rosenblum, 2004) 
4.2.1 Application compatibility 
One of the features of Windows Vista and Windows 7 Professional is Windows XP Mode.  
Windows XP Mode is essentially Microsoft Virtual PC that allows Windows XP to run inside 
Windows Vista or Windows 7.  Microsoft released this so that users could still run applications 
that were not compatible with Windows Vista or Windows 7 inside their latest operating 
system.   
Figure 4:4 shows Windows XP running as virtual machines in Windows 7 (Microsoft 
Corporation, 2012).  The figure shows two “About”-windows.  On the left is the window showing 
the version of Window as being Windows XP and on the right is the window showing Windows 
7 as the operating system. 
The above feature was made possible through Microsoft Virtual PC.  VMware was one of the first 
vendors to allow virtual machines to be installed on a desktop type operating system like 
Microsoft Windows XP (Rosenblum, 2004) 
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FIGURE 4:4 WINDOWS XP MODE IN WINDOWS 7 
Virtual machines make it possible to run a Windows application inside Mac OS X or Linux using 
Virtual Machine software like VMware or Oracle VirtualBox.  This focus of this research is in the 
Windows operating system. 
It will be possible for a bank to design a virtual machine with a specific operating system, give it 
to a user and have the user run it inside his preferred operating system. 
4.2.2 Program testing and development 
Application developers are sometimes faced with a challenge when they have to ensure that the 
application that they are developing can run on various versions of operating systems. 
Keeping a computer for each operating system or configuration setting is expensive and wastes 
time.  Software engineers can keep a library of virtual machines with different software 
configurations to develop or test against. 
System administrators, responsible for application deployment within an organisation can also 
keep various virtual machines, one with a previous version, current version and maybe the next 
version for compatibility testing in the specific environment. 
Another feature that makes virtual machines ideal for application development and testing is 
the ability for a snapshot to be taken of a virtual machine.  A snapshot is a point in time 
reference of a specific system.  Any changes to a system from the time a snapshot was taken can 
easily be undone to ensure the virtual machine is in exactly the same state as it was before 
(Oracle Corporation, 2011). 
Figure 4:5 show that a snapshot was taken of a version 1.0 state and configuration. Changes 
were made to the application or configuration changing the version to 1.1.  Subsequent testing 
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showed that version 1.1 was not successful and could easily be rolled back to version 1.0 
because of the snapshot that was taken of the version 1.0 system and configuration. 
Time
Snapshot: 
Version 1.0
Changes made: 
Version 1.1
Tests unsuccessful:
Revert to version 1.0
 
FIGURE 4:5 TESTING ON VIRTUAL MACHINES ALLOWS FOR QUICK RECOVERY TO PREVIOUS WORKING STATE. 
The testing of applications in a virtual environment does not have direct influence on the end 
user of a virtualised online banking application. 
4.2.3 Accelerated application deployment 
Oracle has preconfigured virtual machines with specific pieces of software (Oracle Corporation, 
2012).  VMware also has an area which has, what they call, Virtual Appliances.  The virtual 
appliances and preconfigured virtual machines are virtual machines that have a number of 
specific applications and operating systems preinstalled and configured on them so that it 
allows a user to only download and run the specific virtual machine on their own computer 
(VMWare Inc, 2012). 
An example of these preconfigured virtual machines is the “Bloombase Spitfire Message Security 
Server”. The Bloombase Spitfire Message Security Server is a high-performance mail proxy 
server that encrypts and signs emails on-the-fly at corporate messaging servers (VMWare Inc, 
2012). 
Just as third parties publish these preconfigured systems for commercial use, is it possible for IT 
departments to preinstall and configure a system and deploy to multiple corporate computers 
without having to go through complex installation and configuration steps per deployed 
computer. 
VMware even made available an online market place for vendors to sell preconfigured virtual 
machines for use by potential customers.  Figure 4:6 shows the virtual appliance marketplace 
from VMWare (VMWare Inc, 2012).  This marketplace allows clients to download a virtual 
appliance and run it on their existing environment. 
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FIGURE 4:6 VMWARE'S VIRTUAL APPLIANCE MARKETPLACE  
Banks can use the same concept to deploy an updated version of the virtual machine to their 
online banking customers.  
It is also possible for banks to develop an online banking virtual appliance that adheres to a 
specific configuration, also known as a known configuration.  With this known configuration the 
bank knows exactly how and who connects to the banking system. 
The bank can also make the virtual appliance available as a LiveCD (PC Magazine, 2012), or 
image that can be run.  This image can be made read only, so that the user of the appliance 
cannot change it.  This read-only image is also known to be persistent.  When a new version of 
the appliance becomes available the whole persistent image can be updated.  Persistent images 
are in many cases used for demo purposes (PC Magazine, 2012). 
4.2.4 Data Isolation 
Rosenblum (2004) identifies isolation capabilities as one of the attributes of a virtual machine 
monitor. 
The United States of America’s National Security Agency (NSA), created a system called, NetTop.  
The NetTop system comprises two virtual machines.  One virtual machine is used to access 
public networks, like the Internet, the other virtual machine is used to access a classified 
network.  The NetTop system is an example where the isolated character of virtual machines is 
exploited to isolate data (Rosenblum, 2004). 
Data isolation is a powerful driver for the use of virtual machines on desktops to ensure 
integrity and security of data and system.  This specific characteristic is used as part of the V-
Bank solution to increase security in online banking systems. 
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Data isolation ensures that the memory space and processes of the system that is used by the 
client to conduct online banking, be isolated from the rest of the user’s computing environment.  
This isolation puts the online banking environment in a sandbox that is not accessible by 
software running on the user’s operating system. 
The reasons for virtualising systems on desktops and servers were discussed and the 
advantages of desktop virtualisation were described.  Desktop virtualisation is an isolated, fully 
configurable environment for online banking.   
Even though virtual machines isolate the virtualised environment and are protected, virtual 
machines also have vulnerabilities and these vulnerabilities are explained in the next section. 
5 Information security vulnerabilities and virtual machines 
Virtual machines can have positive security implications to a system.  It allows not just users 
and processes to be isolated, but full operating systems can be isolated (England & Manferdelli, 
2006). 
There are also some negative security implications such as the security management burden 
that comes with the extra layers of technology.  Some virtualisation systems also allow multiple 
virtual machines to share information between each other.  This can act as an attack vector 
(Scarfone, et al., 2011) 
This section discusses the security implications for using virtual machines in a computing 
environment.  The security implications described are the ability for isolating guest operating 
systems from each other and the host operating system.  It also describes the ability for the 
VMM to monitor the guest operating system and then lastly the image and snapshot capabilities 
of the VMM (Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
 
5.1 Guest operating system isolation 
The inherent characteristic of virtual machines is that they virtualise a computer, with its 
hardware, operating system and applications.  This may lead to an assumption that, just like 
physical computers, virtual machines are isolated from each other.  This is however not true.  
This section shows that even though virtual machines seem to be isolated, that there are a 
number of security considerations to take into account. 
Scarfone, et al. (2011) identifies the following items as a security concern with operating system 
isolation: 
 Partitioning.  When a VMM assigns physical resources to each guest operating system it 
is called physical partitioning.  When a VMM assigns resources to a guest operating 
system from a pool of resources sharing the same security characterisation level is it 
called logical partitioning.  
 Sandboxing.  When guest operating systems are isolated from each other on the same 
host, each with its own resources. 
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 Side-channel attacks.  The ability of a guest operating system exploiting the physical 
properties of the hardware to reveal information about another guest operating system. 
 Escape.  When a guest operating system tries to gain access to the VMM in order to affect 
other guest operating systems or host operating system.  
 Guest operating tools.  In hosted VMM implementations the VMM can install certain 
tools on the guest operating system, allowing the guest operating system to share 
information with the host operating system or other guest operating systems. 
Each of the security concerns are now be briefly described 
5.1.1 Partitioning 
The VMM is responsible for assigning physical resources to guest operating systems.  These 
resources are things such a CPU, memory and storage (Smith & Nair, 2005). 
The VMM assigns the resources from the host system to the guest operating systems.  The 
resources are partitioned to ensure that one guest operating system cannot encroach on 
resources assigned to another guest operating system.  Resources may be partitioned physically 
or logically (Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
In physical partitioning, the physical resources assigned to a virtual machine are disjoint from 
other virtual machines.  Physical partitioning gives a high degree of isolation to a system.  
Neither software problems nor hardware failure on one partition can affect the resources on 
another partition (Smith & Nair, 2005). 
In logical partitioning the underlying hardware are time-multiplexed between the different 
partitions.  This allows for better hardware utilisation between systems (Smith & Nair, 2005).  
Physical partitioning provides stronger security and reliability than logical partitioning 
(Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
5.1.2 Sandboxing 
Partitioning ensures that physical hardware is separate between guest operating systems.  VMM 
also has the ability to control access from the different guest operating systems.  The VMM can 
for instance disable the network in one guest operating system, while enabling the sharing of a 
file system between two operating systems (Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
Isolating each guest operating system and controlling what resources they can access and what 
access is allowed is also known as sandboxing (Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
5.1.3 Side-channel attacks 
Side –channel attacks use the physical characteristic of computer equipment to gain information 
about the software running on the system.  This can include things like electro-magnetic 
emissions or computation time (Green, 2013). 
Recent studies have shown that it is very difficult, but theoretically possible, for one virtual 
machine to gain knowledge, like cryptographic keys belonging to another virtual machine 
through side-channel attacks (Green, 2013). 
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Running multiple virtual machines on the same hardware also mitigates traditional side-
channel attacks by creating noise (Green, 2013). 
5.1.4 Escape 
If an attacker can break out of a virtual machine into the VMM, then the attacker can potentially 
compromise the VMM and gain access to other guest operating systems.  When an attacker 
breaks out of a virtual machine, it is known as escape (Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
Wang and Jiang (2010) argues that the VMM is a complex and big structure and cannot always 
be trusted, which allows virtual machines to exploit vulnerabilities in the VMM and escape. 
5.1.5 Guest tools 
Many hosted virtualisation solutions allow guest operating systems to use mechanisms called 
guest tools to exchange information between each other or the host operating system.  These 
guest tools can include the functionality to share files or directories, copy and paste buffers and 
other resources.  These communication mechanisms can act as attack vectors for attackers.  
Hardware level virtualisation does not have these types of sharing mechanisms (Scarfone, et al., 
2011) 
Because these guest tools can be used as a potential attack vector the bare minimum guest tools 
should be enabled.  This then expands our online banking design requirements with a new 
requirement. 
 
 
5.2 Guest operating system monitoring 
A VMM is fully aware of the state of a guest operating system running on it.  The VMM has the 
ability to monitor each guest operating system as it runs.  This ability is called introspection 
(Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
Introspection allows the VMM to run security applications, such as anti-virus, intrusion 
detection systems and policy checkers.  Unfortunately it also allows attackers to use 
introspection as a way to gain access to information in the virtual machine (Pieters, et al., 2009) 
Introspection is also a problem related to confidentiality of virtual machines.  It allows the VMM 
to see inside the virtual machine (Pieters, et al., 2009) 
Design Requirements 
 
18. The bare minimum guest tools should be enabled in a client-
side virtual machine environment. 
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In an online banking environment this can be problematic as an attacker can gain knowledge 
and information for authenticating, confidentiality and non-repudiation mechanisms used by 
the online banking system. 
Pieters, et al. (2009) recommends that the VMM only has limited introspection capabilities.  This 
leads to an online banking design requirement. 
 
  
5.3 Image and snapshot management 
A feature that can be provided by a VMM is to rollback actions of a virtual machine.  This is 
accomplished by taking a snapshot of the VMM at a specific time.  This snapshot is then an 
image of the virtual machine as it was at that specific date (Pieters, et al., 2009). 
The biggest security concern with snapshots is that they contain sensitive data.  Snapshots 
however contains more than just what is normally part of a virtual machine image, it also 
contains what was in RAM at that specific time (Scarfone, et al., 2011) 
In an online banking environment, the client side online banking environment should not have 
the capability of having snapshots taken.  Snapshots of a client-side operating virtual machine 
image should not be possible.  This may allow attackers to evaluate the snapshot and potentially 
gain access to passwords as they are loaded in RAM. 
 
A virtual machine is implemented as an image that is loaded by the VMM.  Images can be 
deployed as virtual appliances that can expire.  This means the image is read only and cannot 
change.  The image is also normally distributed using read only media.  If it is not managed as an 
appliance then malware on an untrusted host can make changes to the image. (Scarfone, et al., 
2011). 
Guest operating systems running on host operating system cannot be fully protected.  The only 
way to guarantee security is to bypass the host operating system altogether.  This can be 
Design Requirements 
 
20. Snapshots of a client-side operating virtual machine 
environment should not be possible 
Design Requirements 
 
19. The VMM used by the online banking system should have 
limited introspection capabilities 
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accomplished by booting into a removable hypervisor with the guest operating system 
(Scarfone, et al., 2011). 
Virtual machines allow isolation features that increase security of virtual machines.  Virtual 
machines also have their own security concerns that must be taken into account while designing 
a system that uses virtualisation.  In the next section the various virtualisation options are 
described.  An evaluation of the virtualisation options assists with the implementation of our 
virtual machine based online banking solution. 
6 Virtualisation Options 
There are many notable virtualisation solutions available.  Virtualisation solutions can be 
broadly grouped into commercial and open source categories. 
The virtualisation options that are discussed include: 
 OpenVZ (Parallels IP Holdings GmbH, 2013) 
 Xen (Xen Project, 2013) 
 KVM (an., 2013) 
 VirtualBox (Oracle Corporation, 2011) 
 VMware (VMware, 2012) 
 Microsoft Virtual PC (Microsoft Corporation, 2012) 
When evaluating the various virtualisation options the following criteria are looked at: 
1. Can it run on Windows, Apple and Linux? 
2. Does it support a Linux or Windows guest? 
3. What are the licensing implications? 
4. Does it support certain host integration features like printing to host printers? 
6.1 OpenVZ 
OpenVZ is developed as an open source community project, but is supported by Parallels.  
OpenVZ creates multiple Linux servers on the same server hardware (Kolyshkin, 2012). 
OpenVZ can only be used as a Linux host and supports only Linux guests.  There is very little 
overhead for the OpenVZ system and is used to provide virtualised Linux servers. 
There is limited host integration features for printing to USB printers connected to the host 
server. 
6.2 Xen 
Xen Hypervisor is also an open source community project.  Xen is in essence a VMM, but utilise 
existing Linux distributions as the Domain0 Guest.  Figure 4:7 shows the Xen Hypervisor is 
installed directly on the server hardware (Fraser, 2009).   
The Domain0 Guest is a special guest operating system that has direct access to the hardware on 
the host and controls all the other guest operating systems on the hardware (Fraser, 2009) 
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FIGURE 4:7 XEN HYPERVISOR ORGANISATION  
Xen was first developed by the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, but is currently 
maintained and developed by the open source community.  It is licensed under the GNU General 
Public License (GPLv2).   Xen was at the writing of this dissertation maintained and supported 
by Citrix (Citrix Systems, Inc, 2012) 
Xen supports both Linux and Windows as Guest operating systems, but only Linux as the 
Domain 0 Guest (Host).  There is also limited support for USB printing available for guest 
operating systems. 
6.3 KVM 
KVM (Kernel-based Virtual Machine) is currently being developed by the open source 
community with support from Red Hat, Inc.  The KVM project consists of various components 
each with a different license, but in general the project is an open source license. 
KVM works with a Linux host, but can support multiple guest operating systems, including 
Windows and Linux, but can only run in conjunction with a Linux host. 
There is limited printing support for USB printers inside the KVM configuration. 
6.4 VirtualBox 
Oracle VirtualBox VM was developed initially by Innotek GmbH, which was bought out by SUN 
and is currently being developed by Oracle.  The system is open source and binaries exist for 
various platforms, including Linux, MacOS and Windows.  It also supports many different guests 
including Linux, Windows, DOS and even OS/2. 
There is no printing integration support from the host operating system to the guest.  Printers 
have to be defined per guest, inside the guest operating system. 
The base VirtualBox package is distributed under the GNU General Public License V2 (Oracle 
Corporation, 2012). 
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6.5 VMware 
VMware Workstation or VMware Player is software developed by VMware that enables 
virtualisation on desktop operating systems.  It can be installed on Windows and Linux and 
supports many guest operating systems, including Linux and Windows. 
The Guest additions available in VMware allow for the automatic creation of any printer that has 
been created and defined in the host operating system.  This means that there is no need to 
recreate the printers inside the guest operating system, if it has already been created in the host 
operating system. 
VMware Player is freely available for testing and personal use. VMware Player may not be used 
for commercial use (VMware, 2012).  VMware Workstation may be used for commercial use, but 
requires a license from VMware. 
6.6 Microsoft Virtual PC 
Microsoft has two Virtual PC products: the one is called Windows Virtual PC and the other 
Virtual PC 2007.  Windows Virtual PC is available for Windows 7 and allows Windows XP, 
Windows Vista and Windows 7 guest operating systems (Microsoft, 2011).  Virtual PC 2007 is 
available for Windows Vista and Windows XP and supports most Microsoft operating systems, 
but not Linux (Microsoft, 2007) 
Microsoft Virtual PC is available without extra costs to Windows 7, Windows Vista and Windows 
XP users. 
Virtual PC automatically creates printers in the Guest operating systems that exists on the host 
operating system 
 
 Page 92 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
6.7 Summary 
Table 8 shows a summary of the virtualisation options discussed in the above sections. 
 
TABLE 8: SUMMARY OF VIRTUALISATION TECHNOLOGIES 
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7 List of design requirements 
While describing the information security concerns in virtual machines three new design 
requirements were identified.  The three new design requirements are requirements number 
18 to 20.  Figure 4:8 shows the new design requirements that were identified while describing 
virtual machine security concerns. 
Requirement 18 states that the bare minimum guest tools should be enabled in a client-side 
virtual machine environment.  The only guest tool that may be required by an online banking 
system running as a virtual machine is the printer integration.  The printer integration makes is 
more user friendly when clients would like to print information from their online banking 
system. 
While describing image and snapshot management, it was mentioned that virtual machine 
images should be managed as virtual machine appliances that expire.  This requirement was not 
specifically highlighted, as it already complies with requirement one, which states that the client 
operating environment should be persistent.  It should not be possible to change any file or 
configuration in the client operating environment. 
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8 Conclusion 
Virtual machines have important properties like isolation and accelerated application 
deployment that makes ideal solutions for isolating online banking environment from user 
operating environments.   
Part of the requirements for an online banking system is that the banking system should be 
persistent with a known configuration that is also protected from the rest of the user’s 
operating environment.  Virtual machines can be preconfigured, made persistent and given to 
banking clients to increase the security of an online banking system. 
It was shown that virtualisation can increase security of systems, but a number of information 
security concerns should be taken into account while designing an online banking system that 
uses virtualisation.  Some of the virtualisation options that are available for implementing an 
online banking system were described.  The chapter concluded by showing how the design 
requirements for an online banking system are affected by the security concerns of virtual 
machines. 
From this chapter we can now also state that one of the design requirements for our prototype 
system is to make use of virtualisation.  In Chapter 7 the implementation of the prototype is 
discussed.  One of the aspects that are discussed in that chapter is the virtualisation solution 
used by the prototype. 
The list of design requirements has now received input by evaluating the risks inherent to 
online banking.  It was further expanded by evaluating the existing information security 
controls used by banks.  The last input to the list was by describing some of the security 
concerns with virtual machines.  The next chapter looks at some of the existing research 
conducted using virtual machines to increase security for networked systems.  This is used as 
input to further expand the design requirements. 
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Chapter 5: CURRENT RESEARCH 
1 Introduction 
The idea of using virtualisation to increase the security in an environment is not novel.  A 
number of research papers have been published that evaluate the ability of virtual machines to 
increase the security of online systems. 
This chapter evaluates some of the solutions described in the studies.  The solutions are 
evaluated to identify the advantages and disadvantages of the systems and address them as 
design requirements for our online banking system. 
Four research papers were chosen to be evaluated.  The research papers were chosen for the 
following reasons: 
 The solution must make use of virtualisation. 
 The solutions must increase the information security of the applied environment. 
 The research papers must be published a few years from each other to see how 
advancements in technology affected the solutions. 
An overview of the four research papers chosen for evaluation is described in the next section 
2 Background 
Cox, Hansen, Gribble and Levy published a paper in 2006 with the title “A safety-oriented 
platform for Web applications” (Cox, et al., 2006).  This paper is the first of the four studies that 
are evaluated. 
The second study that is examined is called “SafeFox: A Safe Lightweight Virtual Browsing 
Environment” and was written by Wang J., Huang Y. and Ghosh A (Wang, et al., 2010). 
The third study is called “The secure virtual computer on your keychain” proposed by Tom 
Rowan (Rowan, 2008) 
The last study is called “A Novel Security Scheme for Online Banking Based on Virtual Machine” 
(Guan, et al., 2012). 
In this section each research topic is evaluated by describing what the problem was that the 
research topic wanted to solve.  The structure for each research topic then describes the 
following: 
 Design goals.  Each piece of research wanted to solve a specific problem and defined a 
number of design goals.  These design goals are similar to the design requirements that 
have been used as a deliverable for the various chapters in this dissertation.  The design 
goals of each research topic must be understood so that it can be evaluated within the 
boundaries of the defined design goals. 
 Key architecture.  The architecture for each research topic is described as this can lend 
valuable insight into the way in which the problem was addressed. 
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 Implementation.  Since the goal of this dissertation is to implement a prototype of a 
secure online banking system, using virtualisation, is it valuable to understand how 
other researchers implemented their systems. 
 Evaluation.  After the research topic has been described, the research is evaluated. 
In this chapter the term “LiveCD” is used.  A LiveCD is generally referred to as a full operating 
system that gets installed on a compact disk (CD).  The user of a computer then boots the 
computer with the LiveCD and the LiveCD starts the operating system that is installed on the CD.  
The system is usually a persistent system in that it is impossible for files to change on the 
LiveCD, since it is a read-only medium (PC Magazine, 2012). 
3 Study 1: A safety-oriented platform for Web applications 
The study performed by Cox, et al., 2006 and published as “A safety-oriented platform for Web 
applications” is evaluated in this section of the dissertation.  The evaluation starts by looking at 
what problem the research addressed.  Once the problem is understood the design goals for the 
proposed solution is described. 
Once the design goals are understood, the architecture of the solution is examined after which 
the implementation of the solution is discussed. 
An evaluation of the solution is then conducted highlighting any shortcomings and difficulties.  
These shortcomings and difficulties are listed to see if it is possible for the V-Bank solution to 
address the shortcomings. 
When the first Mosaic web browser was released in 1993 the web was perceived as a vast 
repository of interconnected, passive documents.  Since then the web has evolved into a 
collection of independent, dynamic applications. 
Web browsers are unfortunately not adequately protected for their new role.  Despite attempts 
to “retrofit” isolation and security, the original roots of a web browser stays evident. 
The problem focusses on the fact that web browsers cannot cope with the demands and threats 
of today’s web applications and infrastructure. 
With the above in mind Cox, et al. designed the Tahoma browsing architecture. 
3.1 Design goals 
Cox, et al. defined three key principles to which the Tahoma architecture adheres to.  They are: 
1. Web applications should not be trusted.  Web applications and users should be 
protected from the various threats that exist on the web.  Web applications should be 
contained within a sandbox environment, to mitigate potential damage. 
2. Web browsers should not be trusted.  Web browsers can be fairly complex and can even 
become more complex because of third-party add-ons.  This complexity and add-ons is 
vulnerable against online threats.  Browsers should be isolated from the rest of the 
system to minimise the potential impact of an exploited vulnerability. 
3.  Users should be able to identify and manage downloaded Web applications.  Web 
applications should be easily identifiable with their servers to the users. 
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The above design goals gives the user of an implemented Tahoma architecture not only a 
sandboxed environment for the Internet browser, but also protects Web applications (server-
side included) protection from each other. 
3.2 Key architecture 
Before we discuss the architecture of the Tahoma system, the following terms are defined (Cox, 
et al., 2006). 
Tahoma Term 
Web documents: static and active content (e.g. HTML or JavaScript) that a browser fetches 
from the Web service 
Browser: Client side software (e.g. Firefox or Internet Explorer) that interacts with the user to 
fetch, display and execute Web documents 
Virtual machine: a Virtual x86 machine that provides the sandboxed execution environment 
for an instantiated browser. 
Browser interface: A browser executing in a virtual machine; A client has one browser 
instance per executing Web application 
Web application: The union of a client-side browser instance and a remote Web service that 
cooperate to provide the user with some application function (e.g. , online banking, web mail). 
 
The Tahoma architecture is defined with six key features (Cox, et al., 2006).  
1. There is a trusted layer, called the Browser Operating System (BOS) on top of which 
Browser instances can run. 
2. It provides explicit support for Web Applications.  A Web Application is defined as both 
the client side component (Web Browser) and server-side component (Web Services 
and Web Sites) that makes up a specific Web application.  Example: The browser 
instance that runs any client side JavaScript or Java Apps when connecting to an HTTPS 
session that is created on the Web server on an Internet banking system. 
3. It enforces isolation between Web applications.  One Web application cannot spy nor 
have access to any resources belonging to another Web application executed from the 
Tahoma system. 
4. It supports an enhanced window interface for browser instances.  The BOS multiplexes 
multiple instances onto the physical screen and authenticates the Web application for 
the users.  (This gives the user the assurance that he is not connected to a spoofed web 
site). 
5. It enforces policies, defined by the Web service (from the server).  The policies control 
to which set of web sites the browser can connect to for this specific Web application.  
The policies are contained in a component called a manifest, which is given to the client 
when the initial session to the web site is created. 
6.  It provides resource support to browser instances, such as window management, 
network communication, bookmarking and execution of Web applications. 
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FIGURE 5:1: THE TAHOMA ARCHITECTURE. 
Figure 5:1 shows a simplified high-level overview of the Tahoma architecture (Cox, et al., 2006).  
It shows two Web applications (Web application 1 and Web application 2).  Each web 
application shows that it consists of a Web service.  
A Web service may consist of more than one web site.   
A Web application also consists of a Browser interface.  The Browser interface in turn consists 
of the actual web browser, and the web document that gets loaded from the web site.  The web 
document may consist of static or dynamic content that partially gets executed on the client.  
This Browser interface gets executed and given the necessary resource by the trusted Browser 
Operating System (BOS) 
Each Web application is isolated from each other and controlled through a manifest provided by 
the Web service. 
Web documents and manifest information gets transferred between the Browser interface and 
Web service via the Internet. 
3.3 Implementation 
The Tahoma system was implemented using Xen Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM).  The Xen 
VMM makes use of Domain0 through DomainN (Where N is variable number greater than 0). 
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FIGURE 5:2 THE TAHOMA IMPLEMENTATION.  
Figure 5:2 is a simplified view of how the Tahoma system is implemented (Cox, et al., 2006).  It 
shows that the XEN VMM isolates browser instances by sandboxing them in virtual machines.   
The Browser Operating System (BOS) executes in Domain0 and controls the creation of all the 
other domains when a browser instance is launched.  There are three main BOS processes that 
execute.  They are a reverse proxy, a firewall and a window manager.  The reverse proxy and 
firewall enforce the policies that are received from the Web services.  The window manager 
controls the windows in which the various browsers execute. 
Each virtual machine uses Konqueror as the web browser for browsing the web.  Inside each 
virtual machine are two libraries that assist the virtual machine to have access to the BOS.  The 
two libraries are called LibBOS and LibQT.  LibBOS gives the virtual machine access to functions 
that interface with the system functions in the BOS.  LibQT gives the virtual machine access to 
functions that interface with graphical functions in the BOS. 
The browsers that are created by the BOS execute in DomainN and do not have direct access to 
the hardware and must route everything through the BOS before it can get access to the Internet 
or hardware. 
3.4 Evaluation 
This section of the dissertation evaluates the solution described by Cox, et al.  
The Tahoma system describes an architecture which includes the client and the server.  In this 
way the server can help control access to the client. 
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A disadvantage of the Tahoma system is that it is still a generalised system, not specifically built 
for online banking. 
Running the system from a LiveCD eases deployment and implementation, since most people do 
not have a separate computer to only do their banking on.  It may even be possible to transfer 
the whole system to run in a virtual machine that the user can run on their normal desktop 
operating system environment, but from within a virtual machine. 
The major architecture concepts that can be taken from the Tahoma system are: 
1. The system includes the server and the client. 
2. The server controls the access of the client through approved configuration. 
3. Sandboxing of the browser helps to protect the operating system. 
Applying these concepts to online banking lead to the following design requirements:   
An online banking system should be designed to include not just a managed server 
environment, but also a managed client environment.  The Tahoma system took into account 
special web services that can only be used by the Tahoma client-side system, but this gives it all 
the advantages that the Tahoma system was designed for. 
 
The Tahoma server-side environment controls what the client can do on the web site using 
policies.  These policies are transferred to the client through a web service.  This concept can be 
expanded so that it may be possible for the server to evaluate the client configuration.  This can 
be made possible by running various applications pushed from the server on the client.  This 
allows the server to test various configuration settings on the client before the client is granted 
access. 
This requirement however is in line with our existing design requirement eight.  Design 
requirement eight states: An online banking system should only allow connections to and from 
approved clients and servers.  Instead of specifying a new design requirement that might have 
stated that the online banking system should evaluate the client against approved configuration 
settings, the existing design requirement eight is used. 
The Tahoma system sandboxes each web browser in its own virtual machine.  In the case of 
single purpose system that is designed for only online banking then the system should be 
sandboxed from the rest of the client operating environment.  The sandboxing ensures that the 
system is isolated from the rest of the client operating environment.  A new design requirement 
is defined. 
Design Requirements 
 
21. An online banking system should be designed to include not 
just a managed server environment, but also a managed client 
environment. 
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The next study that dealt with virtualisation is called SafeFox. 
4 Study 2: SafeFox: A Safe Lightweight Virtual Browsing 
Environment 
The SafeFox browsing environment was described by Wang, et al. 2010.   
In this section we look at the problem that SafeFox wanted to address.  We then determine the 
design goals of the system and see how the architecture supports these goals. 
After the architecture has been described the implementation of the system is discussed. 
Wang, et al. describe the problem with Internet browsing as the ability of attackers to use the 
web browser as an attack vector to the operating system.  The problem also includes the 
abilities of web sites to gain access to sensitive web sessions, such as banking sessions, though 
cross site vulnerabilities. 
4.1 Design goals 
To help protect the operating system from attacks through the web browser the SafeFox system 
identifies three design goals that must be fulfilled. 
They are (Wang, et al., 2010): 
 Host protection 
 Session protection 
 Low overhead 
Host protection is defined as protecting the operating system that hosts the web browser.  The 
web browser is not supposed to be able to affect the host on which it is running. 
Session protection is defined as protecting one Internet session from another session.  Sessions 
running on the same host should not be able to affect each other. 
The last goal is that the system should not take up significant overhead on the host system. 
4.2 Key architecture 
The SafeFox architecture uses a customised Linux kernel that acts as the host operating system 
for its virtual environments (VE).  It has a number of Linux daemons that help control the 
creation and configuration of the virtual environments.   
Design Requirements 
 
22. The client-side online banking system should be sandboxed 
from the rest of the client operating environment 
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A virtual environment is created each time the user clicks on the Firefox icon.  Each virtual 
environment is a virtual machine with its own resources assigned to it.  The resources includes 
IP address, process namespace and file system. 
A browsing session can either be a general browsing session or a secure bookmarked session.  A 
secure bookmarked session is a user defined web site that the user deems as critical.  This 
means that the user can decide that the online banking web site is a secure bookmarked site.  
The user then creates a secure bookmark specifically for that site.  Each time the user visits the 
site, the site is automatically created in its own virtual environment and never runs from the 
general virtual environment. 
Customized Linux Kernel
SafeFox Control Daemons
FFX
1
FFX
2
FFX
3
VE0 for general 
purpose browsing
VE1 for SB 
site 1
VE2 for SB 
site 2
SB: Secure Bookmark
FFX: Firefox
        : Control commands
 
FIGURE 5:3 THE SAFEFOX BROWSING ENVIRONMENT  
Figure 5:3 shows the SafeFox environment with a user having established a general purpose 
browsing session and two secure bookmarked sites (Wang, et al., 2010).  The general browsing 
session is opened in a virtual environment and each secure bookmarked site in its own virtual 
environment. 
4.3 Implementation 
The SafeFox implementation uses OpenVZ as its virtualisation solution running in Red Hat 
Linux. 
When the user clicks on the Firebox browser icon, the Firefox browser gets loaded in Master 
Mode.  Master Mode is a browser instance that has full Firefox features, including bookmarking, 
cookies and stored passwords and so on. 
The browser running in Master Mode is used for general web browsing.  If the user clicks on the 
Firefox icon again, it opens a second tab in the existing browser and runs in the same virtual 
environment as the first browser instance. 
In the initial Firefox is a bookmark folder called “Secure IC Bookmarks”.  By selecting any of 
these bookmarks, the SafeFox environment creates a separate virtual environment for the new 
site and new Firefox web browser.  This browser now runs in Secure-bookmarked mode. 
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The secure-bookmarked mode browser is a locked down instance of Firefox.  All top menus are 
disabled and the navigation bar is read-only.  Any metadata from the secure-bookmarked site is 
stored in a separate folder structure and any traffic to and from the web site is redirected to the 
new Firefox virtual environment.  It should be noted that the secured bookmark site, does not 
stop the user from clicking inside the current site and going to a new site, thus leaving the 
secure-bookmarked site, but still running in the virtual environment created for the secure-
bookmarked site. 
Closing a secure-bookmarked browser does not destroy the metadata that may have been 
created when the virtual environment was created or downloaded through the secure-
bookmarked session.  The next time the user initiates a session to the secure-bookmarked site 
the site reuses the already created resources. 
The last mode in which the browser can run is called Private mode.  Private mode is initiated by 
clicking on a separate icon on the desktop called “Private Firefox”.  Private mode is essentially 
the same as secure-bookmarked mode, except that it destroys any resources created for it 
during the browsing session when the user closes the session. 
4.4 Evaluation 
SafeFox gives an architecture which does not require any changes to online banking systems or 
web services.  It focusses on the web browser and creates an architecture which does not take 
up significant overhead. 
Even though SafeFox does not fulfil all the online banking design requirements, is it still a more 
secure environment for conducting online banking than from a normal computer. 
SafeFox can be implemented as a virtual machine running on Windows, making it possible for 
banks to deploy the system to their customers, without having to change anything on the online 
banking system. 
The biggest disadvantage of the SafeFox system is that it was never designed for a secure online 
banking system.  It thus does not specify any requirements for the server and allows the server 
to still accept connections from any type of client, whether it is a SafeFox client or not.  The V-
Bank system must incorporate an architecture that addresses both the client and the server and 
the communication channel in between.  This has also been stated in Chapter 5:3.4 as design 
requirement 21. 
5 Study 3: The secure virtual computer on your keychain 
The stealing of an employee’s laptop is a problem for IT directors and security officers.  Apart 
from the fact that there are costs involved in the hardware, the biggest concern is the loss of the 
data stored on the hard drive and VPN access credentials that may fall into the wrong hands 
(Rowan, 2008). 
To minimise the risk of stolen data and credentials in the event of stolen laptops, Rowan 
suggests that it is possible to create a computer on a universal serial bus (USB) storage device 
that can be started in a virtual environment hosted on a borrowed or paid-for host computer. 
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In this section we describe the design goals of the proposed solution.  After the design goals 
have been identified, the architecture of the solution is described after which the 
implementation of the solution is described.  This gives the reader a clear understanding of the 
solution. 
The solutions are then evaluated in the case of online banking.  In the general comments section 
the architectural components is evaluated to see which components can be adapted as a 
requirement for our online banking system. 
5.1 Design goals 
The following design goals are identified in the research paper (Rowan, 2008): 
 A laptop alternative 
 Security and portability 
 Agile workforce 
 Access control 
The primary design goal for the research was to give the mobile workforce an alternative to 
using laptops and storing sensitive data on the laptop.  The research showed that it may be 
possible to use a USB storage device to store a complete operating system that can be carried 
around and used, instead of owning a laptop. 
The USB storage device would be used on a host computer.  The USB device would start a virtual 
machine on the host computer.  This means that the user will be able to work on any host 
computer, be it his home computer, or another computer, without leaving any trace of corporate 
activities.  The USB device is also small and can be carried easily by user. 
The third design goal was to address the problem faced by corporations that allow many of their 
employees not to have to come into the office.  This gives the corporations options to 
temporarily use people, give them the virtual machine they would require for the duration of 
their work and use it on their own computer at home. 
The last design goal was to have the network of the virtual machine protect itself from the 
underlying operating system. 
5.2 Key architecture 
Rowan (2008) does not give a very clear explanation of the architecture utilised by the research.   
Figure 5:4 shows the components mentioned in the research article.  
The area on the left of Figure 5:4 shows the secure virtual computer, running a virtual machine 
on a host operating system.  The area on the right depicts the corporate network.  The corporate 
network is access control protected using network access control policies and virtual private 
network access control.    
The line combining the virtual machine on the host computer with the corporate network shows 
that the virtual machine accesses the corporate network through a virtual private network.  
Before the virtual private network is established network access control policies at the 
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corporate network interrogates the virtual machine hardware and software and determine 
whether access is granted. 
Host Operating System
Hypervisor Layer
VM
vNIC
VM
vNIC
VM
vNIC
Corporate Network
NAC Policies
VPN Access 
Control
NIC
Virtual Rights Management
 
FIGURE 5:4 SECURE VIRTUAL COMPUTER ARCHITECTURE 
On the left hand side of Figure 5:4, running, as a component in the hypervisor layer, is the 
virtual rights management (VRM) (VMWare Inc., 2005) component.  The VRM component 
controls what can be done with the virtual machine.  It has the ability to ensure that the virtual 
machine gets executed from a specific USB memory stick.  It ensures copy protection of the 
virtual machine.  It has the ability to password protect the virtual machine startup and can 
expire virtual machine images (VMWare Inc., 2012). 
5.3 Implementation 
In the research article, Rowan (2008) does not mention any prototype that was implemented.  
The implementation described in this section is recommendations from the research. 
The secure virtual computer on your keychain is implemented as a hosted virtual machine, 
running Windows XP.  The Windows XP image is configured with limited hardware support.  
This cuts down on the operating system image and boot-up time. 
The hypervisor must be installed on the host operating system, allowing the hypervisor access 
to run in processor level ring zero, giving the hypervisor direct access to the hardware on the 
operating system. 
The image of the virtual machine is stored on a USB storage device.  The USB storage device is a 
high quality fast storage device.  This helps to increase the speed of the virtual machine. 
The USB storage device may also include hardware encryption, tamper resistance features, 
water proofing and tough metal cases (Rowan, 2008). 
The VRM may be implemented using VMware ACE (VMWare Inc., 2012). 
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The VPN are not specified and any VPN solutions can be used to ensure network privacy. 
5.4 Evaluation 
The secure virtual computer on your keychain was researched specifically to solve the problem 
of employee laptops getting stolen.  The research did not set out to solve the problem of 
ensuring a secure online banking environment using virtual machines. 
The problem that the research article addressed was primarily to solve the problem where 
laptops get stolen thereby putting the corporation whose data is also stolen at risk.  In this 
section the solution is evaluated to determine whether it can be used in our safe online banking 
environment. This is done using the defined design requirements that has been created in the 
dissertation.  Each design requirement is listed and measured against the proposed solution 
from Rowan. 
Despite the fact that the research did not concentrate on online banking, it fulfilled nearly all the 
online banking design requirements. 
The disadvantage of the research is that it did not describe the implementation of a prototype 
and also did not do a critical evaluation of the proposed solution. 
 The solution described in the research is based very closely on VMware ACE (VMWare Inc., 
2012). 
The biggest disadvantage of the solution is the requirement of using Microsoft Windows.  This 
requires that every banking customer must be issued with an operating system license, which in 
turn may make the solution too expensive. 
An advantage of the system is the VRM, which ensures the validity of the virtual machine and 
the access rights of the host system in the virtual machine. 
6 Study 4: A Novel Security Scheme for Online Banking 
Based on Virtual Machine 
Guang, et al. (2012) describes a system they call Domain Online Banking.  The system uses 
virtualisation on the client computer to isolate the online banking system from the user’s 
operating system applications. 
This section starts by describing the design goals of the solution.  It then describes the 
architecture and then how it was implemented.  The section concludes with a brief evaluation of 
the solution. 
6.1 Design goals 
The Domain Online Banking solution was designed for the following requirements (Guan, et al., 
2012): 
 Any compromised component in the user’s operating system or applications may not 
gain access to the memory address space of the Domain Online Banking system 
 Sensitive information from the user may not be leaked to third parties. 
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 The user cannot access fraudulent web-sites that look like the authorised online-
banking web site. 
The research also specifically wanted to make use of virtualisation as a possible solution and 
protect the online banking environment from the following attacks 
 Phishing scams 
 Pharming 
 Malicious software attacks 
 Man-in-the-middle 
 Bank keylogger 
The next section describes the architecture that enables the design goals. 
6.2 Key architecture 
Figure 5:5 shows the architecture that is used for the Domain Online Banking system (Guan, et 
al., 2012). 
The architecture consists of primarily two components, the client computer, on the left of the 
figure, and the banking server on the right.  The client computer consists of two items (Guan, et 
al., 2012): 
 User’s computer.  This consists of the hardware, operating system and applications on 
the user’s computer 
 Online banking smart USB-key.  The smart USB-key, depicted in the dashed box, consists 
of the Xen Hypervisor, the Linux Dom0 restricted operating system and the Online 
Banking DomU virtual machine. 
Communication between the Online Banking DomU virtual machine and banking server is 
encrypted using a SSL\TLS channel. 
The Xen hypervisor consists of a vTPM module that hashes the Online Banking DomU virtual 
machines image and is compared with the hash of the virtual machine stored on the vTPM 
database on the banking server.  This is indicated with a ‘b’ in the figure.  The vTPM module 
effectively ensures the integrity of the Online Banking DomU virtual machine. 
The Online Banking DomU virtual machine makes use of Virtualisation Technology for Directed 
I\O that ensures that the virtual machine can get exclusive use of certain hardware PCI devices, 
like the keyboard and screen.  This is indicated with an ‘a’ in the figure. 
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FIGURE 5:5 DOMAIN ONLINE BANKING ARCHITECTURE 
 
6.3 Implementation 
The online banking smart USB-key gets pre-burned with the user’s private key, certificate, Xen 
Hypervisor and Online Banking DomU virtual machine.  The URL of the banking site is pre-
configured in the Online Banking DomU virtual machine, ensuring the virtual machine can only 
open a connection to the online banking site. 
The Online Banking DomU virtual machine is implemented as Windows XP, with the browser 
defined as the shell of the operating system.  This means that when the virtual machine starts, 
the web browser opens and automatically makes a connection to the online banking web site. 
When a user receives the online banking smart USB-key from the bank, the user boots his 
computer from the smart USB-key.  The Xen Hypervisor starts and automatically detect the 
user’s operating system, which starts as a DomU virtual machine.   
It also starts the Online Banking DomU virtual machine, but labels the browser window with 
[DOBank], so that the user knows that he is using the Online Banking DomU virtual machine to 
access the online banking web site. 
Whenever the user uses the Online Banking DomU virtual machine the virtual machine gains 
exclusive rights to the keyboard, video graphics adapter (vga) and mouse. 
6.4 Evaluation 
The Domain Online Banking system stops the five major attacks mentioned in the design goals.  
The bank server will only accept connections from authorised clients whose integrity has been 
checked.  Even if an attacker gains knowledge regarding the user’s login details, the attacker will 
not be able to access the online banking system, without the user’s online banking smart USB-
key, which stores a copy of the user’s private key. 
Software keyloggers are not able to capture information from the Online Banking DomU virtual 
machine, because the Online Banking DomU virtual machine has exclusive rights to the 
keyboard. 
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The Online Banking DomU virtual machine can only navigate to the banking web site, which 
means that it minimises the man-in-the-middle attack. 
If the banking server determines that the integrity of the Online Banking DomU virtual machine 
is not intact, then it can automatically download an approved Online Banking DomU virtual 
machine image to the client. 
The Domain Online Banking system treats the online banking system as a combination of both 
the client and the server, the same as the Tahoma system did.  The client-side banking 
environment is totally isolated from the rest of the operating environment, keeping it safe from 
an infected user operating system. 
There may be some implementation challenges with the compatibility of the Xen hypervisor and 
the different hardware configurations that may exist on the client computers.  If such a 
compatibility issue exist then a normal user may not be able to use the system.  
7 Comparative evaluation 
The four studies mentioned in the dissertation all use virtualisation to enhance the security of 
web services.  The latest study, Domain Online Banking system, is probably the closest to 
fulfilling all the design requirements that have been defined in the dissertation so far.  It also 
enhances the latest design requirements that were identified in Chapter 5:3. 
Table 9 lists the various design requirements and mentions whether the solution for the study 
fulfils the requirements, is not applicable or does not fulfil. 
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1 The client operating environment should be 
persistent.  It should not be possible to change 
any file or configuration in the client operating 
environment 
  X 
2 The client operating environment should be 
isolated on the network and only be allowed to 
connect to the banking system environment. 
 X  
3 It should not be possible to modify the Internet 
browser used by an online banking system.   X 
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4 Online banking systems should not allow the 
Internet Browser from opening multiple pages 
and the transaction component in an online 
banking system should re-authenticate the user, 
before committing important transactions. 
  X 
5 An online banking system should evaluate any 
input and allow only approved syntax in input 
fields. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
6 The online banking system should not contain any 
IFrames, nor should it reference code from any 
site except its own. 
 N/A N/A N/A 
7 Name resolution should not affect the connection 
inside an online banking system X X X 

8 An online banking system should only allow 
connections to and from approved clients and 
servers. 
X X  
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an 
online banking system or should minimize the 
effect it may have if present. 
X X  
10 An online banking environment should minimise 
the chances of an attacker using stolen 
information to gain access to a customer’s online 
banking profile. 
X X  
11 Online banking systems must have the ability to 
be updated when software vulnerabilities are 
detected. 
   
12 Online banking systems must ensure TLS 1.2 
channel security  N/A  
13 Online banking systems must have a visual trust 
anchor.  N/A N/A 
14 Online banking systems must properly 
authenticate users before allowing access.  N/A  
15 Online banking systems must implement a RBAC 
policy to ensure access to user information is 
controlled. 
N/A N/A  N/A 
16 Online banking systems must implement a 
layered security program. N/A N/A N/A N/A 
17 Online banking system should implement 
information security controls in all five ISO 7498-2 
security service categories. 
N/A N/A  
18 The bare minimum guest tools should be enabled 
in a client-side virtual machine environment.   N/A 
19 The VMM used by the online banking system 
should have limited introspection capabilities   X 
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20 Snapshots of a client-side operating virtual 
machine environment should not be possible   N/A 
TABLE 9: COMPARITIVE EVALUATION 
From the table we can deduce that systems that are designed for not just the client but include 
specific controls on the server, like study 1 and study 4 provides a safe environment for online 
banking.  In these two studies the server helps with allowing clients certain permissions and 
rights on the server.  The server specifies a policy which has to be adhered to by the client. 
All the solutions have the ability to be updated, which is important in an ever changing security 
landscape where new vulnerabilities are constantly being identified. 
Requirement six is only fulfilled by the first study.  The Tahoma system controls exactly how the 
web service is configured on the server.  It prohibits one site displaying content from another 
site.  The other studies did not define this as a requirement. 
Study 3 has the VMware ACE policies that help control access to the server.  These policies are 
defined using roles from the server.  The other studies did not specify role based access control 
as part of the scope. 
The only study that can cope with name resolution problems, as defined in requirement seven, 
is the study four, which controls where the client connects to. 
Requirement five is not applicable to any of the studies as it is generally assumed that user input 
should be evaluated on the web service. 
Requirement sixteen states that online banking systems must implement a layered security 
program.  The research articles concentrates mostly on the client and communication areas of the 
online banking environment.  The number authentication and authorisation steps necessary for the 
online banking system are not specified.  The assumption from the research is that the server system 
is adequately protected and secured. 
The table shows that the studies do not fulfil or is not applicable to a requirement if it did not 
include that specific design requirement as a requirement for the study.  This highlights the 
importance of defining a list of proper design requirements before designing a secure online banking 
system. 
It is clear that as technology progressed, that it became easier to enable secure, isolated online 
banking sessions. 
8 List of design requirements 
In the evaluation of the Tahoma system and the Domain Online Banking system, two new design 
requirements were identified.  The two new requirements are added to the other design 
requirements identified in the dissertation, but under a category called, current research. 
Figure 5:6 shows the new design requirements identified in this chapter.  Both requirements 
apply to the banking application on the client. 
 
 Page 114 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
 
H
ar
d
w
ar
e
C
u
st
o
m
er
B
an
k
O
p
er
at
in
g 
Sy
st
em
B
an
ki
n
g 
A
p
p
lic
at
io
n
U
se
r
H
ar
d
w
ar
e
O
p
er
at
in
g 
Sy
st
em
W
eb
 S
er
ve
r
B
an
ki
n
g 
Sy
st
em
D
ed
ic
at
ed
 S
ec
u
re
 
C
h
an
n
el
2
1
A
n
 o
n
li
n
e
 b
a
n
ki
n
g 
sy
st
e
m
 s
h
o
u
ld
 b
e
 
d
e
si
gn
e
d
 t
o
 in
cl
u
d
e
 n
o
t 
ju
st
 a
 m
a
n
a
ge
d
 
se
rv
e
r 
e
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t,
 b
u
t 
a
ls
o
 a
 m
a
n
a
ge
d
 
cl
ie
n
t 
e
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t.
2
2
Th
e
 c
li
e
n
t-
si
d
e
 o
n
li
n
e
 b
a
n
ki
n
g 
sy
st
e
m
 s
h
o
u
ld
 
b
e
 s
a
n
d
b
o
xe
d
 fr
o
m
 t
h
e
 r
e
st
 o
f t
h
e
 c
li
e
n
t 
o
p
e
ra
ti
n
g 
e
n
vi
ro
n
m
e
n
t
 
FIGURE 5:6 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
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9 Conclusion 
This chapter looked at some of the current research that utilised virtualisation to enable a safer 
online browsing experience.  The research succeeded in their design goals and in part fulfilled 
the requirements for a secure online banking system.  The design goals of a secure online 
banking system were extended to include some of the principles described in the research. 
Virtualisation technologies are continually developed and enhanced.  These developments 
enable solutions that increase the security of online banking sessions, as virtualisation 
technologies evolve better and more secure methods become available for online banking 
environments. 
Chapters two to five produced a list of design requirements for a secure online banking system.  
This list of design requirements act as input in designing our V-Bank prototype. 
In the next chapter the architecture of the V-Bank system is described.  The architecture is 
defined to fulfil the requirements that are defined in this research. 
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Chapter 6: V-BANK – ARCHITECTURE 
1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter current research that utilised virtualisation was evaluated.  Each 
research paper has a specific architecture that supports the design goals for that specific 
solution. 
This chapter describes the architecture for the V-Bank solution specifically pertaining to design 
specifications that has been developed in the dissertation. 
The next chapter looks at how the architecture was implemented in the V-Bank solution. 
This chapter starts with describing the design requirements that are identified in the 
dissertation.  Once the design requirements have been described the overall architecture of the 
V-Bank solution is described. 
The chapter concludes with an overview of the architecture. 
2 Design requirements 
The architecture has been designed to fulfil the design requirements that have been defined in 
the dissertation. 
The design requirements are grouped according to generally accepted architecture of a 
computing environment. 
Figure 6:1 shows the computing architecture with the design requirements.  The design 
requirements are grouped under the following architectural areas: 
 User 
 Banking application 
 Operating system 
 Hardware 
 Dedicated secure channel 
 Banking system 
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FIGURE 6:1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS 
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3 Overall Architecture 
Figure 6:2 shows the architecture of the V-Bank solution.  The architecture consists of the user’s 
home computer and the V-Bank system.  The user’s home computer consists of the computer’s 
hardware, operating system and applications in the host operating system.  The host operating 
system and hardware are the white areas in the figure on the left. 
The V-Bank solution consists of: 
 A Virtual machine monitor. The virtual machine monitor is installed in the host 
operating system and is situated below the trusted banking operating system.  The 
virtual machine monitor has diagonal shading in the figure. 
 Trusted banking operating system (TBOS).  The TBOS runs as a virtual machine in the 
virtual machine monitor and contains the integrity check (IC) module, which is 
explained later in the chapter.  The TBOS also has diagonal shading. 
 Banking system.  The banking system is located on the bank’s servers and has an 
integrity check (IC) database.  The whole integrity check module and database is 
explained later in the chapter. 
Operating System
Physical
NIC
Virtual Machine Monitor
Trusted Banking 
Operating System
Host 
Operating 
System
Physical 
Video 
Card
Physical 
Keyboard
Physical Hardware
Dedicated Secure 
Channel
User’s home computer Bank
Web Browser
Banking System
Hardware
IC-DB
IC
Module
 
FIGURE 6:2 V-BANK ARCHITECTURE 
A little bit more detail about the TBOS follows. 
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3.1 Trusted banking operating system 
While researching virtual machines, it was realised that virtual machines have special isolation 
properties, that isolates the virtual machine from the rest of the user operating system.  This 
property is used for the TBOS, by implementing it as a virtual machine. 
It was also seen that virtual machines can be configured as a read-only virtual appliance.  Using 
these properties the TBOS is defined with the following features: 
 Persistent.  The TBOS image is read only and cannot change 
 Known configuration.  The bank has full control over the configuration of the TBOS. 
 Mutual identification and authentication.  The TBOS identifies itself to the banking 
system using a certificate stored on the client and the server identifies itself to the client 
using a certificate stored on the server. 
 IC Module. The integrity of the TBOS is evaluated by the banking system, using the IC 
module and the IC database on the banking server.  Before access is granted by the 
server to the client, the server interrogates the client and confirms the configuration of 
the client by evaluating key configuration items on the TBOS.  The key-items are hashed 
and compared with the IC database on the server. 
 Private key signatures.  Banking transactions are signed using the client’s private key 
stored in the TBOS.  The electronic signature ensures non-repudiation of banking 
transactions. 
 Dedicated secure channel.  The client opens a TLS 1.2 channel to the banking server, 
known as the dedicated secure channel.  Data between the client and the server is 
encrypted.  The dedicated secure channel is also enforced using a firewall on the client.  
The firewall on the client ensures that the communication channel can only be 
established between the client and the server and no-one else. 
4 Conclusion 
The architecture of the V-Bank system is similar to the architecture described by Guang, et al. 
(2012).  The big difference between the V-Bank system and the Domain Banking System is that 
the virtual machine from where the online banking is conducted is not running on a Xen 
hypervisor, but instead runs on a virtual machine monitor installed in the host operating 
system. 
The implication of this is that the virtual machine monitor can be used on any hardware 
configuration, as long as the host operating system is supported by the virtual machine monitor.  
The V-Bank solution is more compatible than a system based on a VMM installed directly on the 
hardware and controlled from a Domain0 virtual machine, as in the case of Xen. 
The next chapter describes how the architecture is implemented in the V-Bank system. 
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1 Introduction 
The dissertation so far has been working towards the design and creation of a V-Bank 
prototype.  In the previous chapter the architecture that was defined for the V-Bank prototype is 
defined. 
This chapter describes the various architectural components and explain how our V-Bank 
system is designed. 
The next section describes how the components are organised into groups and where they are 
discussed in the chapter.  The next sections describe each component.  The chapter concludes 
with a summary of the design requirements and which components fulfilled the design 
requirements. 
2 V-Bank Components 
The architecture defines some components that need exclusive implementation on either the 
client or the server.  Some components, however, require changes on both the client and the 
server, such as the dedicated secure channel. 
There are also some components, such as the integrity check (IC) system on the server, that has 
a direct influence on the client, and even go as far as executing components on the client. 
The chapter groups the components together in three categories.  They are: 
 Client side components 
 Client and server-side components 
 Server-side components 
Each of these categories describes a specific component.  Table 10 shows each of the identified 
components and mechanisms for each category.  The components and mechanisms are chosen 
to fulfil specific design requirements, which are mentioned in each section dedicated for the 
specific component. 
Client-side Client and server-side Server-side 
Trusted Banking Operating 
System 
Authentication mechanism Web Server 
Virtual Machine Monitor Dedicated secure channel Data Objects 
Persistence Integrity check-system Access Layer 
Operating system 
configuration 
 Business Layer 
Operating system 
authentication 
 Data Layer 
Private key component   
TABLE 10: COMPONENTS FOR EACH CATEGORY 
The first category that requires attention is the client side components. 
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3 Client-side components 
The client-side components that are discussed are: 
 Trusted Banking Operating System (TBOS)  
 Virtual Machine Monitor 
 Persistence  
 Operating system configuration  
 Operating system authentication 
 Private Key component  
3.1 Trusted Banking Operating System 
The trusted banking operating system (TBOS) is the operating system that is used on the client 
running as a virtual machine. 
There are a number of aspects that must be taken into consideration when deciding on the 
TBOS.  Each of the considerations is described in their own sub-sections.  They are: 
1. Operating system license costs 
2. Flexibility 
3. Bottom up approach or top down approach 
This section concludes with an evaluation of the design requirements that are fulfilled by this 
component. 
3.1.1 Operating system license costs 
Even though the V-Bank system is a prototype, the costs of implementing the system in a 
commercial environment are taken into consideration.  The two categories that are considered 
are: 
 Microsoft licensed operating system 
 Open source operating system 
When a commercial institution deploys a single purpose operating system the cost per deployed 
operating system can get quite large, if the institution has to pay a license per copy deployed. 
For the above reason, it was decided that the V-Bank system uses an open source operating 
system that does not require a license per deployed copy of the operating system. 
3.1.2 Flexibility 
The operating system has to be very flexible to allow changes in its functionality.  The operating 
system must have the ability to change, has to have a small footprint and be built for a single 
purpose. 
An open source operating system allows a bank to make changes to the source code of the 
operating system to ensure it fulfils the configuration requirements of the bank. 
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3.1.3 Bottom up approach or top down approach 
The third item that requires consideration is to decide whether the open source operating 
system is built from scratch (bottom up approach), or use an existing Linux distribution.  
Both the bottom up and top down approach are discussed 
a.) Bottom up 
The advantage of this approach is that the bank has full control over all aspects of the operating 
system.  Because the bank knows the environment in which the operating system is executed, 
the operating system can be built to only support the virtual hardware or the virtual machine.  
Unnecessary software, normally included in operating systems, do not have to be included, such 
as calculators, or writing pads or multi-media players. 
The major disadvantage of this approach is that it takes considerable development time to 
create an operating system of high assurance.  Banks usually are not software development or 
even operating system development companies and may spend considerable money in 
developing such an operating system, even if the bank takes existing Linux operating system 
components to build the system. 
b.) Top down 
The top-down approach is where the bank decides to use an existing Linux distribution and 
then goes through a process of removing unnecessary items. 
The most important advantage to this approach is that the work leverages on what is already 
implemented by the open source community.  These distributions are also generally better 
supported and maintained from a security point of view.  Vulnerabilities in the software 
identified by the community are patched to ensure a more stable, secure operating system. 
A disadvantage of this approach is that the operating system can be bloated, taking up 
unnecessary space. 
During the implementation of the V-Bank system, both approaches were tested.  At first the 
recipes published as part of the Linux From Scratch (LFS) distribution to build a Linux 
distribution was used (Beekmans, 2012).  An operating system was successfully built up to a 
level with a graphical user interface and a very basic Internet browser. 
The top down approach was then tested.   An Ubuntu Linux distribution went through the 
process of removing unnecessary items from the operating system. 
Two working copies of Linux were produced. The top down approach, was faster and required 
less skill to accomplish.  The end-product for both approaches was nearly the same size.  The 
Linux From Scratch operating system failed to work as a read only bootable media, running in a 
virtual machine.  This does not mean that it is impossible to get it to work on read only media. 
From this discussion it became clear to use the top down approach with the Ubuntu based Linux 
as a working copy for the TBOS. 
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3.1.4 Design Requirements 
Table 11 summarises the design requirements fulfilled by the TBOS.  The numbers in brackets 
define the design requirement number fulfilled. 
(11) The TBOS is based on the Ubuntu Linux distribution.  Continual development and support 
on the distribution ensures that the operating system is patched when vulnerabilities are 
identified.   
(13) The TBOS looks different from the rest of the operating environment and a user can easily 
identify the online banking system from normal web sites.  It also displays a X.509 certificate on 
the web site that assists the user in identifying the banking web site. 
(21) The TBOS is a managed component directly accessible by the bank. 
(22) The TBOS runs as a virtual machine which means that the TBOS is isolated or sandboxed 
from the rest of the client operating environment. 
Number Requirement 
11 Online banking systems must have the ability to be updated when software 
vulnerabilities are detected. 
13 Online banking systems must have a visual trust anchor. 
21 An online banking system should be designed to include not just a managed 
server environment, but also a managed client environment. 
22 The client-side online banking system should be sandboxed from the rest of 
the client operating environment 
TABLE 11: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE TBOS 
 
3.2 Virtual Machine Monitor 
The virtual machine monitor software chosen is based on a number of criteria: 
1. Compatibility.  Must be compatible to a wide range of host operating systems, but 
primarily Microsoft Windows based operating systems. 
2. License costs.  The distribution of the virtual machine software should not be very 
expensive if there are to be costs involved. 
3. Printing. Some of the features that people already expect in an online banking system 
are to be able to print out statements or payment information.  The virtual machine 
software must make the virtualisation of existing printers on the host easy. 
Each of the criteria items are discussed next, followed by the design requirements fulfilled by 
the virtual machine monitor. 
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3.2.1 Compatibility 
The virtual machine software must be compatible on Windows and Linux based computers and 
must support Linux guest operating system.  The software should also be simple to install. 
Using Chapter 4:6 as a guide the options for virtual machine software are narrowed town to 
Oracle VirtualBox and VMware Workstation or VMware Player. 
If the requirements were extended to also include Apple computers then only Oracle VirtualBox 
was an option. 
It may be possible to use different virtual machine software on different platforms.  Testing the 
V-Bank system in these configurations is not be part of this study. 
The next criterion to discuss is license costs 
3.2.2 License costs 
By using the compatibility requirement only Oracle VirtualBox and VMware are taken into 
account when considering the terms of license costs. 
Oracle VirtualBox is freely distributable without any end user license costs.  VMware Player is 
available freely for personal use (VMware, 2012).  VMware workstation requires license costs. 
VMware however has a special license programs for enterprise wide distribution programs 
which makes the license cost per installed instance cheaper. 
3.2.3 Printing 
One of the features that users are already familiar with in existing online banking systems is the 
ability to print out information.  This information can be bank statements, or payment 
information. 
From a commercial point of view this may be one of the most important aspects to consider 
when deciding which virtual machine software must be used. 
Only VMware currently has the ability to automatically virtualise existing printers from the host 
operating system into the guest operating system.  All of the other systems require the user to 
create the printer.  This may be problematic since we don’t want users who may be unfamiliar 
with Linux to struggle with creating a printer.  The persistent nature of the V-Bank system also 
means that the user has to create the printer every time the system starts.  This may cause an 
aversion to using the system by users. 
The only aspect left to discuss for virtual machine software is which one is the best option. 
3.2.4 Virtual machine monitor software conclusion 
Using the criteria that was defined for choosing virtual machine software is it clear that there 
are two options: 
 Oracle VirtualBox can be used on Windows, Linux and Apple host computers.  It is freely 
available and can be distributed to a bank’s customers without extra costs.  Oracle 
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VirtualBox however does not automatically create virtualised printers in the guest 
operating system. 
 VMware Player or VMware Workstation can be installed on Windows and Linux host 
computers.  There are license costs involved if used for commercial purposes.  The 
software however automatically creates printers inside the guest operating system that 
already exists on the host operating system, making the system very user friendly. 
It was decided to use VMware Player as the virtual machine software to build the V-Bank 
prototype in.  The printing criteria were the deciding factor in the decision between Oracle 
VirtualBox and VMware. 
3.2.5 Design Requirements 
Table 12 summarises the design requirements that are fulfilled by the virtual machine monitor.   
(18) The virtual machine monitor is configured to only allow the printing guest tool.  (19) 
VMware player does not have introspection abilities.  It cannot control the working of the guest 
operating system, without the help of special guest tools. (20) VMware Player cannot create 
snapshots, like VMware Workstation, or Oracle VirtualBox. 
(22) VMware Player creates an environment in which the TBOS can run as a virtual machine, 
isolated from the rest of the client operating environment.  This creates a sandboxed 
environment in which the client conducts online banking. 
Number Requirement 
18 The bare minimum guest tools should be enabled in a client-side virtual 
machine environment. 
19 The VMM used by the online banking system should have limited 
introspection capabilities 
20 Snapshots of a client-side operating virtual machine environment should not 
be possible 
22 The client-side online banking system should be sandboxed from the rest of 
the client operating environment 
TABLE 12: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE VIRTUAL MACHINE MONITOR 
The next aspect of implementation that is discussed is the persistent characteristic of the TBOS. 
3.3 Persistent image 
Chapter 4:4.2.4 described that a virtual machine can be configured as a virtual appliance that 
can be made read only.  The read only appliance can be implemented as a LiveCD.  The 
advantage of the read only appliance is that it cannot be infected by malware.  The read-only 
nature of the LiveCD, means it is persistent.  Persistent images reset to their original state every 
time the system is started.  No data and settings can be changed. 
A LiveCD is a bootable image of a fully configured operating system with pre-defined 
applications and configuration.  A LiveCD runs in the computer’s memory and does not require 
space on the hard drive of the computer. 
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This section describes how the LiveCD is implemented and concludes with the design 
requirements that the persistent nature of the TBOS fulfils. 
3.3.1 LiveCD implementation 
For the V-Bank implementation it was decided that the TBOS will be distributed as an image of a 
LiveCD.  This image is stored on a Universal Serial Bus (USB) memory stick which the user can 
then connect to his computer, from where the virtual machine software can then read the 
LiveCD image and boot the TBOS. 
Because the LiveCD executes as an image, the image cannot change after it is created, without 
fully destroying it and then recreating it again. 
The LiveCD image file is called “image.iso”.  This file can be mounted by the virtual machine 
software as a CD image.  No virtual hard drive is necessary for the virtual machine 
configuration. 
3.3.2 Design Requirements 
Table 13 summarises the requirements fulfilled by the persistent nature of the TBOS. 
(1) Because the TBOS runs as an image of a LiveCD, the configuration of the operating system 
cannot change.   
(3) It is also not possible to change the Internet browser used by the V-Bank system.   
(9) No software can be installed in the persistent image of the TBOS this includes malware, like 
keyloggers.   
(11) The persistent image of the TBOS cannot be dynamically updated to patch identified 
vulnerabilities.  Manual updates of the persistent image of the TBOS is necessary, although it 
may be possible to design a system to update the image deployed to clients, but this is outside 
the scope of this research. 
Number Requirement 
1 The client operating environment should be persistent.  It should not be 
possible to change any file or configuration in the client operating 
environment 
3 It should not be possible to modify the Internet browser used by an online 
banking system. 
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should 
minimize the effect it may have if present. 
11 Online banking systems must have the ability to be updated when software 
vulnerabilities are detected. 
TABLE 13: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE PERSISTENT NATURE OF THE TBOS 
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The next aspect that is discussed is the configuration of the operating system and how the bank 
can know that this is the configuration that is currently being used when a client connects to the 
V-Bank system. 
3.4 Operating system configuration 
The banks have the luxury of deciding exactly how the TBOS looks and functions.  The TBOS is 
specifically configured for only online banking.  This configuration is called the known 
configuration.  The configuration that is defined by the banks includes configuring the following 
aspects: 
1. Single purpose operating system.  The Linux operating system has to be modified and 
configured so that it can only be used for online banking purposes with the V-Bank 
system. 
2. Least user account rights. Any user using the operating system need only have basic 
permissions so that they can start the web browser to connect to the V-Bank system, 
provide login information and unlock their private keys when required. 
3. Security hardened operating system. The operating system also goes through a 
process of hardening the security in the operating system. 
4. Locked down Internet browser. The Internet browser that is used is locked down so 
that it does not allow browsing to sites other than the V-Bank system. 
Each of these aspects are described in more detail next.  This section concludes with the design 
requirements fulfilled by the known configuration of the operating system. 
3.4.1 Single purpose operating system 
The operating system goes through a process that ensure the system gets a new user interface 
that automatically starts the web browser and not allows the normal user to do anything else. 
The single purpose operating system is configured through the following components: 
 Blackbox window manager (Anon., 2006).  The window manager that comes with 
Ubuntu is changed.  The window manager is a component that handles the user 
interface screens once the user has logged in.  The window manager that is used is the 
Blackbox window manager.  The Blackbox window manager ensures the system has a 
custom menu in the operating system, allowing the user only access to the web browser.  
Blackbox window manager starts a script when the user logs in that start the Internet 
browser (Anon., 2006). 
 iDesk (Anon., 2005).  iDesk places icons on the Blackbox background so that the user 
can execute the Internet browser from there.  Two icons are created, one icon starts the 
Internet browser and the second icon is used to shut down the operating system. 
 Gnome Display Manager (GDM) (The Gnome Project, 2005).  The login manager is the 
system that is first seen when the user starts up the Ubuntu operating system.  It gives 
the user the ability to choose a username and type a password.  To help strengthen the 
security, the login manager is modified so that it does not list the usernames that is 
available on the system.  The user has to first type in his username and then the 
password, instead of selecting his username and then typing the password.  The login 
manager is changed to the GDM instead of the Ubuntu login manager. 
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 Oracle Java Runtime (Oracle, n.d.).  Another piece of software that is installed is the 
Oracle Java Runtime environment.  This is required so that some Java applets can be 
initiated by the V-Bank system. 
The above four components ensures the operating system starts an Internet browser when the 
user logs in. 
The next area of configuration is to configure the rights a use has on the Linux operating system. 
3.4.2 Least user account rights 
In the previous section it was described how the operating system can only start an Internet 
browser when the user logs in.  To further secure the operating system environment, the user 
accounts are configured so that unnecessary rights are removed. 
The Linux operating system has two user accounts created in the system.  The first user account 
is an account the bank uses to configure the operating system.  This user account has root 
permissions on the TBOS and has a complex pass phrase to protect the user account.  This user 
account name and password changes for each version of the V-Bank TBOS deployed. 
The second account that is available on the system is an account that is given to the banking 
user.  The account is based on the user’s name and a password is generated and given to the 
user. 
The account used by the banking user has limited permissions on the TBOS.  Permissions such 
as the mounting of CD-ROMS or the using of sound cards are removed.   
The next section discussed the security configuration of the operating system. 
3.4.3 Security hardened operating system 
Security hardening a Linux distribution means that the default operating system’s security is 
increased to minimize the chances of attackers from exploiting a Linux system. 
Bastille (Anon., 2013) is used to security harden the Ubuntu Linux distribution.  Bastille makes 
it easier to security harden various aspects of the Linux operating system. 
It should be noted that the firewall configuration that was generated by Bastille is only used as a 
guide to generate the IPTables. 
Security hardening the operating system using Bastille ensures the Linux system files are 
protected from unauthorised access.  It locks down user accounts to only have access to their 
home directories and improves the security of the Linux operating system significantly. 
This section described how the security of the Linux operating system is enhanced.  In the next 
section the configuration of the Internet browser and how it is implemented in the TBOS is 
described. 
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3.4.4 Locked down Internet browser 
At the time of writing this dissertation the only two Internet browsers that supported TLS 1.2 
were Microsoft Internet Explorer 9.0 and above and Opera 11 (Opera Corporation, 2013) and 
above. 
Only Opera is a viable option to be installed on the TBOS Linux operating system.  It was decided 
to use Opera 12 as the Internet browser for the V-Bank system. 
Opera 12 has many features which supports a locked down experience. 
When the Opera browser is started using the following command, the browser starts by default 
in a locked down mode: 
opera -kioskmode -kioskbuttons -nocontextmenu -nodownload -nokeys -
nomail -nomaillinks -nomenu -nosave -resetonexit 
The meaning of the switches are as follow: 
-kioskmode Starts the web browser in full screen mode, does not allow the user to 
close the browser 
-kioskbuttons Allows some buttons, like Home on the browser address bar 
-nocontextmenu Does not allow context menus in the browser 
-nodownload Cannot download anything using the browser 
-nokeys Does not allow special keys to be used in the browser, like 
Ctrl+Alt+Delete 
-nomail Does not enable the mail client functionality of the Opera browser 
-nomaillinks Does not follow mail links in hyperlinks 
-nomenu Does not create a menu 
-nosave Does not allow the user to save pages 
-resetonexit Resets the session information when the browser closes 
 
Over and above this, the system also use a feature built into Opera which allows only certain 
web sites to be visited from the web browser.  This is done by creating an urlfilter.ini file, which 
is made available to the client.  Opera is then further configured to use this file.  Appendix A 
describes how this is configured and installed. 
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FIGURE 7:1 OPERA BROWSER RUNNING KIOSKMODE GOING TO THE CUSTOM LAUNCH PAGE 
The home page of the V-Bank system is set to a file that is stored in the computer.  This file is 
used as a launch pad to access the banking application on the server-side.  Figure 7:1 shows 
how the Opera browser looks when it runs in a locked down mode.  Note that there is no menu, 
but there are some buttons that exists.  The only way the user can exit the application is when 
he closes the whole virtual machine.  The user cannot gain access to any other operating system 
command or application. 
The operating system is specifically configured to only allow access to the V-Bank server-side 
environment.  The requirements are fulfilled by configuring the operating system in this way is 
described in the next section. 
3.4.5 Design Requirements 
The operating system is configured specifically for online banking in the V-Bank system. Table 
14 summarises the design requirements that are fulfilled by the configuration of the operating 
system. 
(4) The Internet browser is locked down to only open the V-Bank system web site.  It cannot 
open multiple pages. 
(9) The operating system is security hardened, so that users cannot change important system 
files in the operating system.  The security hardened operating system will not allow a user to 
install a keylogger in the system. 
 Page 133 of 207 
 
 V-Bank – Component design 
(16) The hardening of the security of the operating system means one of the security layers of a 
layered security program is implemented. 
Number Requirement 
4 Online banking systems should not allow the Internet Browser from opening 
multiple pages and the transaction component in an online banking system 
should re-authenticate the user, before committing important transactions. 
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should 
minimize the effect it may have if present. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
TABLE 14: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE OPERATING SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
 
The second last client-side component under discussion is the operating system authentication. 
3.5 Operating system authentication 
The previous sections described which operating system is used for the TBOS, which virtual 
machine monitor software is used, how the TBOS persistence is enabled and how the TBOS is 
configured.  This section described how the TBOS authenticates the user. 
The section concludes with the design requirements fulfilled by the operating system 
authentication. 
3.5.1 Login process 
The TBOS can be configured to either automatically log a client into the operating system as 
shown in Figure 7:2 or to request a username and password before the Opera browser can be 
used to open the connection to the V-Bank system. 
 
FIGURE 7:2 AUTOMATIC LOGIN OF THE TBOS 
An advantage of automatically logging the client into the TBOS is that the client does not have to 
remember a username and password before the client can start using the V-Bank system.  The 
V-Bank system still requires the client to provide a password to unlock his private key and 
password for the random authentication code of the V-Bank system.  The disadvantage of this is 
that someone that steals the V-Bank client side system and knows the password for the private 
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key and the password to the random authentication code can potentially access the V-Bank 
system. 
The other option is for the client to type the TBOS username and password before the user can 
start using the V-Bank system.  Figure 7:3 shows that the TBOS will ask the user for a username 
and password before the Internet browser starts.  The advantage of this is that it makes it more 
difficult for an attacker that has physical access to the client side TBOS to gain access to the 
user’s banking profile. 
 
FIGURE 7:3 TBOS OPERATING SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION. 
A disadvantage of having to prompt the user for a username and password before access is 
granted to the TBOS is that the user has to remember another username and password. 
The V-Bank prototype requires the user to type a username and password before access is 
granted to the TBOS. 
3.5.2 Design Requirements 
Table 15 summarises the design requirements that are fulfilled because the operating system 
authenticates the user. 
(10) One of the items that must be stolen from a user is both his operating system login account 
name and password. 
(16) The operating system authentication is one of the layers of the security program. 
(17) The operating system authentication fulfils one of the identification and authentication ISO 
7498-2 security service. 
Number Requirement 
10 An online banking environment should minimise the chances of an attacker 
using stolen information to gain access to a customer’s online banking profile. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
TABLE 15: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE OPERATING SYSTEM AUTHENTICATION 
In the next section we describe the areas where the user’s private key is stored. 
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3.6 Private Key component 
In the previous section we have seen that the user must provide a username and password 
before the user can gain access to the TBOS.  This section describes what the use of the user’s 
private key is and how it is stored in the TBOS. 
The section concludes with which design requirements are fulfilled by implementing a private 
key for the user in the TBOS. 
3.6.1 Private Key storage 
The user’s private key is used in a number of areas of the V-Bank system.  They are: 
 Dedicated secure channel 
 During transaction authorisations in the authentication service. 
During the session establishment with the V-Bank server the client must take part in a mutual 
authentication handshake enforced by the server.  For the client to establish this connection the 
client utilises his private key.  The private key must be loaded inside the user’s Web browser.  
The web browser prompts the user to determine which private key should be used. 
Another area where the private key is used is during the authorisation of banking transactions.  
During the authorisation process, the client signs the hash of the transaction details with his 
private key.  The Java applet uses a password presented by the system, to unlock the private key 
that is stored in a file on the TBOS.  This private key is not part of the browser setup and 
requires that the system unlocks the file. 
The biggest disadvantage to this private key stored in a file, is that it may be possible for an 
attacker to get access to the private key file.  The attacker can then use some type of brute force 
attack on the file to try and extract the user’s private key (Ellison & Schneier, 2000). 
The user is issued a private key using a certificate authority.  The private key is exported to a 
file, which is password protected.  This file is loaded into the TBOS system per user and then 
imported into the browser and then stored in a folder in the user’s home directory. 
3.6.2 Design Requirements 
Table 16 summarises the design requirements fulfilled by implementing a private key for the 
user. 
(9) Even if a keylogger is present on the host system, access to the V-Bank system is dependent 
on the certificate hosting the user’s private key in the browser. 
(16)(17) The private key component acts as identification and authentication of the user to the 
V-Bank system.  This enables another security layer in the layered security program and it fulfils 
the authentication security mechanism defined by ISO 7498-2. 
(17) The private key is also used to sign banking transactions.  This ensures non-repudiation of 
the banking transactions.  Non-repudiation is another security service of ISO 7498-2. 
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Number Requirement 
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should 
minimize the effect it may have if present. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
TABLE 16: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY IMPLEMENTING A PRIVATE KEY 
The implementation of the private key component is the last client side component that is 
discussed in this section.  In the next section we discuss the components that have 
implementation areas in both the client and the server.  
4 Client and Server-side components 
Some of the components implemented in the V-Bank system has to be implemented on both the 
client and the server. 
The components that fall in this category are: 
1. Authentication mechanism 
2. Dedicated secure channel 
3. Integrity check system 
Each of the components will form the same structure as the pervious sections where the 
component is described and also include the system requirements fulfilled by the component. 
4.1 Authentication mechanism 
The V-Bank system uses mutual authentication.  
Mutual authentication means the V-Bank system authenticates the client before access is 
granted, but the client also authenticates the server before trying to communicate. 
The authentication mechanism is enabled in a number of areas, they are: 
1. The web server 
2. The Internet browser 
3. The Java runtime environment 
The configuration of these areas is now described and concludes with the design requirements 
fulfilled by the authentication mechanism. 
4.1.1 The web server 
The web server has to be configured so that it identifies itself to the client.  The web server is 
also configured to not only identify itself to the client, but also so that the client identifies itself 
to the server. 
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The authentication mechanism is applied on the virtual directory of the web server.  The 
configuration is set so that the banking system requires encryption. 
 
FIGURE 7:4 IIS 7.5 SSL SETTINGS PAGE 
The mutual authentication is enabled using Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS) 7.5 
built-in functionality as shown in Figure 7:4.  The server’s certificate is loaded on the IIS server.  
The banking system’s SSL settings are enabled in IIS to require SSL encryption and require 
client certificate mapping.  This means that the server present himself to the client using an 
industry standard X.509 certificate, but the client must also identify itself to the server, using a 
certificate stored on the client. 
The certificate on the server ensures that the browser on the client encrypts traffic to and from 
the server using the server’s public key.   
4.1.2 The Internet browser 
The client is asked to present a certificate with a private key shown in Figure 7:5.  This 
certificate is loaded in the client’s browser. 
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FIGURE 7:5 CLIENT AUTHENTICATION TO THE SERVER. 
The V-Bank system uses the certificate that belongs to the user to extract the public key.  The 
public key is then used to identify the user to the banking system after which the client is 
presented the V-Bank login screen. 
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FIGURE 7:6 X.509 CERTIFICATE BELONGING TO A CLIENT 
Figure 7:6 shows an example of an X.509 certificate that belongs to a client that is loaded in the 
certificate store that is used by the server to identify the client, when the client connects. 
The Internet browser is one of the components that connect to the server to ensure that traffic 
is encrypted.  Another component that opens connections to the server is the Java runtime 
environment that is installed in the TBOS. 
4.1.3 The Java runtime environment 
The Java runtime environment executes Java applets presented by the server.  These applets are 
transferred to the client.  Before the Java applet executes on the client the Java runtime client 
verifies whether the Java applet has been signed by a trusted source. 
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FIGURE 7:7 JAVA CONFIGURATION FOR TRUSTED CERTIFICATES. 
In this case every Java applet that is produced must be signed by a special code-signing V-Bank 
private key.  The X.509 certificate for this code-signing private key must be trusted by each and 
every Java runtime client that is installed on the TBOS clients.  This is accomplished by using a 
code signing certificate that is issued by a trusted certificate authority. Figure 7:7 shows the Java 
runtime client’s control panel where the administrators of the V-Bank system will prepopulate 
the runtime client with trusted certificates. 
Whenever this verification takes place the browser opens the Java key store on the client and 
the Java runtime verifies the signature according to the certificates loaded in the Java key store.  
This process identifies and authenticates the code from the server to ensure that the code is 
authorised to run on the client. 
If the Java runtime client does not trust the signature in the Java applet then the Java applet 
cannot execute on the client. 
The authentication mechanism requires a number of configuration settings to be applied per 
client.  This process needs to be automated to ensure the V-Bank support department does not 
spend unnecessary time per client when issuing a V-Bank system to a client.  The automation of 
this process is not part of this study and may require further study. 
The V-Bank online banking system makes extensive use of Java.  At the time of writing the 
dissertation new security vulnerabilities have been identified in Java (United States Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team, 2013).  The V-Bank solution is susceptible to these known 
vulnerabilities provided that an attacker can access the TBOS over the network.  In the next 
section it will be made clear that the TBOS is protected from network connections not 
originating from the V-Bank system.  This mitigates the risk of these vulnerabilities. 
Authentication is further described to understand how the server authenticates the client 
during login and then re-authenticates and authorize transactions during a banking session.  
This authentication mechanism is server-side only and is described in Chapter 7:5.1 
 Page 141 of 207 
 
 V-Bank – Component design 
4.1.4 Design Requirements 
Table 17 summarises the design requirements that are fulfilled by the authentication 
mechanism that has to be configured on the client and the server. 
(9) Because the authentication mechanism uses certificates stored on the client and server and 
is not depended on keyboard input, information stolen by a keylogger cannot be used to gain 
access to the V-Bank system. 
(13) The certificate identification from the server creates a visual certificate icon in the browser 
of the user, giving the user a visual trust anchor. 
(14) The V-Bank system requires mutual authentication by using certificates stored on the 
client and the server.  Access will not be granted to the user if the user does not present a public 
key stored in a certificate to the server.  This means that the user is authenticated before access 
is granted to the V-Bank system. 
(16) The mutual authentication mechanism is one of the layers in the layered security program 
implemented by the V-Bank system. 
(17) The authentication mechanism described in this section is an identification authentication 
security service as described by ISO 7498-2. 
Number Requirement 
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should 
minimize the effect it may have if present. 
13 Online banking systems must have a visual trust anchor. 
14 Online banking systems must properly authenticate users before allowing 
access. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
TABLE 17: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM 
The next section describes how to implement the dedicated secure channel. 
4.2 Dedicated secure channel 
The dedicated secure channel is responsible to ensure that traffic to and from the TBOS can only 
go to the V-Bank server components.  The dedicated secure channel consists of two 
configuration items.  They are: 
1. The firewall on the client and server 
2. TLS 1.2 encryption 
This section concludes by describing the design requirements fulfilled by the dedicated secure 
channel. 
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4.2.1 The firewall on the client and server 
The firewall on the client ensures network traffic can only flow between the client and the 
server.  The firewall on the server minimises any other types of traffic to the server. 
The implementation of the client-side firewall is in the form of Linux IPTables.  IPTables is a 
firewall system that is included in Ubuntu Linux distributions. 
In the V-Bank implementation, the firewall allows only HTTP and HTTPS traffic to and from the 
IP address of the V-Bank server. 
DNS traffic is not allowed to or from the TBOS. The hosts file, which a helps identify IP addresses 
to host names, is populated with the name of the V-Bank system before the time.  This is done to 
ensure that DNS contamination will not cause traffic from the client to flow to another host on 
the Internet. 
The following entry is one of the entries in the IPTables configuration file, which allows HTTPS 
traffic to the V-Bank system given the IP address of the server as 10.0.0.14 
NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -j ACCEPT  
-A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.14/32 -o eth0 -p tcp -m state –state 
This entry may need to be changed depending on the number of Interface servers the bank has, 
but for the prototype only one entry is required to one IP address. 
The firewall on the server-side is enabled to accept HTTPS traffic from any client.  For the 
prototype the normal Windows firewall is used, but in practice another type of firewall with 
dedicated intrusion detection mechanisms can be used. 
Apart from the firewall that helps minimise the chance of traffic going to and from any other 
host except the V-Bank system, the V-Bank system also implements TLS 1.2 as the transport 
layer security standard. 
4.2.2 TLS 1.2 encryption 
TLS 1.2 encryption is used to encrypt traffic between the client and the server. 
TLS 1.2 is enabled on the Opera browser, as well as the Java runtime client.  The IIS server is 
also enabled to use TLS 1.2. 
The Opera browser’s setting is part of the advanced settings in the browser’s Preferences menu 
as shown in Figure 7:8. 
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FIGURE 7:8 ENABLE TLS 1.2 IN OPERA 
Figure 7:9 show the Java runtime client’s TLS 1.2 is set using the Java control panel. 
 
FIGURE 7:9 ENABLING TLS 1.2 IN JAVA 
For IIS special registry settings have to be configured to ensure TLS 1.2 is enabled.  The registry 
keys on the IIS 7.5 server are: 
HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocols
\TLS 1.2\Server 
See the Appendix A for a Windows PowerShell script that can be executed on the server that 
creates the necessary registry keys and registry settings. 
Once all the settings are made the Opera browser can be queried to determine whether the 
session is a TLS 1.2 session as shown in Figure 7:10. 
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FIGURE 7:10 TLS 1.2 ENCRYPTION VERIFICATION 
 
4.2.3 Design Requirements 
Table 18 summarises the design requirement fulfilled by the dedicated secure channel. 
(2) By using the firewall on the client, network traffic can only flow between the client and the 
V-Bank system.  Traffic to and from any other host is not allowed. 
(7) The firewall is configured with the IP address of the server.  This ensures that name 
resolution does not affect the connection of the TBOS. 
(9) In the remote chance that a keylogger is installed in the TBOS then the keylogger cannot 
send the captured keys to a 3rd party, as only network traffic between the TBOS and the V-Bank 
server-side system is allowed. 
(16) The firewall and the TLS 1.2 encryption is one of the layers in the layered security program 
implemented by the V-Bank system. 
(12)(17) The TLS 1.2 encryption ensures HTTP traffic is encrypted between the client and the 
server.  Encryption is one of the security services defined by ISO 7498-2. 
Number Requirement 
2 The client operating environment should be isolated on the network and only 
be allowed to connect to the banking system environment. 
7 Name resolution should not affect the connection inside an online banking 
system 
9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an online banking system or should 
minimize the effect it may have if present. 
12 Online banking systems must ensure TLS 1.2 channel security 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
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17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
TABLE 18: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE DEDICATED SECURE CHANNEL 
The dedicated secure channel helps protect the client from most network based attacks on the 
TBOS, since it does not allow traffic to the client from any other host except the V-Bank server-
side system. 
4.3 Integrity check system 
To ensure that the integrity of the TBOS stays intact, an integrity check (IC) system is employed.  
The IC system is implemented in client and server-side components.  The IC system is enabled 
as an integrity check module (IC Module) on the client and integrity check database (IC 
Database) on the server. 
This section describes the IC system and how it is configured on the V-Bank system. 
4.3.1 IC System 
When the TBOS connects to the server-side system, the server requests that the client provide 
some configuration settings.  This request is implemented using a number of Java Runtime 
applets.  The configuration settings checked by the server is the Opera browser and the Java 
version. 
The server confirms that the client is currently using the approved Opera browser version and 
Java version before access is granted to the banking site. 
When the client logs in to the server, the server initiates a Java applet that initiates the integrity 
checker module.  The integrity checker module does the following: 
1. It retrieves a list of all the processes that currently have a network connection open 
from the client. 
2. The actual file that’s causing the process is then determined 
3. The file is then found on the TBOS file system and a hash is calculated for the binary 
value of the file. 
4. The hashed information is sent back to the server 
5. The server confirms whether the names of the processes and hash values of the 
processes currently connected to the network is the correct values as defined by the 
bank. 
Figure 7:11 shows an example of a client that opened the approved version of the Opera 
browser and the approved version of Java.  The Java applet running on the client looked for the 
application files on the hard drive and produced a hash value of each.  These hash values are 
then sent to the server.  The server compares the hash values and the names of the processes 
with its approved configuration and grants access accordingly. 
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Java: 17665AB8C345F…
Opera: 876EB89A0CC11...
Java: 17665AB8C345F…
Opera: 876EB89A0CC11...
Access Granted
 
FIGURE 7:11 IC MODULE. 
The configuration verification process can be enhanced to verify many client side configuration 
items to see whether the client system integrity is intact. 
4.3.2 Design Requirements 
Table 19 summarises the design requirements fulfilled by the IC System. 
(8) The server confirms the configuration on the client by executing integrity checks.  This 
means that clients that do not have the approved configuration will not be able to connect to the 
server. 
(10) If an attacker steals the user’s username and password then the attacker will still not be 
able to gain access to the V-Bank system, without the TBOS generated for the client.  Any other 
configuration will not be allowed. 
(16) The IC System is one of the layers in the layered security program implemented by the V-
Bank system. 
(17) The IC System is another form for authenticating and ensuring integrity of the client.  The 
authentication and integrity is security services defined by ISO 7498-2. 
(21) The IC System ensures that the client is a managed component, just as the server can be 
managed by the bank. 
Number Requirement 
8 An online banking system should only allow connections to and from approved 
clients and servers. 
10 An online banking environment should minimise the chances of an attacker 
using stolen information to gain access to a customer’s online banking profile. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
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21 An online banking system should be designed to include not just a managed 
server environment, but also a managed client environment. 
TABLE 19: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE IC SYSTEM 
The IC System is the last component that requires configuration on both the client and the 
server.  The next section describes the components that exist on the server. 
5 Server-side components 
It is assumed that the server-side environment is highly secure and is beyond the scope of the 
research. 
A number of components require implementation on the server.  For the V-Bank prototype only 
a simulated banking system is created.  This section describes the various components that are 
implemented in the V-Bank system and the technologies that are used to fulfil the design 
requirements. 
The system is designed according to the following high level programming architecture as 
shown in Figure 7:12. 
Database
Data Layer
Business Layer
Access Layer
HTML, ASP, JAVA 
Applets and 
JavaScript IIS W
eb
 Server
 
FIGURE 7:12 SERVER-SIDE ARCHITECTURE IMPLEMENTATION 
There are three layers.  The three layers are: 
 The Access Layer.  The Access Layer consists of a number of Hypertext Markup 
Language (HTML), Active Server Pages (ASP), JavaScript and Java Applets that are 
presented via HTTPS to the clients.  The Access Layer creates a number of data objects 
that is then given to the Business Layer where business rules are applied on the data 
object.  Data objects are a defined programming structure with specific properties.  The 
access layer uses data objects instead of data tables.  Using data objects mean that the 
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object can only contain certain types of information, minimising the chances of SQL 
injection attacks. 
 The Business Layer.  The Business Layer interfaces with the data store via a Data Layer 
to ensure that the Business Layer does not have to worry about what type of data store 
is implemented on the V-Bank system. 
 The Data Layer.  The Data Layer transform data objects to relevant SQL queries, which 
may update, insert or select the data stored on the SQL server. 
The Database utilised by the V-Bank prototype was Microsoft SQL Server 2008. 
The Access Layer, Business Layer and Data Layer are all implemented as an IIS ASP.NET 
application.  Some of the Access Layer components are protected by the IIS forms authentication 
and SSL encryption. 
The server-side components are: 
 Web Server. 
 Data Objects. 
 Access layer. 
 Business layer. 
 Data layer. 
The component that requires special implementation and configuration is the web server. 
5.1 Web Server 
The web server is primarily responsible for accepting Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
connections over port 80 from the clients.  The web server requires special configuration to 
ensure web traffic is handled correctly by the V-Bank system. 
The next section describes how the user is given authorised access to different areas in the V-
Bank system depending on the authentication. 
5.1.1 Layered authorisation 
The web server presents pages in three areas of the V-Bank system.  The first area is 
unprotected pages, which means anyone can connect to these pages.  The second area that the 
web server presents are protected SSL encrypted pages.  The last area presented by the web 
server, are the SSL encrypted forms authenticated pages as shown in Figure 7:13. 
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FIGURE 7:13 THE THREE SECURE AREAS OF THE V-BANK SYSTEM 
For the V-Bank prototype the SSL encryption is established using a certificate signed by a self-
signed certificate authority (CA).  The root key of the self-signed certificate authority is 
specifically installed in the TBOS as a trusted certificate authority.  The SSL encrypted pages are 
also configured to force a web browser to present a client certificate during connection.  This 
client certificate is used by the V-Bank system to identify the connected client. 
Once the client is authenticated, then the client can access the SSL Encrypted Forms.  A 
successful login verifies two things: 
1. Correct password characters during random authentication code, given the clients 
public key.  The system verifies the password characters with the stored password for 
the users in the V-Bank system. 
2. Integrity check from the clients.  The system verifies the integrity of the V-Bank clients 
to ensure that the correct applications are connecting to the V-Bank system. 
If the clients are successfully logged in then the web server is told by the system that the clients 
passed their forms authentication.  Once this is done, the clients are given access to the other 
areas of the web server. 
The web server that was used to implement the V-Bank system was Microsoft Internet 
Information Server (IIS). 
5.1.2 Design Requirements 
The authorisation to different areas in the web server is one of the layers in the layered security 
program.  This design requirement is shown in Table 20. 
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Number Requirement 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
TABLE 20: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE WEB SERVER 
 
5.2 Data Objects 
The V-Bank system has been designed to use different classes of objects.  Instead of using data 
variables or entries from a table, the data objects ensure that data integrity is intact when it is 
created or modified.   
The properties of objects are parsed to ensure valid input when the object is created or 
modified.  The use of data objects ensures that the chances of SQL injection is minimised. 
The types of objects that can exist in the system include administrative users, banking 
transactions, approved configurations, beneficiaries, payments, accounts and user profiles. 
The data objects can be used by any of the three layers.  The first layer that interacts with the 
user is the Access Layer. 
5.2.1 Design Requirements 
Table 21 shows that before an object is created in the V-Bank system, (5) the properties of the 
object is verified to ensure proper syntax was used in the input fields. 
(16) The data objects and the syntax checking of the objects implemented is another layer in the 
layered security program. 
Number Requirement 
5 An online banking system should evaluate any input and allow only approved 
syntax in input fields. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
TABLE 21: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE DATA OBJECTS 
 
5.3 Access Layer 
The Access Layer is responsible for presenting information to the user.  It is also the access layer 
against which the user interacts. 
The functionality in the Access Layer is achieved through the use of Hypertext Markup Language 
(HTML), Active Server Pages (ASP), JavaScript and Java Applets. 
Apart from the client using the access layer to input information into the system, the access 
layer also interacts with the IC module on the client.  This interaction is described next. 
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5.3.1 Interaction with the client 
By default the web services running on a web server do not have access to the resources of a 
computer belonging to a client.  This means that the web application cannot determine whether 
the computer complies with the configuration standard defined by the bank.  The web server 
also cannot access the user’s private key stored on the user’s computer so that the client can 
sign banking transactions created by the user. 
Fortunately Java has a way that allows Java applets that has been digitally signed, by a trusted 
authority, to be executed on the client computer and gain access to resources on the client 
computer. 
Two Java Applets have been created that enables the Access Layer to gain access to the 
resources on the client computer to enable the digital signing of transactions and the gathering 
of configuration information for compliance verification.  The two Java applets are 
 BankingInitialCheck. BankingInitialCheck runs a “netstat –tuwp” and “ps –aux” 
commands on the TBOS.  The “netstat –tuwp” lists all the processes that currently has 
connections open to the network. Once the process that have connections open on the 
network has been determined it finds the binary files of those processes on the TBOS by 
executing the “ps –aux” command.  Once the files have been found, hashes of the files are 
created. The name of the file, together with the hash value of the file is then sent to the 
server.  The server can now determine whether these files are in compliance with the 
banking system’s approved configuration. 
 BankingSign.  BankingSign opens the file that contains the user’s private key on the 
client computer.  It then uses the private key to sign the transaction details of the client. 
The access layer acts as an interface between the client and the business logic of the system.  
The access layer constructs data objects received from the client via the Java applets or user 
input. 
5.3.2 Design Requirements 
Table 22 summarises the design requirement fulfilled the access layer. 
(6) The access layer presents the ASP pages from the web server to the client’s browser, without 
making use of IFrames. 
(16) The access layer is one of the layers implemented by the layered security program. 
Number Requirement 
6 The online banking system should not contain any IFrames, nor should it 
reference code from any site except its own. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
TABLE 22: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE ACCESS LAYER 
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5.4 Business Layer 
The business layer in the system works with the data that was captured by the Access Layer and 
applies some business rules onto it. 
 
FIGURE 7:14 CLASSES USED BY THE BUSINESS LAYER. 
Figure 7:14 is a screenshot of the classes that are in use in the business layer.  The access layer 
uses the business layer to act on the data that is captured in the access layer, or the access layer 
uses the business layer to display the necessary data to the user. 
Example:  The ProfileBLL class is used by the access layer to authenticate a user.  The access 
layer first constructs a profile object for the user.  This includes at least the user’s public key, as 
presented by the web browser to the web server.  The access layer goes through the process of 
building a random authentication password using the ProfileBLL class.  The user types the 
missing characters for the password and the access layer uses the ProfileBLL class to 
authenticate the user.  The Authenticate method in the ProfileBLL class returns a true or false 
value that shows whether the user has been authenticated. 
The business layer fulfils a very strong role as Execution Service, Authentication Service and 
Transaction Service.  Many of the methods either enable the execution of data tasks against a 
user’s profile, or it authenticates the user or enables transactions to occur between accounts. 
The business layer verifies user input to minimise the chances of SQL injection attacks. 
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5.4.1 Design Requirements 
Table 23 summarises the design requirements fulfilled by the business layer. 
(5) The business layer verifies properties of data objects before they are added to the data store 
via the data layer.  This ensures the syntax of input fields are double checked by the V-Bank 
system. 
(15) The business layer ensures that access to information in the system is granted according to 
the role based access control.  Administrators will have access to profiles in the banking system, 
but not the accounts.  Users will have access to their own accounts, but not another’s, nor can 
they get access to the profiles defined in the system. 
(16) The business layer implements one of the layers of the layered security program. 
(17) The authorisation components in the business layer are one of the security services 
defined by ISO 7498-2. 
Number Requirement 
5 An online banking system should evaluate any input and allow only approved 
syntax in input fields. 
15 Online banking systems must implement a RBAC policy to ensure access to 
user information is controlled. 
16 Online banking systems must implement a layered security program. 
17 Online banking system should implement information security controls in all 
five ISO 7498-2 security service categories. 
TABLE 23: DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FULFILLED BY THE BUSINESS LAYER 
 
The business layer classes used by the access layer do not understand the type of data store 
used by the system.  The business layer utilises the data layer to retrieve, insert or update data 
into the data store.  The next section describes the data layer. 
5.5 Data Layer 
The business layer uses a number of generic data layer classes to retrieve, insert or update 
different data items in the V-Bank system.  These generic classes utilise ASP.NET specific classes 
like table adapters and data sets to interface with the Microsoft SQL Server database. 
The data layer is the final layer that makes up the implemented architecture of the V-Bank 
prototype server-side components. 
The data layer acts as a support layer for the Authentication Service, Transaction Service and 
Execution Service and indirectly to the Interface Service via the business layer. 
The data layer does not fulfil a specific design requirement.  The data layer is mentioned here to 
complete the picture of the server side components even though it has no direct effect on the 
design requirements. 
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It is also assumed that the data base system of an online banking system is highly secure, with 
proper auditing and access control.  Securing of database systems are outside the scope of this 
dissertation. 
6 Design requirements evaluation 
Table 24 summarises the design requirements identified in the dissertation and maps it against 
the components implemented in the V-Bank prototype that fulfils the requirements. 
The components are grouped together in a very light grey that depicts the client-side 
components.  The little darker grey in the middle of the table groups together the components 
configured on the client and server.  The darkest grey, on the right hand side of the table is the 
server-side components. 
A quick scan of the table, from top to bottom, verifies that all the design requirements are 
fulfilled by at least one of the design components.  In some cases many components fulfil the 
design requirements.  This is the case for the design requirement for the keylogger, layered 
security program and ISO 7498-2 security services.   
The layered security program and ISO 7498-2 security services require multiple components 
because of the nature of the requirement.  The fact that the keylogger requirement is fulfilled by 
multiple components proves how important protection against keyloggers is in the design of the 
system. 
A scan from left to right shows that all the components help to fulfil the design requirements, 
except for the data layer.  As already mentioned, the data layer itself is only mentioned in the 
component configuration because this is the component where all the data of the system is 
stored.  It is also assumed that the data layer is highly secure and outside the scope of the 
dissertation. 
The only design requirement that is not properly fulfilled is requirement 11, that states that an 
online banking system must have the ability to be updated when a vulnerability is identified.  
The V-Bank system can be updated when a vulnerability gets identified, but the current 
prototype still uses a manual method to update the TBOS image.  In a commercial environment 
this requirement needs to be better fulfilled to include the requirement that the update should 
happen automatically and securely. 
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TABLE 24: SUMMARY OF DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND COMPONENTS 
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1 The client operating environment should be 
persistent.  It should not be possible to change 
any file or configuration in the client operating 
environment

2 The client operating environment should be 
isolated on the network and only be allowed to 
connect to the banking system environment.

3 It should not be possible to modify the Internet 
browser used by an online banking system.

4 Online banking systems should not allow the 
Internet Browser from opening multiple pages 
and the transaction component in an online 
banking system should re-authenticate the user, 
before committing important transactions.

5 An online banking system should evaluate any 
input and allow only approved syntax in input 
fields.
 
6 The online banking system should not contain any 
IFrames, nor should it reference code from any 
site except its own.

7 Name resolution should not affect the connection 
inside an online banking system

8 An online banking system should only allow 
connections to and from approved clients and 
servers.

9 A keylogger should not be allowed inside an 
online banking system or should minimize the 
effect it may have if present.
    
10 An online banking environment should minimise 
the chances of an attacker using stolen 
information to gain access to a customer’s online 
banking profile.
 
11 Online banking systems must have the ability to 
be updated when software vulnerabilities are 
detected.
 
12 Online banking systems must ensure TLS 1.2 
channel security

13 Online banking systems must have a visual trust 
anchor.
 
14 Online banking systems must properly 
authenticate users before allowing access.

15 Online banking systems must implement a RBAC 
policy to ensure access to user information is 
controlled.

16 Online banking systems must implement a 
layered security program.
         
17 Online banking system should implement 
information security controls in all five ISO 7498-2 
security service categories.
     
18 The bare minimum guest tools should be enabled 
in a client-side virtual machine environment. 
19 The VMM used by the online banking system 
should have limited introspection capabilities

20 Snapshots of a client-side operating virtual 
machine environment should not be possible

21 An online banking system should be designed to 
include not just a managed server environment, 
but also a managed client environment.
 
22 The client-side online banking system should be 
sandboxed from the rest of the client operating 
environment
 
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7 Conclusion 
This chapter explained how the V-Bank system was implemented.  The implementation of the V-
Bank system happens in different components.  The different components can be grouped into 
client-side, client and server-side and server-side components. 
The components were selected and implemented to ensure the design requirements identified 
by the research have been fulfilled. 
More details of how specific components were configured can be found in the Appendix A. 
In the next chapter the V-Bank prototype system is evaluated and highlights the strengths and 
weaknesses of the system.  
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Chapter 8: V-BANK PROTOTYPE ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION 
1 Introduction 
This chapter evaluates the prototype and where applicable try and determine if a weakness is 
the result of a design requirement or implementation problem. 
The chapter starts by describing how the prototype works.  The prototype description is 
conducted by using use cases for the bank, the banking user and an attacker. 
The chapter then moves on to comment on the viability of commercially implementing the V-
Bank architecture 
2 Prototype analysis 
This section describes how the V-Bank prototype behaves in the following three areas: 
 Bank.  The bank starts by creating the TBOS image and gives it to the online banking 
user. 
 Banking user.  The online banking user uses the V-Bank system for online banking.  It 
starts with explaining how the banking user configures his host computer and continues 
with use cases up to the point where the banking user pays a beneficiary. 
 Attacker.  Three attacks are discussed.  The attacks include phishing attacks, online 
attacks against the TBOS and using stolen information to try and gain access to the V-
Bank system. 
A video demonstration of the V-Bank prototype accompanies the dissertation on an 
accompanied CD-ROM.  The video demonstration can also be downloaded from 
https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8o50-4OdA6fNGp5NzhBSGJTN1U/edit?usp=sharing .  The 
file downloaded is videos.zip, which can be extracted into a folder.  The videos can then be 
viewed by opening Index.htm from the extracted source. 
It took the author of this dissertation about 380 hours to design, develop and configure the V-
Bank prototype.  The area that took the most time was the testing that was done to decide 
between the bottom-up approach, or the top-down approach for developing the TBOS. 
2.1 Bank 
There is only one use case necessary to describe what the bank does to generate the TBOS 
image.  The use case is defined in Figure 8:1 
Bank
Generates TBOS for
User
 
FIGURE 8:1 USE CASE FOR BANK 
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2.1.1 Generates TBOS for User 
This section will not describe the detailed steps of creating the TBOS.  Details of the steps can be 
found in Appendix A. 
The basic steps for creating the TBOS from the bank are: 
1. Create the banking profile, which includes the profile number and initial password for the 
user. 
2. Create X.509 certificate for user. 
3. Link the public key in the X.509 certificate for the user to the banking profile. 
4. Load the certificate in the web server for mutual authentication. 
5. Create username and password for the TBOS. 
6. Install X.509 certificate in TBOS Internet Browser and Java control panel. 
7. Store user’s private key as file on the TBOS file system. 
8. Generate LiveCD image of the TBOS. 
9. Load LiveCD image on USB memory stick. 
The outcome of the process is that the bank gives the banking user a memory stick with a 
LiveCD image file. 
The bank can also copy the LiveCD image of the TBOS on a protected USB memory stick.  A 
protected USB memory stick can be protected so that the LiveCD image cannot be copied from 
the LiveCD image.  This was not implemented as part of the V-Bank prototype. 
2.2 Banking User 
The banking user fetches the USB memory stick from the bank and has to prepare his computer 
to run the TBOS.  Figure 8:2 shows the use cases for the banking user.  The use cases are 
described next. 
Banking User
Start V-Bank System
Authenticates with
System
Integrity Check
Pay Beneficiary
Other banking
activities
Configures host
system
 
FIGURE 8:2 USE CASES FOR BANKING USER 
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2.2.1 Configures host system 
The user has to install VMware Player in his host operating system.  The source files can be 
downloaded from the VMware website and the installation is very easy.  The host operating 
system requires a reboot once the VMware Player is installed.  This section will not describe the 
installation of the VMware Player. 
To configure the host system further, the user inserts the USB memory stick into a USB port.  
The banking user starts the VMware Player.  On the VMware Player, the banking user clicks on 
the File Menu and selects the Open a Virtual Machine.  In the file navigation box, the user has to 
navigate to the USB memory stick and select the V-Bank.vmx file.  Figure 8:3 shows the V-
Bank.vmx file in the USB memory stick. 
 
FIGURE 8:3 SELECT V-BANK.VMX FILE FROM USB 
Figure 8:4 shows how the VMware Player will look once the TBOS configuration has been 
imported into the VMware Player. 
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FIGURE 8:4 THE CONFIGURED VMWARE PLAYER 
2.2.2 Start V-Bank System 
The banking user starts the V-Bank system by ensuring the USB memory stick is inserted in a 
USB port on his host computer.  The user open the VMware Player and click on the “Play virtual 
machine” for the V-Bank TBOS virtual machine. 
Once the user has clicked on the “Play virtual machine”, the TBOS starts up.    Figure 8:5 shows 
how it will look while the TBOS is starting up. 
 
FIGURE 8:5 TBOS STARTING UP 
Once the TBOS has started the TBOS will display a screen for the user to type his username.  
Figure 8:6 shows how the screen will look once the TBOS has started. 
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FIGURE 8:6 TBOS LOGIN SCREEN 
2.2.3 Authenticates with system 
The user authenticates with the V-Bank system in a number of areas they are: 
 Linux Login 
 V-Bank user authentication 
Each of these areas are now briefly described 
The user has to type the TBOS username and password given to him by the bank to log into the 
Linux operating system 
Once the user has logged in, the TBOS opens a landing page.  For the prototype the landing page 
was a file located on the TBOS.  Part of the tests, not included for the dissertation was trying to 
use the TBOS to connect to other commercial banks.  The landing page contains links to the 
various banks.  For prototype testing and demonstration purposes only the V-Bank system was 
left as a valid link.  The V-Bank landing page is shown in Figure 8:7. 
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FIGURE 8:7 V-BANK LANDING PAGE 
The user selects the V-Bank Web site from the landing page and gets redirected to the server-
side V-Bank web site.  The V-Bank Web site is by default an unsecured web page as shown in 
Figure 8:8. 
 
FIGURE 8:8 UNSECURED V-BANK WEB PAGE 
The user must now click on the Login icon on the web page.  The web browser is now redirected 
to a secure web page.  The first thing the user experience is that the user must select the user’s 
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certificate stored in the TBOS Internet browser.  Figure 8:9 shows the certificate presented to 
the user that is preloaded into the TBOS Internet browser. 
 
FIGURE 8:9 CERTIFICATE SELECTION 
The certificate for the client identifies the client to the server and the V-Bank system 
automatically loads the user’s profile number into the system. Figure 8:10 shows the V-Bank 
login page.  The login page identified the user from the user’s certificate as profile 10000000. 
 
FIGURE 8:10 THE V-BANK LOGIN PAGE 
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All the pages from this point onwards in the V-Bank system is encrypted using TLS 1.2.  Figure 
8:11 displays a summary of the connection information displayed by the Opera browser on the 
TBOS.  It confirms the TLS 1.2 encryption protocol. 
 
FIGURE 8:11 SECURE CHANNEL USING TLS 1.2 ENCRYPTION 
The user now enters the random authentication code.  This means he has to type certain 
characters for the V-Bank password.  The random authentication code minimizes keylogger 
attacks on the system. 
2.2.4 Integrity check 
Once the user has typed the missing characters for his password, the system goes through the IC 
module.  The system does this quietly and cannot be discerned from the user interface.  The IC 
module confirms the browser and Java configuration of the TBOS and any other processes that 
have a connection open to the TBOS.  If there is an unauthorized process that has a connection 
open to the V-Bank system then the IC module will fail and the user will not be allowed access to 
the V-Bank system. 
Figure 8:12 shows how the screen will look if a connection is opened by an unauthorised 
configuration.  A message stating that access is denied because of wrong system configuration is 
displayed to the user. 
 
FIGURE 8:12 IC MODULE 
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2.2.5 Pay beneficiary 
After the client authenticated with the V-Bank system and the V-Bank system confirmed the 
integrity of the TBOS, then the use the system as a normal online banking system.  A special case 
is where the banking user pays a beneficiary. 
To ensure another layer of security the banking user signs beneficiary payment transactions 
using his private key.  This ensures non-repudiation and ensures that only the client can sign the 
transaction using his private key. 
Figure 8:13 is the beneficiary payment screen.  The banking user fills in the relevant detail and 
selects the beneficiary.   
 
FIGURE 8:13 USER GENERATES A PAYMENT TO A BENEFICIARY 
If the banking user is happy with the information entered on the page, he clicks on the Approve 
and Sign button.  The V-Bank system downloads and starts a Java applet that opens the private 
key for the user, uses the information in the banking transaction to generate a hash and signs 
the hash.  The process happens quietly without the user knowing that it is happening.  The 
password to open the private key is embedded in the Java applet and stored on the server. 
Once the banking transaction is signed the user is presented with the information in Figure 
8:14. 
 Page 167 of 207 
 
 V-Bank Prototype Analysis and Evaluation 
 
FIGURE 8:14 A LIST OF PAYMENTS 
The user can get a list of payments by manipulating the Date From and Date To fields.  The 
banking user can verify the signature on a payment by click on the Verify Signature link. 
If the signature on the payment transaction is verified the user is presented with a screen 
shown in Figure 8:15. 
 
FIGURE 8:15 VERIFIED SIGNATURE ON PAYMENT 
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2.2.6 Other banking activities 
The previous use cases for the banking user described the V-Bank prototype and the security 
features built into the prototype.  The prototype has also been extended to include some basic 
online banking functionality, but is not developed to be a full blown online banking system with 
all the possible features. 
The goal of the prototype is to test the security features and design requirement defined in the 
dissertation.  This section mentions the other functionality that was built into the prototype, but 
is not enhanced because it does not add value to the design requirements of the dissertation. 
The basic functionality includes: 
 The viewing of statements.  From the enquiries menu the banking user has the option to 
view a statement for one of his linked accounts.  The banking user can change the time 
period to display transactions. 
 Creating of beneficiaries.  Creating of beneficiaries has not been extended to include out 
of band authorisation by the banking user.  Creating of a beneficiary is a simple as 
providing the beneficiary name, bank account number and the description. 
 Changing of password.  The banking user can change his random authentication code 
password from the Admin menu. 
2.3 Attacker 
The previous sections described how the V-Bank prototype would be used without malicious 
intent.  In the research conducted by Guan, et al. (2012), five important banking service attacks 
are identified.  For each attack a use case is defined and discussed in context of the V-Bank 
prototype.  Figure 8:16 shows the use cases for the five important banking service attacks. 
Attacker
Phishing
Pharming
Malicious Software
Attacks
Man in the middle
Keylogger
 
FIGURE 8:16 USE CASES FOR ATTACKER 
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Each of these use cases are discussed next. 
2.3.1 Phishing 
In a phishing attack an attacker generates an e-mail with a URL in order to steal the user’s 
online banking credentials (Nilsson, et al., 2005). 
The V-Bank system is protected from phishing attacks because the V-Bank system is dependent 
on the banking user providing a certificate before authentication so that the V-Bank system can 
identify the user. 
The certificate is also only available in the TBOS this means that even if a fraudulent web site 
prompts the user for a certificate, the user will not be able to provide the certificate from his 
host operating system, from where he opened the link. 
The TBOS is also protected through a firewall to only allow connection to the V-Bank site, which 
means that the TBOS cannot provide the certificate information to any site other than the V-
Bank site. 
2.3.2 Pharming 
Pharming redirects user’s to phishing sites through DNS contamination (Li & Schmitz, 2009). 
The TBOS is protected from pharming attacks because of the firewall allowing network traffic 
only to and from the V-Bank server.  The TBOS also does not rely on external DNS to determine 
the IP address of the V-Bank server. 
If the host operating system is infected then the TBOS will still connect to the V-Bank system 
because of the TBOS independence of DNS. 
2.3.3 Man-in-the-middle 
With a man-in-the-middle attack, an attacker captures information sent from the client the 
online banking system, by intercepting and sending things on behalf of the user. 
Cheng, et al. (2010) mentions that two-way authentication is an effective method to prevent 
HTTPS hijacking.  The V-Bank system requires both the server and the client authenticates in 
the TLS 1.2 encrypted channel. 
2.3.4 Keylogger 
The V-Bank system was tested in the case of a keylogger in the TBOS and in the host operating 
system. 
The TBOS does not allow a keylogger to be installed.  The user does not have rights to install the 
keylogger, nor is it possible for the user to download anything to the TBOS. 
Figure 8:17 shows how the browser stops the user from navigating to any other site, other than 
the V-Bank site.  The firewall in the TBOS also stops any network attacks from connecting to the 
TBOS, potentially exploiting a vulnerability in the TBOS to install the keylogger. 
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FIGURE 8:17 SINGLE PURPOSE OPERATING SYSTEM 
In the case where the keylogger is either a hardware keylogger, or is installed on the host then 
the keylogger could capture different login information.  The first information that was 
recorded was the Linux username and password typed by the banking user.  The second set of 
information was the missing characters in the random authentication code. 
If we assume the attacker has this information then the attacker will still require the actual 
TBOS on the USB memory stick, before he can gain access to the user’s online banking system. 
2.3.5 Malicious Software Attacks 
Malicious software attacks can target the host operating system and the TBOS.  It has been 
shown that the TBOS is very well protected against malicious software attacks.  The first line of 
defence in the TBOS is the firewall that only allows connections to the V-Bank site.   
The second line of defence is the locked down interface and user rights.  Users cannot install 
new software in the TBOS, either accidentally, or maliciously.   Figure 8:18 shows that a user 
tried to access the hosts file on the local system through the user interface, but was denied 
access. 
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FIGURE 8:18 LOCKED DOWN INTERFACE 
The last line of defence is the persistent nature of the TBOS.  If for some reason the TBOS gets 
infected by malicious software, then the infection will be removed once the system is rebooted. 
It has also been shown that even if the host operating system is infected that it has little to no 
effect on the TBOS, because the TBOS is isolated from the host operating system. 
This section evaluated and demonstrated how the prototype works for the bank, banking user 
and in some attacks. 
The next section describes some general comments regarding the V-Bank system 
3 General comments 
The previous section described how the V-Bank system functions.  This section looks at the 
strengths and weaknesses that is identified.  The strengths is first mentioned and then the 
weaknesses. 
3.1 Strengths 
The following strengths were identified for the V-Bank prototype 
 IC System 
 Known TBOS configuration 
 Public \ Private key encryption 
 Firewalled communication channel 
 Virtual machine implementation 
Each of these strengths are discussed in the following sections 
 Page 172 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
3.1.1 IC System 
The bank can determine for each client that connects to the banking site whether the integrity of 
the client’s software modules is intact. 
3.1.2 Known TBOS configuration 
In the V-Bank prototype the bank is always aware of the exact configuration of the TBOS that 
connects to the server-side system.  The bank can determine how this configuration should look 
like and what software is part of the banking session when the user and system has been 
authenticated. 
The known configuration also gives banks full control of what can execute on the TBOS during a 
banking session.  This gives the banks flexibility to increase the configuration verification that 
runs on the V-Bank prototype. 
3.1.3 Public \ Private key encryption 
The secure communication channel utilises public\private key encryption.  The biggest 
advantage to this is that the user is identified using his private key and not an identifier that can 
be spoofed by an attacker. 
The public\private key encryption ensures that the access is controlled through “something the 
user has”, instead of just “something the user knows”.  Without physically having access to the 
V-Bank TBOS, which contains the user’s private key, an attacker cannot gain access to a user’s 
banking information. 
3.1.4 Firewalled communication channel 
The firewalled communication channel helps ensure that the TBOS connect only to the V-Bank 
server-side system.  This minimises the chances of a man-in-the-middle, or even man-in-the-
browser attacks. 
3.1.5 Virtual machine implementation 
The TBOS runs as a virtual machine, isolating and giving a level of protection to the system.  The 
TBOS can also be easily deployed, because it is a virtual machine and does not require very 
complex setup instructions. 
3.2 Weaknesses 
Now that some of the strengths of the system have been highlighted the weaknesses are 
discussed.  The weaknesses, as identified by the author are: 
 Software based private key 
 Update unfriendly 
 Static password 
 Administrative overhead 
 Less user friendly 
Each of these weaknesses are discussed in the following sections 
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3.2.1 Software based private key 
The user’s private key is embedded inside the key store of the TBOS browser.  This makes it 
possible for an attacker that gains access to the user’s TBOS and have the user’s or 
administrator’s password to export the user’s key and import it into his own browser. 
Once this has occurred, the attacker is able to gain access to the user’s banking information, 
provided that the attacker also has knowledge of the user’s password that is part of the random 
authentication code and has a copy of the approved TBOS configuration. 
3.2.2 Update unfriendly 
The persistent nature of the TBOS makes it difficult for the bank to update the system if new 
security patches have to be deployed to the client’s TBOS. 
3.2.3 Static password 
The persistent nature of the TBOS makes it impossible for the user to change his password for 
the TBOS.  Any password changes for the TBOS are lost when the TBOS have rebooted. 
If the bank also ships each TBOS with the same administrative password then an attacker that 
steals the password for the one administrator account can gain access to all the user’s TBOS 
systems. 
3.2.4 Administrative overhead 
Each banking customer must get a custom built TBOS.  This means that if the bank cannot 
automate the customisation required for each TBOS, it becomes too cumbersome and too 
expensive in human resources. 
Figure 8:19 shows the high-level steps required in the process of creating a TBOS for a client.  
The steps described in the yellow section are required for each customer.  The green areas are 
user independent and are the same for all of customers.  A system needs to be developed that 
can automate the steps and link them together to quickly and easily create a TBOS per customer.  
The creation of such an automation system is not part of this study. 
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FIGURE 8:19 THE HIGH LEVEL STEPS REQUIRED TO CREATE THE TBOS 
3.2.5 Less user friendly 
The V-Bank system requires that the user has some knowledge in working with the virtual 
machine software.  Users may feel negative towards the extra steps required to start the TBOS 
and the time it takes for the TBOS to start.  These feelings can increase if the user is used to only 
starting his Internet browser and then directly going into the banking system. 
In a commercial environment where banks compete for customer numbers, this may also cause 
customers to rather decide to use banks with solutions that may be easier to use. 
4 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrated how the V-Bank prototype works.  The system was evaluated from 
the perspective of the bank, the banking user and from an attacker. 
The V-Bank prototype can enhance the security of an online banking system.  Users will be able 
to use the system with a high degree of assurance that their online banking sessions are 
protected from attackers. 
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A number of items make the V-Bank system difficult to implement in a commercial 
environment.  If the system can be further developed to solve the weaknesses identified in the 
dissertation then the system has merit for commercial adoption. 
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Chapter 9: CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
1 Introduction 
This study looked at the problems that users and banks face when conducting banking on the 
Internet.  In this chapter we conclude the study that was defined in chapter 1. 
This chapter reviews the problem statement and looks at the defined hypothesis and state 
whether the hypothesis was true.  The chapter concludes with some areas that may require 
further research. 
The next section reviews the problem statement and tests the hypothesis. 
2 Problem statement and hypothesis 
In Chapter 1:2 it was argued that the problem that this study attempts to resolve is that banks 
cannot control what users load on their computers, nor can they control how users’ operating 
systems are configured.  Many users are not security conscious and do not know what effect a 
specific piece of software has on the overall security of their computer.  This all leads to an 
environment where the operating system environment of a normal desktop computer is in an 
unknown, potentially insecure state. 
This study hypothesises that it is possible for banks to create a virtualized computer that can be 
configured to be in a known state.  This known state can be evaluated and changed to conform 
to an accepted security configuration.  This virtual computer, with its security configuration, can 
be locked so that it cannot change.  The virtual computer can then be given to a banking user as 
an environment in which the user should do online banking, which should be more secure than 
their normal computer. 
This study has demonstrated that the hypothesis is true.  It is possible for a bank to create a 
virtualised computer that can be configured to be in a known state.  This known state can be 
evaluated and changed according to an accepted security configuration.  The virtual computer 
can be locked so that it cannot change.  The virtual computer can be loaded on a various media 
that can be given to a user that gives them an environment in which the user can do online 
banking, which is more secure than their own computer. 
3 Primary and Secondary Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is: 
 
Primary Objective: 
Develop a proof of concept system using 
virtualisation to increase the security of online 
banking from an end-user’s perspective 
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The first part of the objective is to develop a prototype that uses virtualisation.  Chapters 7 and 
8 showed how the prototype is designed and implemented.   
The second part of the objective states that the prototype must increase the security of online 
banking.  It was already argued in the problem statement that the typical computer of user can 
be an unsafe environment from which online banking is conducted.  Chapter 8 shows the design 
requirements and that the V-Bank system fulfils the design requirements. This makes the V-
Bank system a safer environment from which online banking can be conducted, thus fulfilling 
the primary objective. 
The secondary objectives and the fulfilling of the objectives of the study are: 
 Describe the security risks faced by online banking.  Chapter 2 described the risks 
inherent to online banking.  The risks were identified and from the risks an initial set of 
design requirements is formulated. 
 Describe information security mechanisms used in online banking environments.  
Chapter 3 evaluates the security mechanisms used in online banking.  The security 
mechanisms are evaluated using a case study and the design requirements for a safe 
online banking system are extended. 
 Describe the security controls included in an online banking system.  The existing 
security controls used in online banking are described in Chapter 3. 
 Identify the security advantages provided by virtual machines. Chapter 4 evaluates 
virtual machines and the security advantages provide by virtual machines.  Chapter 5 
expanded on this by investigating existing research where virtual machines are used to 
enhance the web experience. 
 Describe the architecture of an online banking system.  The architecture of the V-Bank 
prototype is described in Chapter 6. 
 Describe the isolation features that enhance the security of the online banking session. 
Chapter 4 described the isolation features of virtual machines.  The isolation features 
are used as design requirements and forms part of the V-Bank prototype architecture 
and design described in chapters 6 and 7. 
The dissertation fulfilled the primary objective and secondary objectives defined in Chapter 1. 
The next section describes the areas that may require further study. 
4 Areas for further study 
This section covers some of the areas that may require further study.  These areas were 
identified while doing research.  Some areas also need to be expanded to show potential 
solutions. 
The areas identified that may require further study are the following and discussed in the 
following sections: 
 Interdependencies on the host system 
 Software based private key  
 Update unfriendly 
 Static password 
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 Administrative overhead 
 Less user friendly  
4.1 Interdependencies of the host system 
Because the virtual machine monitor is installed inside the user’s operating system an attacker 
may be able to connect to the virtual machine through an unknown vulnerability in the host 
operating system or virtual machine monitor software.  To minimise this from happening is it 
recommended that virtual machine monitor software not execute as a hosted virtual machine 
and that the whole virtual machine should be isolated from the host operating system running 
on the same hardware. 
Figure 9:1 shows a potential solution where the virtual machine monitor software may have a 
secure mode.  This secure mode allows the virtual machine to have direct access to the system’s 
hyper visor.  Further to this the secure mode of the virtual machine software may have the 
ability to freeze the host operating system.  This stops any vulnerability that may exist in the 
host operating system to affect the guest operating system. 
Host Operating System
Physical hardware
Hyper Visor
Virtual Machine
 
FIGURE 9:1 EXCLUSE HARDWARE USE BY A VIRTUAL MACHINE 
4.2 Software based private key 
The private key for the user in the V-Bank TBOS is stored within the Internet, as well as on a 
password protected file on the TBOS.  An attacker that has physical access to the TBOS and has 
the password for the user may gain access to the user’s private key and thus copying it, or 
stealing it. 
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A solution should be found where the private key is not part of the browser, nor is it stored on a 
file.  The solution can even be a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) compliant 
solution. These solutions already exist in the form of smartcards. 
If the system can be implemented where the image of the TBOS is stored on a token that has a 
smartcard as part of the hardware, then the TBOS can read the user’s private key from the 
smartcard.  The security of the private key can then be further increased if the smartcard 
requires biometric unlocking. 
4.3 Update unfriendly 
The persistent nature of the V-Bank TBOS makes it difficult for a bank to update deployed 
systems.  The existing solution requires the bank to physically give the user a new image when 
the security configuration of the TBOS changes. 
The TBOS should be redesigned so that when banks require a change in the security 
configuration of a TBOS that it can be easily deployed.  The problem to try and overcome is that 
the image of the TBOS is persistent.  This means that it is difficult for the image to update itself. 
A potential solution for this requirement may be a second virtual machine whose role it is to 
update the TBOS.  This updater virtual machine is in a locked state and can only be unlocked 
using the bank’s private key. 
Figure 9:2 shows how the process for updating the TBOS may work.  It should be noted however 
that this solution may not be possible and requires study to determine if the process is secure 
and may not be exposed to other vulnerabilities. 
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Updater Virtual 
Machine
Trusted Banking 
Operating System
1. User connects to the server-side banking system.
2. The server-side system determines through the 
configuration check that the TBOS is out of date.
3. A process executes on the TBOS that verifies the 
configuration of the Updater Virtual Machine (UVM) 
and updates it if necessary and unlocks the UVM.
4. The TBOS shuts down and starts the UVM
5. The UVM connects to the server-side system through 
secure channels and updates the TBOS
6. The UVM shuts down and starts the TBOS.  Repeat 
from step 1
 
FIGURE 9:2 A MODEL FOR UPDATING THE TBOS 
4.4 Static password 
At the moment the password for the Linux user account cannot change because the image of the 
TBOS is persistent. 
Users should have the option to change their password when required.  A fully persistent 
system, cannot allow the user to change their password.  There may be two solutions to this 
problem: 
 The first solution is that the TBOS system has an area that is not persistent, that 
specifically hosts the user’s password. 
 The second solution may be that the TBOS does not use passwords at all, but protect the 
user’s private key through biometric access control. 
4.5 Administrative overhead 
The V-Bank prototype requires significant administration to generate a TBOS for a client.  This 
process should be automated and make it easy for a bank to generate the TBOS with the 
required hardware for a user. 
The automation system mentioned here requires further study  
 Page 182 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
4.6 Less user friendly 
At the moment the user are required to first start the virtual machine monitor software.  Once 
the virtual machine monitor software is running the user is required to start the TBOS.  Only 
after the TBOS is running can the user log into the V-Bank system. 
The amount of effort to start the environment may confuse users.  A commercial solution 
requires that the user should go through very few steps to start the online banking session.  The 
V-Bank system should be integrated into the virtual machine manager software so that a user 
does not even realise that the virtual machine manager software starts before the TBOS starts. 
This may be possible by adapting open source virtual machine manager software, like Oracle 
VirtualBox to integrate seamlessly into the TBOS. 
5 Conclusion 
This chapter concludes the study into the design and implementation of a safe online banking 
solution that uses virtualisation.  The chapter reviewed the problem that the solution addressed 
and determined whether the hypothesis that was stated in Chapter 1 was true. 
The primary and secondary objectives were evaluated and found that the research objectives 
were met.  The chapter also looked at areas for further study that resulted from the research. 
The research described in this dissertation, showed that online banking faces many risks.  Banks 
and consumers cannot always trust the state of their own computers, as it may be infected by 
malware. 
The V-Bank prototype looks at the banking environment as a combination of both the client-side 
trusted banking operating system (TBOS) and the server-side back end.  The V-Bank prototype 
does not try and solve the problem by just applying client-side controls, or just server-side 
controls.  Instead, it approaches the online banking system as an enterprise system which 
incorporates the client, network and server. 
Commercial banks can use the principles and architecture defined by the V-Bank prototype to 
increase the security of Internet banking. Further research and development can take the V-
Bank system into a commercially viable solution that can be adopted by banks. 
The V-Bank system has demonstrated that it is possible for banks to use virtualisation as an 
environment from where users can conduct online Banking. 
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Appendix A: Configuration settings for the V-Bank 
system 
This appendix lists some of the commands and steps that were used when creating the V-Bank 
TBOS configuration. 
1 High level steps to generate a TBOS client 
The high level steps required to create a TBOS client are as follow: 
1.) Install an Ubuntu desktop client as a virtual machine 
2.) Configure, install and remove software required for the TBOS 
3.) Use xxx to create a backup *.iso file from the existing installation 
4.) Use the steps in 12 to extract the iso and modify some of the settings in the ISO and 
repackage it. 
The rest of the appendix explains how to create the user accounts, install the JAVA runtime, 
configure the Opera browser, IPTables and package the TBOS client as in ISO.  It also shows 
some of the settings required to modify IIS 7.5 to accept TLS 1.2 connections. 
1 Create limited User Account 
From the original Ubuntu window manager the following steps create an account with limited 
rights in the operating system. 
System > Administration > Users and Groups 
From the User settings window select, Add User 
From the New User Account-window fill in the Basic Settings for your user 
Name: bankinguser 
Advanced Settings: 
User Privileges:  Ensure nothing is selected. 
This will give the user only user permissions on the system without any special privileges. 
2 Install Oracle Java Run-time 
Login as an account with root permissions and ensure that you have downloaded the Oracle 
Java JRE for Linux.  Go to the directory where the java runtime has been downloaded. 
Copy and extract the Java source files 
sudo -s cp –r jre-6u33-linux-i586.bin /opt/java 
cd /opt/java/ 
sudo -s chmod a+x jre-6u33-linux-i586.bin 
sudo ./jre-6u33-linux-i586.bin 
sudo gedit /etc/profile 
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Add the following lines to the profile file 
JAVA_HOME /opt/java/jre1.6.0_33 
PATH=$PATH:$HOME/bin:$JAVA_HOME/bin 
JRE_HOME= /opt/java/jre1.6.0_33 
PATH=$PATH:$HOME/bin:$JRE_HOME/bin 
export JAVA_HOME 
export JRE_HOME 
export PATH 
Save the profile file. 
sudo update-alternatives --install "/usr/bin/java" "java" 
"/opt/java/jre1.6.0_33/bin/java" 1 
sudo update-alternatives --install "/usr/bin/javaws" "javaws" 
"/opt/java/jre1.6.0_33/bin/javaws" 1 
sudo update-alternatives --set java /opt/java/jre1.6.0_33/bin/java 
sudo update-alternatives --set javaws /opt/java/jre1.6.0_33/bin/javaws 
Update the environment 
. /etc/profile 
Update the Opera browser Java plugin. 
cd /usr/lib/opera/plugins 
sudo ln –s /opt/java/jre1.6.0_33/lib/i386/libnpjp2.so 
3 Install and configure Opera browser 
3.1 Creat Opera URL Approve List 
cat > ~/urlfilter.ini << "EOF" 
[prefs] 
prioritize excludelist=0 
 
[include] 
file://localhost/usr/share/bankinghome/default.htm 
file://localhost/usr/share/bankinghome/* 
https://v-bank/banking/* 
*.class 
 
[exclude] 
* 
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http://help.opera.com/img/*=UUID:08FD5E80E9E511E084B8F1090A5DB689  
EOF 
 
sudo mv ~/urlfilter.ini /usr/share/bankinghome 
sudo chgrp root /usr/share/bankinghome/urlfilter.ini 
sudo chown root /usr/share/bankinghome/urlfilter.ini 
3.2 Install Opera Web Browser – Required for TLS 1.2 
Open existing Web Browser and go to: http://www.opera.com/browser/download/ 
Save file. 
Double click the *.deb file. 
Click on the Install button. 
Copy Required Certificates 
Copy the certificates folder to home directory 
sudo mv ~/certificates /home/bankinguser 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/certificates –R 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/certificates –R 
 
3.3 Configure Opera settings 
As the banking user: 
Open Opera browser 
In the address bar, type opera:config 
Bittorent client. (Remove the check box next to Enable) 
Network \ URL Filter file, Select  
Select Opera menu, Preferences, Advanced, Security. 
Click the Security Protocols button, unselect SSL 3 and TLS 1. Select only TLS 1.2 
Click on Manage Certificate button. 
On the Authorities tab, click Import  
Import the Naledi root certificate, as well as the user certificate. 
 Page 196 of 207 
 
 Using virtualisation to create a more secure online banking infrastructure 
4 Install Blackbox Window Manager 
sudo apt-get install blackbox blackbox-themes 
 
cat > .blackboxrc << "EOF" 
session.styleFile: /usr/share/blackbox/styles/Gray 
session.menuFile: /home/bankinguser/.blackbox/menu 
session.screen0.workspaces: 1 
session.screen0.workspaceNames: My Banking Screen 
session.fullMaximization: True 
EOF 
sudo mv .blackboxrc /home/bankinguser/.blackboxrc 
 
 
sudo mkdir /home/bankinguser/.blackbox 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackbox 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackboxrc 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackbox 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackboxrc 
 
4.1 Create Blackbox Menu 
cat > menu << "EOF" 
[begin] (Blackbox) 
[exec] (Opera) { opera –kioskmode -kioskbuttons –nocontextmenu –nodownload 
–nokeys –nomail –nomaillinks –nomenu –nosave -resetonexit } 
[end] 
EOF 
sudo mv menu /home/bankinguser/.blackbox/menu 
 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackbox/menu 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.blackbox/menu 
 
 
{opera -nocontextmenu -nodownload -nokeys -nomail -nomaillinks -nomenu -
nosave –resetonexit } 
5 Install iDesk 
sudo apt-get install idesk 
 
cat > .ideskrc << "EOF" 
table Config 
Background.Color: #C2CCFF 
end 
table Actions 
Execute[0]: left singleClk 
end 
EOF 
sudo mv .ideskrc /home/bankinguser/.ideskrc 
 
sudo mkdir /home/bankinguser/.idesktop 
sudo cp /usr/share/pixmaps/firefox.png 
/home/bankinguser/.idesktop/touchicon.png 
 
cat > touchicon.lnk << "EOF" 
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table Icon 
Caption: Opera 
ToolTip.Caption: Double click me to launch 
Command: opera –kioskmode –nocontextmenu –nodownload –nokeys –nomail –
nomaillinks –nomenu –nosave -resetonexit 
Icon: /home/bankinguser/.idesktop/touchicon.png 
Width: 100 
Height: 100 
X: 100 
Y: 100 
end 
EOF 
sudo mv touchicon.lnk /home/bankinguser/.idesktop/touchicon.lnk 
 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.ideskrc 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.idesktop 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.ideskrc 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.idesktop 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.idesktop/touchicon.lnk 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.idesktop/touchicon.lnk 
 
5.1 Create Startup script 
cat > .bbstartup.sh << "EOF" 
#!/bin/sh 
idesk & 
exec blackbox 
EOF 
sudo mv .bbstartup.sh /home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
 
 
sudo chgrp bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
sudo chown bankinguser /home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
sudo chmod +x /home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
 
sudo cp /usr/share/xsessions/blackbox.desktop 
/usr/share/xsessions/blackbox.desktop_backup 
 
cat > blackbox.desktop << "EOF" 
[Desktop Entry] 
Encoding=UTF-8 
Name=BlackBox 
Comment=Highly configurable and low resource X11 Window manager 
Exec=/home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
Terminal=False 
TryExec=/home/bankinguser/.bbstartup.sh 
Type=Application 
EOF 
sudo mv blackbox.desktop /usr/share/xsessions/blackbox.desktop 
 
Change user profile desktop 
Open the Login Window Preferences by selecting: 
System > Administration > Login Window 
Under the General tab select 'Blackbox' for default session. 
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sudo /usr/lib/lightdm/lightdm-set-defaults -s blackbox 
6 Use GDM Login Manager 
sudo dpkg-reconfigure gdm 
7 Remove sessions apart from blackbox 
Rename all *.desktop file under /usr/share/xsession to *.desktop_backup 
 
8 Remove a list of user accounts from login screen 
To “hide” the first configuration user account, do the following: 
gdm gconftool-2 --type bool --set /apps/gdm/simple-
greeter/disable_user_list 'true' 
9 Give banking user permissions to shutdown computer 
sudo 
The program sudo allows normal users to execute certain root-only commands.  
Which users are authorized to run which commands is specified in the 
/etc/sudoers file.  
This should only be edited with the command visudo. 
 
For example, suppose I wanted to add a group of users who are allowed to 
shut down the machine.  
So I first want to add a group called "shutdown" (run these commands while 
root) 
 
groupadd shutdown 
 
Then I need to edit the /etc/group file to add users to the "shutdown" 
group.  
I just tack the usernames at the end of the shutdown line, separated by 
commas, e.g. 
 
shutdown:x:407:user1,user2,... 
 
Whatever users I put there will be able to shut down the computer (so 
choose wisely).  
Now I need to configure sudo to allow members of the "shutdown" group to 
actually  
invoke the assorted shutdown commands provided in linux. Run visudo and add  
the following lines 
 
%shutdown ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /sbin/reboot 
%shutdown ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /sbin/halt 
%shutdown ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /sbin/shutdown 
 
This allows the "shutdown" group to run /sbin/reboot, /sbin/halt, and 
/sbin/shutdown  
AS IF THEY WERE ROOT 
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Add the following to the blackbox/menu 
sudo /sbin/shutdown -h now 
 
10 Create a banking application web page. 
Create a default.htm file, with hyperlinks to the various banks to where the user needs to 
connect to. 
Sudo mkdir /usr/share/bankinghome 
Sudo cp *.htm /usr/share/bankinghome 
Change the Opera home page to file:///usr/share/bankinghome/default.htm 
11 Configure iptables in Ubuntu 
The IP address 192.168.209.1 in the rule set below is the IP address of the V-Bank server.  
Change this IP address to the actual IP address of the server 
sudo cat > ~/iptables.rules 
# Generated by iptables-save v1.4.10 on Tue Jun 28 21:46:16 2011 
*filter 
:INPUT DROP [0:0] 
:FORWARD DROP [0:0] 
:OUTPUT DROP [0:0] 
-A INPUT -d 255.255.255.255/32 -i eth0 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -d 192.168.255.255/32 -i eth0 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -d 192.168.1.255/32 -i eth0 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -d 169.254.0.0/16 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -m recent --rcheck --seconds 60 --name DEFAULT --rsource -m limit 
--limit 10/sec -j LOG --log-prefix "BG "  
-A INPUT -m recent --update --seconds 60 --name DEFAULT --rsource -j DROP  
-A INPUT -s 192.168.32.128/32 -i eth0 -m recent --set --name DEFAULT --
rsource -j DROP  
-A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -m multiport --dports 53,113,135,137,139,445 -j 
DROP  
-A INPUT -i eth0 -p udp -m multiport --dports 53,113,135,137,139,445 -j 
DROP  
-A INPUT -i eth0 -p udp -m udp --dport 1026 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -i eth0 -p tcp -m multiport --dports 1433,4899 -j DROP  
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT  
-A INPUT -p icmp -m limit --limit 10/sec -j ACCEPT  
-A INPUT -p icmp -j DROP  
-A INPUT -p udp -m udp --sport 53 -m state --state ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT  
-A INPUT -p tcp -m state --state RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT  
-A INPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "IN "  
-A INPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable  
-A FORWARD -j LOG --log-prefix "FW "  
-A FORWARD -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable  
-A OUTPUT -o lo -j ACCEPT  
-A OUTPUT -d 192.168.209.1/32 -p tcp -m state --state 
NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 80 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -d 192.168.209.1/32 -o eth0 -p tcp -m state --state 
NEW,RELATED,ESTABLISHED -m tcp --sport 1024:65535 --dport 443 -j ACCEPT 
-A OUTPUT -j LOG --log-prefix "OU "  
-A OUTPUT -j REJECT --reject-with icmp-port-unreachable  
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COMMIT 
# Completed on Tue Jun 28 21:46:16 2011 
EOF 
Create a restore file as well. 
sudo cat > ~/iptables.restore 
# These lines are here in case rules are already in place and the script is 
ever rerun on the fly. 
# We want to remove all rules and pre-exisiting user defined chains and 
zero the counters 
# before we implement new rules. 
iptables -F 
iptables -X 
iptables -Z 
 
# Set up a default DROP policy for the built-in chains. 
# If we modify and re-run the script mid-session then (because we have a 
default DROP 
# policy), what happens is that there is a small time period when packets 
are denied until 
# the new rules are back in place. There is no period, however small, when 
packets we 
# don't want are allowed. 
iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT 
iptables -P FORWARD ACCEPT 
iptables -P OUTPUT ACCEPT 
EOF 
 
chmod +x ~/iptables.restore 
 
Apply the iptables rules by doing the following: 
sudo iptables-restore < ~/iptables.rules 
 
Reset the iptables rules to defaults by doing the following: 
sudo ./iptables.restore 
12 Create the TBOS Ubuntu client 
12.1 Obtain the base system 
Download an official Desktop CD from http://releases.ubuntu.com/  
Note: the example shown here uses the ubuntu-9.04-desktop-i386.iso Desktop CD 
12.2 Move or copy it into an empty directory  
mkdir ~/livecdtmp 
mv image.iso ~/livecdtmp 
cd ~/livecdtmp 
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12.3 Extract the CD .iso contents 
12.3.1 Mount the Desktop .iso 
mkdir mnt 
sudo mount -o loop image.iso mnt 
12.3.2 Extract .iso contents into dir 'extract-cd' 
mkdir extract-cd 
rsync --exclude=/casper/filesystem.squashfs -a mnt/ extract-cd 
12.4 Extract the Desktop system 
12.4.1 Extract the SquashFS filesystem 
sudo unsquashfs mnt/casper/filesystem.squashfs 
sudo mv squashfs-root edit 
 
12.4.2 Prepare and chroot 
If you need the network connection within chroot 
sudo cp /etc/resolv.conf edit/etc/ 
 
Depending on your configuration, you may also need to copy the hosts file 
 
sudo cp /etc/hosts edit/etc/ 
 
sudo mount --bind /dev/ edit/dev 
sudo chroot edit 
mount -t proc none /proc 
mount -t sysfs none /sys 
mount -t devpts none /dev/pts 
(these mount important directories of your host system - if you later decide to delete the edit/ 
directory, then make sure to unmount before doing so, otherwise your host system will become 
unusable at least temporarily until reboot) 
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To avoid locale issues and in order to import GPG keys 
export HOME=/root 
export LC_ALL=C 
12.5 Customizations 
12.5.1 Apt-get 
sudo apt-get install sun-java6-jre sun-java6-plugin sun-java6-fonts 
12.5.2 Prerequisites 
In 9.10, before installing or upgrading packages you need to run 
dbus-uuidgen > /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 
and 
dpkg-divert --local --rename --add /sbin/initctl 
ln -s /bin/true /sbin/initctl 
12.5.3 Install Trusted Root Certificates 
Get the libnss3-tools 
sudo apt-get install libnss3-tools 
wget -O cacert-root.crt "http://www.cacert.org/certs/root.crt" 
wget -O cacert-class3.crt "http://www.cacert.org/certs/class3.crt" 
certutil -d .mozilla/firefox/zpigy3el.default/ -A -t "TC,C,C" -n 
"CAcert.org Class 3" -i cacert-class3.crt 
certutil -d .mozilla/firefox/zpigy3el.default/ -A -t "TC,C,C" -n 
"CAcert.org" -i cacert-root.crt 
You may also need to import the user’s certificate that contains the private key into the firefox 
database. 
Copy the “Private_Key_Cert.pfx” to the banking user’s home directory. Note: This certificate 
would have to have been generated by a certificate authority like CACert. 
Ubuntu openssl doesn’t seem to like the “_” character in the filename. So for rename the 
filename using the following command” 
Mv Private_Key_Cert.pfx cert.pfx 
Now you can use the pk12util to import the pfx file 
pk12util -i cert.pfx -d .mozilla/firefox/zpigy3el.default/ -n "Banking 
User" 
 Page 203 of 207 
 
 Appendix A: Configuration settings for the V-Bank System 
12.6 Advanced Customizations 
12.6.1 Live CD Kernel 
If you want to customize further the boot process, you can change the livecd kernel, by copying 
the vmlinuz and initrd you want in place of the ones you find in extract-cd/casper. 
i.e. 
sudo cp edit/boot/vmlinuz-2.6.15-26-k7 extract-cd/casper/vmlinuz 
sudo cp edit/boot/initrd.img-2.6.15-26-k7 extract-cd/casper/initrd.gz 
Note that the initial ramdisk filename for newer releases (since 9.10) is casper/initrd.lz 
(not .gz). 
12.6.2 Removing the (Casper) Autologin 
The autologin feature of the Jaunty/9.04 live CD is a bit of an on-the-fly boot-hack. After 
extracting the initrd.gz, you need to edit the casper-bottom/25configure_init script and then 
recreate the initrd.gz file, replacing the original in extract-cd/casper. The process to do so goes 
like this: 
cd extract-cd/casper 
mkdir tempdir 
cd tempdir 
gunzip -dc ../initrd.gz | cpio -imvd --no-absolute-filenames 
cp scripts/casper-bottom/25configure_init scripts/casper-
bottom/25configure_init.orig 
vi scripts/casper-bottom/25configure_init 
Now look for line 25 which has the conditional statement to test $USERNAME. 
Line 25 performs a conditional evaluation and if it evaluates to true, it will execute the code 
within the if block. The if block contains code to modify files used in the boot process to create 
the live cd autologin. 
To disable the autologin feature, Remove $USERNAME, but just leave the quotes. The -n 
modifier tests the $USERNAME string to see if it's length is non-zero. By removing the variable, 
and leaving two double quotes, this statement evaluates to false because the two double quotes 
effectively make a zero-byte string. Be sure to leave no whitespace between the quotes because 
whitespace will make the evaluation true and execution wil fall into the if block. 
21:log_begin_msg "$DESCRIPTION" 
22: 
23:# Arrange for shells on virtual consoles, rather than login prompts 
24: 
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25:if [ -n "$USERNAME" ]; then 
After making the change, line 25 will look like this: 
25:if [ -n "" ]; then 
Save the file and quit the editor. 
There are also some other settings which may be changed at this stage.  Some of the startup 
scripts set the hostname.  For the v-Bank system the hostname was changed to “TBOS”. 
Another setting that was changed in here was the script that generates the hosts file, which will 
normally be stored under /etc/hosts.  The hosts file has been edited to include the hostname for 
the v-bank server-side system, with the IP address of the server. 
Some of the scripts in here also needs to be updated so that the v-Bank TBOS does not ask for 
the “installation media” to be removed from the CD-ROM. 
12.6.3 Boot init 
You have to edit the files in edit/usr/share/initramfs-tools/scripts/casper-bottom/* For 
example you can change the hostname or the livecd user. 
You can use this method to edit the default hosts file that recides under /etc/hosts after the 
system has started. 
i.e. 
sudo nano edit/usr/share/initramfs-tools/scripts/casper 
and edit the username or hostname 
sudo nano edit/usr/share/initramfs-tools/scripts/casper-bottom/10adduser 
to edit even the livecd user's password. 
If you're customizing 10.04, you need to edit variables in /etc/casper.conf for the user and host 
names instead of modifying the scripts 
P.S. in order to obtain an encrypted password, you have to use the mkpasswd program that's 
shipped with whois package! 
Then, from extract-cd/casper/tempdir run the following command to re-create the initrd.gz file. 
There are other methods for re-creating the initrd.gz file on this page which may work also: 
cp ../initrd.gz ../initrd.gz.orig 
find . | cpio -o -H newc | gzip -9 > ../initrd.gz 
This will create a new initrd.gz file with no auto login. You can then continue to remaster the CD 
as described on this page. Be sure to create a user and password to login with before you 
remaster the cd. If you do not, you will not be able to login after booting! 
12.7 Cleanup 
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Be sure to remove any temporary files which are no longer needed, as space on a CD is limited. 
A classic example is downloaded package files, which can be cleaned out using: 
aptitude clean 
Or delete temporary files 
rm -rf /tmp/* ~/.bash_history 
Or delete hosts file 
rm /etc/hosts 
Or nameserver settings 
rm /etc/resolv.conf 
If you installed software, be sure to run 
rm /var/lib/dbus/machine-id 
and 
rm /sbin/initctl 
dpkg-divert --rename --remove /sbin/initctl 
from within the chroot environment. 
now umount (unmount) special filesystems and exit chroot 
umount /proc || umount -lf /proc 
umount /sys 
umount /dev/pts 
exit 
sudo umount edit/dev 
    Note: if "umount /proc" command fails, "umount -lf /proc" will be used to retry automatically. 
12.8 Producing the CD image 
The following steps show how to recreate the CD image from the temporary extracted CD files. 
12.8.1 Regenerate manifest 
sudo chmod +w extract-cd/casper/filesystem.manifest 
sudo chroot edit dpkg-query -W --showformat='${Package} ${Version}\n' > 
extract-cd/casper/filesystem.manifest 
sudo cp extract-cd/casper/filesystem.manifest extract-
cd/casper/filesystem.manifest-desktop 
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sudo sed -i '/ubiquity/d' extract-cd/casper/filesystem.manifest-desktop 
sudo sed -i '/casper/d' extract-cd/casper/filesystem.manifest-desktop 
12.8.2 Compress filesystem 
For slightly higher compression at the cost of compression time, you can increase the block size: 
sudo rm extract-cd/casper/filesystem.squashfs 
sudo mksquashfs edit extract-cd/casper/filesystem.squashfs -b 1048576 
Update the filesystem.size file, which is needed by the installer: 
printf $(sudo du -sx --block-size=1 edit | cut -f1) > extract-
cd/casper/filesystem.size 
12.8.3 Remove old md5sum.txt and calculate new md5 sums 
cd extract-cd 
sudo rm md5sum.txt 
find -type f -print0 | sudo xargs -0 md5sum | grep -v isolinux/boot.cat 
| sudo tee md5sum.txt 
12.8.4 Create the ISO image 
sudo mkisofs -D -r -V "v-bank live cd" -cache-inodes -J -l -b 
isolinux/isolinux.bin -c isolinux/boot.cat -no-emul-boot -boot-load-size 
4 -boot-info-table -o ../image1.iso . 
12.9 Enable TLS 1.2 in IIS 
# Enables TLS 1.2 on Windows Server 2008 R2 and Windows 7 
# June 27, 2010 
# Version 1.2 
# These keys do not exist so they need to be created prior to setting 
values. 
 
md 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2" 
md 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Server" 
md 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Client" 
 
# Enable TLS 1.2 for client and server SCHANNEL communications 
 
new-itemproperty -path 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Server" -name "Enabled" -value 1 -PropertyType "DWord" 
new-itemproperty -path 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Server" -name "DisabledByDefault" -value 0 -PropertyType "DWord" 
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new-itemproperty -path 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Client" -name "Enabled" -value 1 -PropertyType "DWord" 
new-itemproperty -path 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\TLS 1.2\Client" -name "DisabledByDefault" -value 0 -PropertyType "DWord" 
 
# Disable SSL 2.0 (PCI Compliance) 
md 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\SSL 2.0\Server" 
new-itemproperty -path 
"HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\SCHANNEL\Protocol
s\SSL 2.0\Server" -name Enabled -value 0 -PropertyType "DWord" 
